Foro Militar General

Según wikipedia, si existió un BAP Rímac hundido,...pero -¡Tranquilo Cartaphilus!- se hundió en 1855 y era un barco de vapor no un submarino (bueno de que se sumergió se sumergió, pero nunca realizó el proceso inverso y aun está en el fondo del mar)...

Atte.

GMSA.

PS: Mmm...así se crean los mitos, de medias verdades: Un BAP Rímac hundido y un zafarrancho de combate antisubmarino en Valparaíso (en donde, aparte de una mortandad de peces, no se consiguió cosa alguna).

Claro, todo el mundo conoce al Rímac del ochocientos. Es historia naval empírica y contrastada.

El problema surge cuando alguien pretende sentar cátedra sobre algo de lo que no tiene ni pajolera idea. Porque plantarse aquí hablando de un submarino llamado Rímac, es indicio de ignorar hasta límites vertiginosos la historia naval peruana. Como dije, Perú ha tenido a lo largo de estas décadas, 18 submarinos. Cualquier persona que mínimamente conozca el tema podría recitar sus nombres de memoria, y constatar que nunca hubo un Rímac.

Ahí está la cosa. Cualquier persona que mínimamente conozca el tema. Pero el amigo MX78 no lo conoce ni de lejos. O sea, que una de dos: o pretende disertar sobre un tema desde la más profunda ignorancia, o es un troll intoxicador y desinformador.

Ambas opciones delatan una participación igualmente perniciosa y que ausaría, cuando poco, rubor y vergüenza (propia y ajena).

Estimado Cartaphilus:

Ahora, haciendo memoria, en esos años sí había un BAP Rímac. Era un transporte qu sirvió desde la década de los 20s. Sin embargo, tengo dudas serias en que un analista militar lo pueda haber confundido con un U-boat (bueno, según la RN, gunther Prien confundió al Pegasus con el Repulse ).
saludos cordiales.

PS: Editado. El transporte ex-alemán era el BAP Callao.

GMSA escribió:Según wikipedia, si existió un BAP Rímac hundido,...pero -¡Tranquilo Cartaphilus!- se hundió en 1855 y era un barco de vapor no un submarino (bueno de que se sumergió se sumergió, pero nunca realizó el proceso inverso y aun está en el fondo del mar)...

Atte.

GMSA.

PS: Mmm...así se crean los mitos, de medias verdades: Un BAP Rímac hundido y un zafarrancho de combate antisubmarino en Valparaíso (en donde, aparte de una mortandad de peces, no se consiguió cosa alguna).

Cuando los paises dan de baja a sus naves... despues compran otras y estas siguen con los mismos nombres. Algunas veces el nombre desaparece por tiempo y despues vuelve denuevo... como en el caso del RIMAC. Y conste!!! De que hasta el JANE's lo dice... por lo tanto, se puede apreciar de que NO es un cuento mio.

El O'HIGGINS, por ejemplo... este nombre siempre seguira, ya hubo un destructor, y ahora un submarino. El CARRERA, es otro ejemplo! o como lo es para el PERU... "GRAU", otro nombre que no desaparece de sus unidades.

Asi... como se puede apreciar, y hasta JANE's lo dice... hubo un RIMAC (submarino) en el PERU.

Saludos,

Cartaphilus escribió:Claro, todo el mundo conoce al Rímac del ochocientos. Es historia naval empírica y contrastada.

El problema surge cuando alguien pretende sentar cátedra sobre algo de lo que no tiene ni pajolera idea. Porque plantarse aquí hablando de un submarino llamado Rímac, es indicio de ignorar hasta límites vertiginosos la historia naval peruana. Como dije, Perú ha tenido a lo largo de estas décadas, 18 submarinos. Cualquier persona que mínimamente conozca el tema podría recitar sus nombres de memoria, y constatar que nunca hubo un Rímac.

Ahí está la cosa. Cualquier persona que mínimamente conozca el tema. Pero el amigo MX78 no lo conoce ni de lejos. O sea, que una de dos: o pretende disertar sobre un tema desde la más profunda ignorancia, o es un troll intoxicador y desinformador.

Ambas opciones delatan una participación igualmente perniciosa y que ausaría, cuando poco, rubor y vergüenza (propia y ajena).

Espero que haya visto los links que le deje... para que pueda conocer el armamento o mejor dicho... el poderio que tenia el PERU... ahi se conoce a submarinos y los que han sido dados de baja... ademas, de naves de guerra que fueron dados de baja tambien... sin olvidar lo que todavia tienen... Lo unico que no sale en el link es sobre las nuevas adquisiciones que hicieron ultimamente y la noticia del GRAU.

Saludos,

MX78 escribió:
Asi... como se puede apreciar, y hasta JANE's lo dice... hubo un RIMAC (submarino) en el PERU.

Saludos,

Lo dicho. O un troll, o uno de los mayores ignorantes que circulan a día de hoy por la red. En realidad, un troll ignorante.

A ver, corazón: ¿puedes aportar las características, año de entrada en servicio y lugar de construcción del "submarino Rímac"?


PD. En cada mensaje tuyo caes más bajo y haces más el ridículo.

PPD. No necesito ver ningún vídeo para recitarte de memoria los 18 submarinos en servicio en la MGP a lo largo de su historio. ¿Conoces tú esos submarinos, troll intoxicador?

Para culturizar al cenutrio lamelibránquido, intoxicador y trollero, repasemos la historia de los sumergibles peruanos, para ver si el famoso Rímac existió.

1. Primeros sumergibles (fabricados en Francia, los primeros de Iberoamérica)

- Ferré.
- Palacios.

2. Época de entreguerras (estadounidenses bajo llave, conocidos como serie R).

- Casma
- Pachocha
- Islay
- Arica

3. Posguerra (estadounidenses bajo llave, modificaciones de la clase Mackerel, conocidos en Perú como serie S o Sierra. Inicialmente llevaron nombres de fauna marina).

- Abtao
- Angamos
- Dos de Mayo
- Iquique

4. Ayuda americana (conversiones GUPPY de Balaos ex-estadounidenses)

- Pacocha
- La Pedrera
- Hay que sumar una tercera unidad vendida como fuente de repuestos, y nunca dada de alta en la MGP ni bautizada.

5. Submarinos alemanes (U-209 en sus variantes 1100 y 1200).

- Islay
- Arica
- Casma
- Antofagasta
- Pisagua
- Chipana



Y ahí se acaba la cosa.

El lamelibránquido afirmó que en Perú prestó servicio un submarino llamado Rímac. Eso sí, es incapaz de aportar ninguna fecha, característica o dato del mismo. No sé si el lamelibránquido es tan sumamente ignorante que desconoce una simple lista de 18 submarinos, o es tan sumamente impresentable que intoxica el foro con información falsa y con mentiras reiteradas. Lo cierto es que ambas opciones no hacen sino reflejar a un forista impresentable que, cada vez que escribe algo, queda a la altura del betún. No se puede esperar otra cosa de un tipo que suelta perlas como eso de que Chile compró en 1978 100 Hunters a "un país de Asia", o que en Chile se fabricó este modelo de avión, y otras tantas sandeces más.

Y es que todos somos esclavos de nuestras palabras, y dueños de nuestros silencios...


PD. Sigo esperando que nos expliques cuál de los 17 submarinos chilenos zarpó hacia el Callao y no regresó, y cuál volvió gravemente averiado.

Amigos para dejar tranquilos a moros y cristianos; el SS Pacocha fue hundido por un pesquero japones.

Exijo una verdadera explicacion de como sucedio eso.(jejeje)

Porque de lo contrario en una verdadera confrontacion los SS peruanos, estarian en graves problemas.

Saludos.

Estimado Julio Antonio:

Espero que este resumen de Wikipedia te pueda servir, para facilitarle la lectura, te lo presento en tu cuasi lengua materna.

_____________________________________________________________

Formerly USS Atule (SS-403), a Balao-class submarine with a GUPPY IA upgrade, she had been sold to Peru and commissioned on 28 May 1974.

At 18:50 in the evening of 26 August 1988, Pacocha was transiting on the surface with the forward torpedo room and bridge hatches as well as the main induction valve open. Forty-nine men were aboard, including the Squadron Commander, to conduct an operational readiness inspection.

About half an hour after sunset, ten minutes from Pachocha’s expected arrival at the port of Callao, the 412 ton Japanese fishing trawler Kiowa Maru (also spelled Kyowa Maru and Hyowa Maru) rammed her in the after port quarter. Kiowa Maru was equipped with an ice-breaker bow, with a sub-surface protrusion designed to penetrate and break apart what it struck. Pacocha sank quickly.

Four men died immediately in the collision and sinking: her commanding officer, Capitán de Fragata Daniel Nieva Rodríguez, died securing the bridge access hatch; Teniente Segundo Luis Roca Sara and two enlisted men were trapped in flooded compartments and drowned. Twenty-three of her crew succeeded in abandoning ship.

In the sinking submarine, Teniente Roger Cotrina Alvarado secured the forward torpedo room watertight door. He then tried to secure the forward torpedo room hatch, but it was jammed by a sailor whose leg had been caught as the hatch fell shut. As Pacocha began to sink, water rushing in the forward hatch washed Cotrina down the ladder.

Pacocha had assumed a 40 degree up-angle, and lifting the hatch required enormous strength. Nonetheless, Cotrina climbed back to the hatch, freed the sailor, and shut and dogged the hatch. Less than five minutes after the collision, Pachoca settled on the bottom. Survivors aboard her noted her keel depth to be 140 feet (43 m) with a 9 degree up angle.

At 20:02, with Pachoca an hour overdue, the Peruvian Navy declared an emergency. Boats were dispatched to search along Pacocha’s route. The tug Jennifer II was sent to rendezvous with Kiowa Maru and investigate. Some twenty minutes later, Contralmirante Guillermo Tirado, Commander of the Submarine Flotilla, arrived at the Callao Naval Base, assumed command, and dispatched the submarine BAP Dos de Mayo (SS-41) to search.

At 20:30, the survivors trapped in Pacocha released their messenger buoy and attempted to call aft compartments on the sound-powered telephone. There was no response.

By 21:00, the crew of Jennifer II had confirmed that Kiowa Maru had collided with something, and radioed their report to the base. While that report was in progress, the survivors in Pacocha fired a red distress flare. The Navy immediately issued a call for rescue and salvage divers to report for duty. Rescue of the survivors on the surface began at once, and within an hour and a half, twenty survivors and three bodies were drawn from the water. Three enlisted men had died of hypothermia during the four hours they had spent in the 14 °C (57 °F) water.

Meanwhile, 22 survivors mustered in Pacocha’s forward torpedo room: four officers, four chiefs, and fourteen junior enlisted personnel. The senior officer transpired to be Cotrina. At 21:20 they fired another flare that led searchers to the messenger buoy at 21:31. Messenger buoys on Balao-class submarines do not have telephones, so communication could not be established, but those on the surface did realize that the buoy and flares probably meant that someone was still alive. The survivors held training in the use of the Steinke hood, with which most crewmen were unfamiliar. (The Peruvian Navy, like the United States Navy, had stopped in-water escape training from depth several years previously.)

At 22:50, the smell of chlorine gas in main control prompted another assessment of the boat's condition. A vent valve was found that had not been tightly shut, and more water had seeped into the aft battery compartment. All lithium hydroxide canisters were brought forward, and the survivors sealed themselves in the forward torpedo room. By 23:30, two canisters of lithium hydroxide were opened and spread. The crew was put to bed.

By midnight on Saturday, 27 August 1988, all twenty survivors and three bodies had been brought ashore. Survivors were taken to the nearby Naval Hospital. Although all suffered from hypothermia, none had significant injuries. At the scene, an assortment of vessels were on the surface including the submarine, Dos de Mayo, a torpedo retriever, a floating crane, and several small craft.

Locating divers during their off-duty hours was hampered by the lack of telephones in many of their homes, but by midnight, eight were at the scene in SCUBA gear. Depth to the deck of the ship was between 125 feet (38 m) aft and 110 feet (34 m) forward, with the ship variably reported as having between a nine and fifteen degree up-angle. The first team of divers followed the messenger buoy's line, which had played out to a significant distance. Since it was not located directly over Pacocha, a second line was tended straight down to the sail. The divers tapped on the hull and received a response from the forward compartment of the boat. However, they were unfamiliar with the code used, so were unable to interpret the tapping.

At 00:40, Contralmirante Tirado called Captain Schillingsburg, the United States Defense Attaché, to request rescue assistance from the United States Navy.

By 01:00 the survivors had sent messages to the rescuers that they should be able to hold out for 48 hours. By 0200, three volunteers in Pacocha had donned oxygen breathing apparatuses (OBAs) and walked through compartments as far aft as main control. The aft battery compartment had water over the deck, so it was not entered. Meanwhile, personnel ashore including several divers studied the salvage air connections on BAP La Pedrera (SS-49) (the former USS Sea Poacher (SS-406), also a GUPPY IA Balao-class submarine) and discovered that they did not have appropriate salvage air hoses or fittings. Ultimately, Mark V diving system umbilicals were used with fittings manufactured during the night on two frigates. (Mark V diving hoses are negatively buoyant, ½-inch inner diameter, 600 psig (4.2 MPa) pressure rated hoses, MIL-H-2815.)

After two frustrating hours, improved communications with Pacocha were finally established at 02:27 using the signal ejector to pass written notes to the divers. Word was received at 0350 and passed to the survivors that the United States Navy was sending its rescue system. However, over the next few hours the estimated time of arrival of the rescue system shifted steadily later.

Having had no communication from the surface for nearly two hours and unaware that there were currently no divers available, Pacocha fired another flare at 04:20. Yellow was picked so as not to give the impression that something new was seriously wrong—they only wanted to express concern that they had not heard anything in a couple of hours. However, at 04:40 a small electrical short and fire broke out in main control. It was brief and self-extinguishing, but renewed concern for the survivors' atmosphere. Only carbon dioxide extinguishers were available for fire-fighting.

A new group of divers arrived on scene at about 05:00 after reviewing salvage connections, escape trunk configuration, and other details on La Pedrera. Shortly after the divers went to work, they recovered the body of Pacocha’s Commanding Officer, Capitán de Fragata Nieva, just inside the deck access door to the sail.

At 06:00 the survivors held reveille and prepared breakfast. Utilizing the signal ejector, communication was passed that the crew was in good spirits with enough air to last for seventy-eight hours based on calculations of available oxygen and lithium hydroxide. They also had adequate supplies of water, but no food after eating what little they had, including cake, for breakfast. While inspecting the submarine, the survivors noted a heavy black cloud rising from below the deck in the forward battery compartment. No one entered this compartment again. Two more canisters of lithium hydroxide were opened and spread on the upper bunks. Later in the morning another four canisters were opened. Approximately twenty canisters were unopened. One eight cubic foot (230 L) oxygen cylinder was bled into the compartment; three oxygen cylinders were left unused.

Information on the use of the escape trunk and the Steinke hood was passed from the surface. The crew was divided into five groups and one member from each group trained in the operation of the escape trunk. Groups were arranged by seniority, with one officer in four of the five groups, and by other factors such as swimming ability and self-confidence. Via message, Pacocha informed those on the surface that there were twenty-two survivors.

At 07:30 a message was sent to Pacocha informing them that the fly-away rescue system was on the way from the United States. This provided a visible boost to morale among the crewmen, and all involved in the casualty planned to wait for that equipment.

However, by 09:50, the crew was becoming listless, agitated, and hyperventilating. The boat's only atmosphere monitoring equipment was aft in the flooded compartments, but the lithium hydroxide did not seem to be working as well as expected. Cotrina was becoming concerned about the submarine's atmosphere. He spread four additional lithium hydroxide canisters. To exacerbate the situation, their only light, the emergency light located at the bottom of the forward ladder, was periodically flickering on and off, and the beam from their only battle lantern was steadily growing weaker. Cotrina passed a message to the surface requesting guidance. Contralmirante Tirado instructed Cotrina to use his best judgment in decided when to escape. Cotrina consulted his crew; their recommendations to escape were unanimous with one exception. Teniente Lindley offered various reasons to wait, and if he had to escape, he wanted the divers to provide SCUBA tanks since he had been trained in their use. Cotrina ordered him to join the first group of escapees.

At 11:30, divers completed connecting high and low salvage using Mark V diving umbilicals for hoses and the manufactured fittings. The high salvage was connected to air banks on the submarine BAP Abtao (SS-42), These banks were charged by thirty-five-year-old, oil-lubricated compressors. There are no filters on the system, and air samples of the air banks had never been taken.

During escape training, crew members decided to inflate their Steinke hoods in the compartment before entering the escape trunk, and to use them as flotation devices, but not to enclose their heads in the hoods. One member of the first group, Chief Monzon, did wear the hood. He was to be the third most seriously injured of the twenty-two escapees. After inflating the escape devices, four men entered the escape trunk and controlled flooding and pressurizing from inside the trunk. After the side access hatch was opened, the four men spent at least ten minutes arguing over who would exit first.

Finally Teniente Gomez, the senior man, ducked under and began his ascent, followed in turn by Chief Monzon and Petty Officer Reyes. All three men reached the surface and were promptly rescued. However, within minutes of reaching the surface, they began suffering great pain in their joints, became disoriented and unsteady, experienced shortness of breath, and displayed symptoms of crepitus.

The rescuers on the surface had been told to expect four men in the first group. Finding only three, they began to search for the missing Teniente Lindley. While they searched, the survivors drained and opened the escape trunk, where they found the teniente, alive and well, still in the escape trunk. Lindley reentered the submarine, and was added to the last escape group.

The second group, led by Teniente Nieri, completed their escape by 12:25 without incident, and were flown by helicopter to the recompression chamber. The helicopter flew low over the water, to keep the air pressure as high as possible.

Immediately after the second group surfaced, air was supplied through the high salvage connection. When the connection was opened aboard Pacocha, high-pressure seawater came from the line since it had not yet been blown dry. The survivors immediately shut the high salvage connection valve and never reopened it. The low salvage line was open to atmosphere on the surface, not pressurized, but was connected to the submarine below the level of water in the bilge. Thus, that line was filled with seawater to a depth equivalent to the pressure in the boat, and did not allow air flow.

All five of the survivors in the third escape group completed an uneventful escape by 12:40. However, after they left, the outer escape hatch could not be shut from inside the submarine, so when the crew attempted to drain the trunk, seawater continued to flood into the submarine until the valves were secured. After the problem was communicated to the surface, divers investigated, discovered that the hatch’s dogs were obstructing closure, and freed the obstruction with a large wrench.

The fourth escape group made an uneventful escape by 15:15. On reaching the surface at least one of them was transported to the shore recompression facility by helicopter. The fifth group then made an uneventful escape by 16:25. By this time, a recompression chamber was on scene on the floating crane along with two medical officers. All three in this escape group were recompressed within five minutes of surfacing.

After the fifth group left the escape trunk, divers placed a set of SCUBA bottles in the trunk. The final three escapees spent between one-half and one hour breathing from the SCUBA bottles bottles before escaping at 18:05, by which time personnel topside were again becoming apprehensive. Divers were sent to investigate the delay and were present when all three escapees simultaneously emerged from the escape trunk.

Since the chamber at the scene was occupied, these individuals were transported by boat to the shore facility. About an hour and a half lapsed between surfacing and recompression, apparently because no chamber was available. Oficial de Mar 2o. Carlos Grande Rengifo developed such severe decompression sickness (the "bends"), possibly combined with gas embolus, that he died during recompression treatment.

The Peruvian Navy's efforts to salvage Pacocha began on 30 August 1988, immediately after the crew escaped, and continued for eleven months. One hundred fifty men, seventy of them divers from the Salvage Service, worked eight hundred hours, two hundred of preliminary inspection and six hundred diving. The submarine broke the surface again on 23 July 1989, eleven months after she was sunk. After being studied for the effects of the ramming and sinking, her hulk was cannibalized for spare parts for other Peruvian submarines.

____________________________________________________________

Y lo más importante luego de la tripulación, se pudo rescatar los 6 nuevos torpedos A-189. Saludos "indestruiblemente" cordiales.

reytuerto escribió:Estimado Julio Antonio:

Espero que este resumen de Wikipedia te pueda servir, para facilitarle la lectura, te lo presento en tu cuasi lengua materna.

_____________________________________________________________

Formerly USS Atule (SS-403), a Balao-class submarine with a GUPPY IA upgrade, she had been sold to Peru and commissioned on 28 May 1974.

At 18:50 in the evening of 26 August 1988, Pacocha was transiting on the surface with the forward torpedo room and bridge hatches as well as the main induction valve open. Forty-nine men were aboard, including the Squadron Commander, to conduct an operational readiness inspection.

About half an hour after sunset, ten minutes from Pachocha’s expected arrival at the port of Callao, the 412 ton Japanese fishing trawler Kiowa Maru (also spelled Kyowa Maru and Hyowa Maru) rammed her in the after port quarter. Kiowa Maru was equipped with an ice-breaker bow, with a sub-surface protrusion designed to penetrate and break apart what it struck. Pacocha sank quickly.

Four men died immediately in the collision and sinking: her commanding officer, Capitán de Fragata Daniel Nieva Rodríguez, died securing the bridge access hatch; Teniente Segundo Luis Roca Sara and two enlisted men were trapped in flooded compartments and drowned. Twenty-three of her crew succeeded in abandoning ship.

In the sinking submarine, Teniente Roger Cotrina Alvarado secured the forward torpedo room watertight door. He then tried to secure the forward torpedo room hatch, but it was jammed by a sailor whose leg had been caught as the hatch fell shut. As Pacocha began to sink, water rushing in the forward hatch washed Cotrina down the ladder.

Pacocha had assumed a 40 degree up-angle, and lifting the hatch required enormous strength. Nonetheless, Cotrina climbed back to the hatch, freed the sailor, and shut and dogged the hatch. Less than five minutes after the collision, Pachoca settled on the bottom. Survivors aboard her noted her keel depth to be 140 feet (43 m) with a 9 degree up angle.

At 20:02, with Pachoca an hour overdue, the Peruvian Navy declared an emergency. Boats were dispatched to search along Pacocha’s route. The tug Jennifer II was sent to rendezvous with Kiowa Maru and investigate. Some twenty minutes later, Contralmirante Guillermo Tirado, Commander of the Submarine Flotilla, arrived at the Callao Naval Base, assumed command, and dispatched the submarine BAP Dos de Mayo (SS-41) to search.

At 20:30, the survivors trapped in Pacocha released their messenger buoy and attempted to call aft compartments on the sound-powered telephone. There was no response.

By 21:00, the crew of Jennifer II had confirmed that Kiowa Maru had collided with something, and radioed their report to the base. While that report was in progress, the survivors in Pacocha fired a red distress flare. The Navy immediately issued a call for rescue and salvage divers to report for duty. Rescue of the survivors on the surface began at once, and within an hour and a half, twenty survivors and three bodies were drawn from the water. Three enlisted men had died of hypothermia during the four hours they had spent in the 14 °C (57 °F) water.

Meanwhile, 22 survivors mustered in Pacocha’s forward torpedo room: four officers, four chiefs, and fourteen junior enlisted personnel. The senior officer transpired to be Cotrina. At 21:20 they fired another flare that led searchers to the messenger buoy at 21:31. Messenger buoys on Balao-class submarines do not have telephones, so communication could not be established, but those on the surface did realize that the buoy and flares probably meant that someone was still alive. The survivors held training in the use of the Steinke hood, with which most crewmen were unfamiliar. (The Peruvian Navy, like the United States Navy, had stopped in-water escape training from depth several years previously.)

At 22:50, the smell of chlorine gas in main control prompted another assessment of the boat's condition. A vent valve was found that had not been tightly shut, and more water had seeped into the aft battery compartment. All lithium hydroxide canisters were brought forward, and the survivors sealed themselves in the forward torpedo room. By 23:30, two canisters of lithium hydroxide were opened and spread. The crew was put to bed.

By midnight on Saturday, 27 August 1988, all twenty survivors and three bodies had been brought ashore. Survivors were taken to the nearby Naval Hospital. Although all suffered from hypothermia, none had significant injuries. At the scene, an assortment of vessels were on the surface including the submarine, Dos de Mayo, a torpedo retriever, a floating crane, and several small craft.

Locating divers during their off-duty hours was hampered by the lack of telephones in many of their homes, but by midnight, eight were at the scene in SCUBA gear. Depth to the deck of the ship was between 125 feet (38 m) aft and 110 feet (34 m) forward, with the ship variably reported as having between a nine and fifteen degree up-angle. The first team of divers followed the messenger buoy's line, which had played out to a significant distance. Since it was not located directly over Pacocha, a second line was tended straight down to the sail. The divers tapped on the hull and received a response from the forward compartment of the boat. However, they were unfamiliar with the code used, so were unable to interpret the tapping.

At 00:40, Contralmirante Tirado called Captain Schillingsburg, the United States Defense Attaché, to request rescue assistance from the United States Navy.

By 01:00 the survivors had sent messages to the rescuers that they should be able to hold out for 48 hours. By 0200, three volunteers in Pacocha had donned oxygen breathing apparatuses (OBAs) and walked through compartments as far aft as main control. The aft battery compartment had water over the deck, so it was not entered. Meanwhile, personnel ashore including several divers studied the salvage air connections on BAP La Pedrera (SS-49) (the former USS Sea Poacher (SS-406), also a GUPPY IA Balao-class submarine) and discovered that they did not have appropriate salvage air hoses or fittings. Ultimately, Mark V diving system umbilicals were used with fittings manufactured during the night on two frigates. (Mark V diving hoses are negatively buoyant, ½-inch inner diameter, 600 psig (4.2 MPa) pressure rated hoses, MIL-H-2815.)

After two frustrating hours, improved communications with Pacocha were finally established at 02:27 using the signal ejector to pass written notes to the divers. Word was received at 0350 and passed to the survivors that the United States Navy was sending its rescue system. However, over the next few hours the estimated time of arrival of the rescue system shifted steadily later.

Having had no communication from the surface for nearly two hours and unaware that there were currently no divers available, Pacocha fired another flare at 04:20. Yellow was picked so as not to give the impression that something new was seriously wrong—they only wanted to express concern that they had not heard anything in a couple of hours. However, at 04:40 a small electrical short and fire broke out in main control. It was brief and self-extinguishing, but renewed concern for the survivors' atmosphere. Only carbon dioxide extinguishers were available for fire-fighting.

A new group of divers arrived on scene at about 05:00 after reviewing salvage connections, escape trunk configuration, and other details on La Pedrera. Shortly after the divers went to work, they recovered the body of Pacocha’s Commanding Officer, Capitán de Fragata Nieva, just inside the deck access door to the sail.

At 06:00 the survivors held reveille and prepared breakfast. Utilizing the signal ejector, communication was passed that the crew was in good spirits with enough air to last for seventy-eight hours based on calculations of available oxygen and lithium hydroxide. They also had adequate supplies of water, but no food after eating what little they had, including cake, for breakfast. While inspecting the submarine, the survivors noted a heavy black cloud rising from below the deck in the forward battery compartment. No one entered this compartment again. Two more canisters of lithium hydroxide were opened and spread on the upper bunks. Later in the morning another four canisters were opened. Approximately twenty canisters were unopened. One eight cubic foot (230 L) oxygen cylinder was bled into the compartment; three oxygen cylinders were left unused.

Information on the use of the escape trunk and the Steinke hood was passed from the surface. The crew was divided into five groups and one member from each group trained in the operation of the escape trunk. Groups were arranged by seniority, with one officer in four of the five groups, and by other factors such as swimming ability and self-confidence. Via message, Pacocha informed those on the surface that there were twenty-two survivors.

At 07:30 a message was sent to Pacocha informing them that the fly-away rescue system was on the way from the United States. This provided a visible boost to morale among the crewmen, and all involved in the casualty planned to wait for that equipment.

However, by 09:50, the crew was becoming listless, agitated, and hyperventilating. The boat's only atmosphere monitoring equipment was aft in the flooded compartments, but the lithium hydroxide did not seem to be working as well as expected. Cotrina was becoming concerned about the submarine's atmosphere. He spread four additional lithium hydroxide canisters. To exacerbate the situation, their only light, the emergency light located at the bottom of the forward ladder, was periodically flickering on and off, and the beam from their only battle lantern was steadily growing weaker. Cotrina passed a message to the surface requesting guidance. Contralmirante Tirado instructed Cotrina to use his best judgment in decided when to escape. Cotrina consulted his crew; their recommendations to escape were unanimous with one exception. Teniente Lindley offered various reasons to wait, and if he had to escape, he wanted the divers to provide SCUBA tanks since he had been trained in their use. Cotrina ordered him to join the first group of escapees.

At 11:30, divers completed connecting high and low salvage using Mark V diving umbilicals for hoses and the manufactured fittings. The high salvage was connected to air banks on the submarine BAP Abtao (SS-42), These banks were charged by thirty-five-year-old, oil-lubricated compressors. There are no filters on the system, and air samples of the air banks had never been taken.

During escape training, crew members decided to inflate their Steinke hoods in the compartment before entering the escape trunk, and to use them as flotation devices, but not to enclose their heads in the hoods. One member of the first group, Chief Monzon, did wear the hood. He was to be the third most seriously injured of the twenty-two escapees. After inflating the escape devices, four men entered the escape trunk and controlled flooding and pressurizing from inside the trunk. After the side access hatch was opened, the four men spent at least ten minutes arguing over who would exit first.

Finally Teniente Gomez, the senior man, ducked under and began his ascent, followed in turn by Chief Monzon and Petty Officer Reyes. All three men reached the surface and were promptly rescued. However, within minutes of reaching the surface, they began suffering great pain in their joints, became disoriented and unsteady, experienced shortness of breath, and displayed symptoms of crepitus.

The rescuers on the surface had been told to expect four men in the first group. Finding only three, they began to search for the missing Teniente Lindley. While they searched, the survivors drained and opened the escape trunk, where they found the teniente, alive and well, still in the escape trunk. Lindley reentered the submarine, and was added to the last escape group.

The second group, led by Teniente Nieri, completed their escape by 12:25 without incident, and were flown by helicopter to the recompression chamber. The helicopter flew low over the water, to keep the air pressure as high as possible.

Immediately after the second group surfaced, air was supplied through the high salvage connection. When the connection was opened aboard Pacocha, high-pressure seawater came from the line since it had not yet been blown dry. The survivors immediately shut the high salvage connection valve and never reopened it. The low salvage line was open to atmosphere on the surface, not pressurized, but was connected to the submarine below the level of water in the bilge. Thus, that line was filled with seawater to a depth equivalent to the pressure in the boat, and did not allow air flow.

All five of the survivors in the third escape group completed an uneventful escape by 12:40. However, after they left, the outer escape hatch could not be shut from inside the submarine, so when the crew attempted to drain the trunk, seawater continued to flood into the submarine until the valves were secured. After the problem was communicated to the surface, divers investigated, discovered that the hatch’s dogs were obstructing closure, and freed the obstruction with a large wrench.

The fourth escape group made an uneventful escape by 15:15. On reaching the surface at least one of them was transported to the shore recompression facility by helicopter. The fifth group then made an uneventful escape by 16:25. By this time, a recompression chamber was on scene on the floating crane along with two medical officers. All three in this escape group were recompressed within five minutes of surfacing.

After the fifth group left the escape trunk, divers placed a set of SCUBA bottles in the trunk. The final three escapees spent between one-half and one hour breathing from the SCUBA bottles bottles before escaping at 18:05, by which time personnel topside were again becoming apprehensive. Divers were sent to investigate the delay and were present when all three escapees simultaneously emerged from the escape trunk.

Since the chamber at the scene was occupied, these individuals were transported by boat to the shore facility. About an hour and a half lapsed between surfacing and recompression, apparently because no chamber was available. Oficial de Mar 2o. Carlos Grande Rengifo developed such severe decompression sickness (the "bends"), possibly combined with gas embolus, that he died during recompression treatment.

The Peruvian Navy's efforts to salvage Pacocha began on 30 August 1988, immediately after the crew escaped, and continued for eleven months. One hundred fifty men, seventy of them divers from the Salvage Service, worked eight hundred hours, two hundred of preliminary inspection and six hundred diving. The submarine broke the surface again on 23 July 1989, eleven months after she was sunk. After being studied for the effects of the ramming and sinking, her hulk was cannibalized for spare parts for other Peruvian submarines.

_____

Y lo más importante luego de la tripulación, se pudo rescatar los 6 nuevos torpedos A-189. Saludos "indestruiblemente" cordiales.

Gracias Reytuerto.

Cartaphilus escribió:

MX78 escribió:
Asi... como se puede apreciar, y hasta JANE's lo dice... hubo un RIMAC (submarino) en el PERU.

Saludos,

Lo dicho. O un troll, o uno de los mayores ignorantes que circulan a día de hoy por la red. En realidad, un troll ignorante.

A ver, corazón: ¿puedes aportar las características, año de entrada en servicio y lugar de construcción del "submarino Rímac"?


PD. En cada mensaje tuyo caes más bajo y haces más el ridículo.

PPD. No necesito ver ningún vídeo para recitarte de memoria los 18 submarinos en servicio en la MGP a lo largo de su historio. ¿Conoces tú esos submarinos, troll intoxicador?

Realmente para que faltar el respeto!

Al parecer a Ud. no le gusta la noticia de lo que sucedio... y quizas tampoco de las noticias que da su propio pueblo!

Duro de cabeza... mmm pero que quiciera que le dijera... dejeme contarle... las agencias de informaciones de CHILE han detectado espias peruanos que se dedican a ver salir a los barcos de guerra peruanos y dan aviso al PERU. Esto, los chilenos solo dejan de que los espias sigan de cerca estas actividades, ya que asi, saben donde estan ellos.

Que mas quiere que le cuente?

1987 PERU manda aviones de combate mirage a BOLIVIA y este pais denuncia a la ONU de que CHILE esta entrando en espacio aereo boliviano con el fin de buscar una guerra...

Otra mas?

ECUADOR derriba aviones peruanos, estos pilotos de guerra fueron entrenados en CHILE e ISRAEL. Los israelitas estaban por mandar a sus pilotos para pelear contra los peruanos... y los chilenos ya habian mandado tropas al CENEPA. Interesante... no es asi?

PERU, no solo compro submarinos alemanes, sino que tambien sovieticos... despues, querian comprar un portaaviones a INGLATERRA (EL HERCULES), pero la compra no sucedio porque los ingleses le hubieran dado datos a los chilenos, asi que buscaron a otro pais. El PERU no entro en guerra contra CHILE, asi que los sovieticos, les dieron media cuenta!!!

1986, dos aviones mirage entraron en el espacio aereo chileno... nunca mas fueron vistos.

PERU, mando a minar sus fronteras y espera a que CHILE desmine sus fronteras con el PERU, pero el PERU esta esperando a que LA HAYA de su veredicto para ver si ellos hacen tambien lo mismo o no... ya que si la HAYA no da ese pedazo de mar para el PERU, Uds. tienen pensado en tomarlas a la fuerza. Para eso ya estarian desmorando el desminado hasta el 2014.

Para el 1978, cuando ARGENTINA y CHILE estaban por entrar en guerra, tropas peruanas estaban en la frontera contra CHILE, ademas los propios bolivianos hicieron lo mismo... El Gobierno de BRASIL en un comunicado les dijo de que la guerra era entre CHILE y ARGENTINA solamente. El Gobierno de ARGENTINA entonces busco la solucion PAPAL (no fue CHILE), y PERU se vio obligado a mandar tropas al este del pais por una posible invacion brasileira, mientras que los bolis, se hecharon para atras... denuevo.

Tantas cosas que se... y como veo a gentuza como Ud. duros de mentalidad... no queda otra que hacerles ver la realidad!

Como esta el Submarino Sovietico que se escapo de los chilenos? Por si acaso... la tripulacion del submarino RIMAC hundido a las afueras de VALPARAISO, tenian unos rasgos bastantes identicos a los peruanos... y me gustaria mencionar de que su bandera estaba en aquel Submarino?

No solamente ese episodio sucedio en CHILE, sino que otro fue en TALCAHUANO, en 1976, cuando un Marino chileno vio un brillo a la distancia, pregunto a su base si un submarino estaba usando el periscopio y la respuesta fue negativa... salieron lanchas y barcos a interceptarles... Sepa bien de su historia antes de andar escribiendo estupideces.

CALLAO tiene bases bajo tierra, TACNA encontraron unas cuevas bajo tierra y cualquiera que se aproxime, seran disparados... ni siquiera juzgados. Esas cavernas van hacia el sur del pais/ norte de CHILE.

Wow, pero que secretos!!!

El SCUD MISIL fue dado a conocer en un desfile... gran obra y que buena copia del misil ese... que es solo una maqueta para intimidar a las tropas vecinas!

Periodico "LA RAZON", los escritores son ex-uniformados de las FFAA's del PERU. Por eso tanto odio en sus noticias y falsedades tambien!

Ciudad de LIMA. Helicopteros fabricados en RUSSIA, estan para la vista no mas... ya no vuelan!

Que mas quiere caballero?

Quiere hablar de la base de la marina al oeste de LIMA? Ningun problema... y esa nave es bastante grande... si es que Ud. sabe a lo que me refiero. Ni si quiera saben esconderla.

Saludos,

Querido cefalópodo, usted se insulta solo en cada uno de sus mensajes.

Todo ese fárrago de Ecuador, Mirages y demás ni me he molestado en leerlo, porque en este debate no me interesa.

Sí he leído que usted sigue afirmando que existió el submarino BAP Rímac.





Pues nada. Existió, y está hundido en Valparaíso, junto a la Perla Negra del capitán Jack Sparrow y al galeón fantasma del Holandés Errante.

Supongo que, si existió, usted podría proporcionar:

- Su lugar de construcción
- Su fecha de botadura y entrada en servicio
- Sus carcaeterísticas técnicas
- Su numeral en la MGP


Pero como no existió, y por tanto no lo puede hacer, me encargaré personalmente de que lo pongan de patitas en la calle en este foro porque está contraviniendo una de sus reglas, la 4.13, que dice algo así como:

4.13.- No se recomienda la publicación de mensajes con contenidos absurdos, que contradigan informes técnicos o históricos, sin el apoyo de fuentes documentales o gráficas, que sean posteados con el ánimo de crear polémica para hundir el foro. Dicha actividad podrá ser considerada como labor de "troll o trolling"

Sus mensajes tienen contenidos absurdos, contradicen la historia y lo datos empíricos, no se apoyan en ninguna fuente (llevo seis o siete mensajes pidiéndole que me dé datos de los submarinos peruano y chileno hundidos, y usted como si nada), y no tienen más razón de ser que la de tocar el escroto a los foristas y ensuciar el foro con mamarrachadas. Usted es un troll de la peor calaña, un impresentable que no se merece estar en un foro serio como este, en definitiva, un individuo despreciable con el que no merece la pena perder ni un segundo más.

Miento. Sí, merece perder dos segundos o tres. Los que tardaré en poner al corriente a los moderadores de su sinvergonzonería.

Con todo mi desprecio,


Joseph C.

Lo de la tripulación del submarino con rasgos identicos a los peruanos (me pregunto cuales son esos rasgos tan especiales que le permiten diferenciar a un peruano del resto de americanos) tiene un sabor a Roswell y Area 51 entrañable.

Les hicieron una autopsia de esas que se ven las cremalleras del disfraz también?

Saludos.

Pero es que de eso va el tema. El submarino fue hundido, "ellos" lo saben, pero no quieren que la información salga a la luz. Son los mismos que tienen guardada el Arca de la Alianza en el Pentágono, los del OVNI en el Área 51, los que envenenaron a Juan Pablo I y empotraron a Lady Diana contra un pilar, los que sustituyeron al difunto Paul McCartney por un doble, y los que crearon en un estudio de California las imágenes de Armstrong y Aldrin dando botecitos en la Luna.


O sea, que yo hundo un submarino enemigo, pero lo mantengo en secreto. Tiene una lógica aplastante.


Por supuesto, en el complot no sólo están metidos los chilenos, que guardan silencio porque seguramente les da vergüenza ser uno de los dos países que han hundido un submarino desde la II Guerra Mundial. También los peruanos (por sus rasgos los conoceréis) están en el ajo. Ellos han silenciado a las familias de los tripulantes, a sus amigos y a sus compañeros de la Armada, y ellos han borrado todo rastro del BAP Rímac en los documentos oficiales.

Pero la conspiración quedaría incompleta si no involucrase a los distintos servidores de internet del mundo, así como a los portales y buscadores. Sólo así se explica que en cientos de millones de páginas webs, no haya ni rastro del BAP Rímac: cuándo y dónde se construyó, cuáles eran sus características... Ni qué decir de fotos. Todo ha desaparecido. "Ellos" lo han hecho, porque no quieren que sepamos la verdad.

Menos mal que Fox MX78 Lamelibránquido Mulder está aquí para desvelarlo. Él sabe la verdad. Tiene amigos en las Fuerzas Armadas Chilenas, un cuñado men in black, y su casero es "El fumador" de Expediente X. Le han pasado los informes, incluso el de la autopsia (esos cadáveres con fenotipo peruano son la prueba definitiva), y por eso ha demostrado con tanta contundencia la existencia del BAP Rímac y su hundimiento.


Lástima que la Administración del Foro ya esté informada de su altruista labor de trolleo y nos vayamos a quedar sin saber más.


Yo quiero creer.



[/i]

Estimado MX78:

Si tus fuentes fueron las mismas que te dijeron que en 1995 unidades de la Armada (peruana) entraron en aguas guayaquileñas, entonces creo que te están tomando el pelo.

Nuevamente, hasta 1996 no hubo en la MGP material soviético/ruso. Recien en ese año se incorporaron cañones-obuses D-30, transportes An-32 y helicopteros Mi-8 provenientes de Bielorusia. Pero ¿un submarino? Y te equivocas, el portaviones por el que la Armada mostró interés no fue el Hércules, sino el Bulwark, interés muy, pero muy transitorio.

Pilotos ecuatorianos entrenados en Israel? pues me es perfectamente posible, después de todo, la FAE opera Kfir. Pilotos ecuatorianos entrenados en Chile? Tal vez en tácticas, pero en 1995 los principales modelos FAE eran Jaguar, F-1E y Kfir C-2; en la FACh estos eran F-5E y Mirage 5/-50, entonces no había similitud de modelos. Tropas chilenas en el Cenepa? Imaginate un prisionero de esa nacionalidad, como quedaría el gobierno de Concertación?

En 1978 deberías explicar que hacía en petrolero Beagle en Talara, cargado de "cosacos". Finalmente, ¿sabes el nivel de la capa freática en el Callao, especialmente en la zona de la Base Naval? Cuando averigues eso, sabrás porque los polvorines de la armada están en San Lorenzo. Y eso no es infidencia... eso lo sabe el Agregado Naval chileno de turno con toda seguridad (tíos muy simpáticos por cierto).

PS: Considero el preposicionamiento de unidades cerca de puntos vitales enemigos como algo lícito para los usos de la guerra.