Foro Militar General

El dato de la RCS frontal del EF vs. la RCS frontal del F-22 no creo que sea muy de fiar, porque el EF tiene que llevar sus armas en soportes externos, que por mucho diseño "stealth" que tengan siempre aumentaran mucho la RCS.

Por eso, de los datos publicados "segun donde" yo no me fio un pelo. No obstante, hay que decir que esos datos serian con armas Aire-aire encastradas. Pero ni se sabe cuales, ni cuantas.

ipa7 2h y 7 minutos cargado con bombas y misiles sin depositos externos de combustible.



http://eurofighter.com/news/IPA7PavewayIVTrials.asp


Toberas +6 % de ahorro en combustible y +7% en velocidad excediendo el mach.



http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/20 ... phoon.html

Para mi el Eurofighter es el caza europeo que mejor se adapta a las necesidades europeas y no un caza americano pensado para ellos.
Es lamentable que paises europeos se ofrescan a recibir cazas americanos otra vez en sus fuerzas aereas, que desunion!!!!.

Paises que se quejan de no poder supuestamente adquirir mas cazas EF2000, pero si a la larga desean adquirir F-35! Con esos millones que pagarian por F-35 pagarian el presupuesto de EF2000!!! Pero claro el Lobbie americano, compensaciones economicas, comisiones y ademas ayudan a salvarguardar el gasto que viene subiendo es decir los paises europeos pondran sus euros para el tio sam,.. y el tiempo de operativo,

LOKÙRA escribió:Para mi el Eurofighter es el caza europeo que mejor se adapta a las necesidades europeas y no un caza americano pensado para ellos.

Unas necesidades europeas que no difieren en absoluto con las estadounidenses. La USAF estaría encantada de contar con el Tifón en su inventario, de la misma forma que cualquier fuerza europea tiraría cohetes por contar con el Strike Eagle en el suyo. Si hablamos del mundo de la caza de forma específica, esto es así sin lugar a dudas.

Es lamentable que paises europeos se ofrescan a recibir cazas americanos otra vez en sus fuerzas aereas, que desunion!!!!.

Pues sí, aunque más lamentable es que pudiendo obtener productos que son necesarios, se opte por carecer de ellos aunque éstos puedan adquirirse en el mercado exterior. A día de hoy, la industria europea es INCAPAZ de producir un avión como el F-35, y no por incapacidad tecnológica precisamente.

Paises que se quejan de no poder supuestamente adquirir mas cazas EF2000, pero si a la larga desean adquirir F-35! Con esos millones que pagarian por F-35 pagarian el presupuesto de EF2000!!!

Ambos aviones representan distintos conceptos operativos, y si una fuerza estima que ambos son interesantes y necesarios, deben adquirirse independientemente de lo que dicten las necesidades políticas e industriales, porque el fín último es cumplir la misión con éxito, vencer, y si es posible garantizar la vuelta con la familia, no se si me explico. Los norteamericanos eso lo tienen bastante más claro que nosotros.

Pero claro el Lobbie americano, compensaciones economicas, comisiones y ademas ayudan a salvarguardar el gasto que viene subiendo es decir los paises europeos pondran sus euros para el tio sam,.. y el tiempo de operativo,

El día en que al Tío Sam le de por clarificar ese concepto y decida que los europeos se limpien su propio cul*, vamos a flipar todos.

El problema ya no es solo el precio del caza f-35 es tambien que beneficios saca un pais que tiene el efa.

1º el f-35 es el caza de las diferentes versiones de exportacion dependiendo de tu amistad con estados unidos,digamos pues que la usaf tendria la version platino del caza (150 MILLONES USD)y dependiendo de lo "amigo que seas" te puede tocar plata,cobre o bronce del f-35.

2ºRetorno industrial al estado tanto en construccion,piezas y mantenimientos 0.Esto es igual a que el caza tiene un costo a lo largo no solo de la produccion sino tambien de su vida operativa 40 años del doble de su precio.Si el caza vale 150 millones para la usaf la version top para nosotros valdra 150 millones x 2 (300 millones)pues no hay absolutamente ningun retorno industrial,quiza en algo de men power(mano de obra).DE SER UN CAZA HECHO PARCIALMENTE O TOTALMENTE EN UN PAIS EL COSTO DEL CAZA SE REDUCE PUES EL ESTADO RECAUDA EN IMPUESTOS Y DEL DINERO QUE SUELTA VUELVE UNA PARTE A EL,ENTONCES EL VALOR DE LA CANTIDAD QUE SOLTO PARA ESA TAREA ES MUCHO MENOR.

Pongamos que me cuesta 100 millones si tengo toda mi produccion aqui o casi toda,en impuestos,salarios y cotizaciones a la (SS)SEGURIDADAD SOCIAL,IVA,PARTE DE ESOS 100 MILLONES QUE DIO EL ESTADO VUELVEN EN RETORNOS INDUSTRIALES,POR LO TANTO LA FACTURA FINAL REAL SE REDUCE CONSIDERABLEMENTE Y EL PRECIO DEL CAZA.


3ºPosiblidad de tener accceso a la tecnologia mas sensible 0.Posiblidad de motorizar el caza con tus propios motores 0.Posiblidad de modificar el hardware y software 0,no tienes acceso al sistema del caza,lo unico que te permiten es cambiar el sistema de ordenadores por otro de sustitucion en caso de estar defectuoso pero no manipularlo,no tienes el acceso ni claves,de repararlo tenemos que enviarlo a usa y tener un repuesto operativo en casa siempre.


4ºPosiblidad de tener acceso a integrar tus propias armas en produccion o i+d indigenas 0(castrado a poner las armas USA obligatoriamente pues al no tener codigo ni acceso al bus de integracion de armas aunque desarrolles un arma nueva tienes que solicitar permiso,a lo cual te diran que no es necesario o no lo necesitas pues ya tienen algo parecido).Dependes forzosamente del congreso Estaunidense.

Con el Efa y mienbros del consorcio los apartados anteriores se cumplen totalmente o parcialmente dependiendo del grado de socio.



Filosofia" es stealth permite traer el piloto a casa",para mi esta filosofia no es valida,la filosofia deberia ser,"es stealth permite una mayor capacidad para cumplir un grupo de misiones determinadas" pero donde nunca podran garantizar el exito o asegurarlo.

Pensad que esa misma filosofia de Lockeed martin podria ser aplicada al campo de las fuerzas terrestres y en ellas siempre se pierde mas personal y personas que en las fuerzas aereas y ellos tambien tienen derecho a volver con sus familias.

Mi punto de vista muy malo por:

No hay una amenaza seria real para tales cazas,actualmente europa tiene una hornada de efas,rafales,gripens,f-16 y f-18 muy competente como para pensarselo 2 veces antes de que alguien cometa un ataque a los cuales se les puede aprovechar y exprimir hasta llegar al ucav y saltar perfectamente la produccion de f-35,mixto efa y ucav es la version mas economica y factible en el futuro y si se desea pequeñas minimas cantidades de f-35.

Meteorswarm escribió:El problema ya no es solo el precio del caza f-35 es tambien que beneficios saca un pais que tiene el efa.

1º el f-35 es el caza de las diferentes versiones de exportacion dependiendo de tu amistad con estados unidos,digamos pues que la usaf tendria la version platino del caza (150 MILLONES USD)y dependiendo de lo "amigo que seas" te puede tocar plata,cobre o bronce del f-35.

Es que se supone que si eres socio del programa es precisamente para tener acceso a la mejor opción.

Meteorswarm escribió:2ºRetorno industrial al estado tanto en construccion,piezas y mantenimientos 0.Esto es igual a que el caza tiene un costo a lo largo no solo de la produccion sino tambien de su vida operativa 40 años del doble de su precio.Si el caza vale 150 millones para la usaf la version top para nosotros valdra 150 millones x 2 (300 millones)pues no hay absolutamente ningun retorno industrial,quiza en algo de men power(mano de obra).DE SER UN CAZA HECHO PARCIALMENTE O TOTALMENTE EN UN PAIS EL COSTO DEL CAZA SE REDUCE PUES EL ESTADO RECAUDA EN IMPUESTOS Y DEL DINERO QUE SUELTA VUELVE UNA PARTE A EL,ENTONCES EL VALOR DE LA CANTIDAD QUE SOLTO PARA ESA TAREA ES MUCHO MENOR.

Pongamos que me cuesta 100 millones si tengo toda mi produccion aqui o casi toda,en impuestos,salarios y cotizaciones a la (SS)SEGURIDADAD SOCIAL,IVA,PARTE DE ESOS 100 MILLONES QUE DIO EL ESTADO VUELVEN EN RETORNOS INDUSTRIALES,POR LO TANTO LA FACTURA FINAL REAL SE REDUCE CONSIDERABLEMENTE Y EL PRECIO DEL CAZA.

Sería cierto si eres un simple comprador (caso de España), pero no si eres socio fabricante. Al firmar para ser socio e invertir dinero en un proyecto firmas también las compensaciones que sacarás (partes q fabricarás, repuestos, etc).

Meteorswarm escribió:3ºPosiblidad de tener accceso a la tecnologia mas sensible 0.Posiblidad de motorizar el caza con tus propios motores 0.Posiblidad de modificar el hardware y software 0,no tienes acceso al sistema del caza,lo unico que te permiten es cambiar el sistema de ordenadores por otro de sustitucion en caso de estar defectuoso pero no manipularlo,no tienes el acceso ni claves,de repararlo tenemos que enviarlo a usa y tener un repuesto operativo en casa siempre.

Depende... si eres socio gold (de los que han invertido más) tienes más acceso que si eres socio silver o un simple comprador. Aunque la verdad es que en el caso del F35 UK siempre se ha quejado de que no le dan toda la información que habían pactado.

Meteorswarm escribió:4ºPosiblidad de tener acceso a integrar tus propias armas en produccion o i+d indigenas 0(castrado a poner las armas USA obligatoriamente pues al no tener codigo ni acceso al bus de integracion de armas aunque desarrolles un arma nueva tienes que solicitar permiso,a lo cual te diran que no es necesario o no lo necesitas pues ya tienen algo parecido).Dependes forzosamente del congreso Estaunidense.

En este punto discrepo... depende de si pagas el acceso al código o no...
He visto fotos de F-18, de fabricacion estadounidense, lanzando misiles Taurus (fabricación europea).

Meteorswarm escribió:Con el Efa y mienbros del consorcio los apartados anteriores se cumplen totalmente o parcialmente dependiendo del grado de socio.

Idem si eres socio del F35... Para España, que sería un simple comprador, sería preferible comprar más EFA (salvo los F35B de la armada), pero para UK o Italia puede convenirle más los retornos del F35 o del EFA... dependerá de lo que tengan firmado...

Pero es que si lo piensas bien el f-35 el unico socio que lleva algo del pastel en el caza es UK,el resto pagaron por un caza que no les cede nada tecnologicamente y solamente les dan un puesto preferente para conseguir las primeras unidades.....pero no solo eso.....las primeras unidades como en toda fabricacion son las que mas taras(problemas) llevan.

Aparte los costes estan disparados actualmente al 2009,como se complique mas la produccion este caza va salir tan caro como el f-22,actualemente se manejan precios de 122 millones de dolares para el año 2007 y sumarle un costo de mantenimiento a lo largo de su vida de 304 millones.....a fecha 2009 sin entrar en produccion.Total 431 millones de dolares que cuesta el caza barato y digo barato por el tema de mayor o menor amistad con USA,porque te cederan mejor o peor Stealth dependiendo de tu amistad.

Informe GAO 2000

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ns00074.pdf

informe gao 2009 (incremento del costo del 350%

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09303.pdf

¿Donde esta ese caza a 50 millones?

Rumores dicen que se escucha reduccion de produccion y ciertos paises sin capacidad para comprar el numero de unidades que necesitaban.

Saludos

Meteorswarm escribió:Pero es que si lo piensas bien el f-35 el unico socio que lleva algo del pastel en el caza es UK,el resto pagaron por un caza que no les cede nada tecnologicamente y solamente les dan un puesto preferente para conseguir las primeras unidades.....pero no solo eso.....las primeras unidades como en toda fabricacion son las que mas taras(problemas) llevan.

Aparte los costes estan disparados actualmente al 2009,como se complique mas la produccion este caza va salir tan caro como el f-22,actualemente se manejan precios de 122 millones de dolares para el año 2007 y sumarle un costo de mantenimiento a lo largo de su vida de 304 millones.....a fecha 2009 sin entrar en produccion.Total 431 millones de dolares que cuesta el caza barato y digo barato por el tema de mayor o menor amistad con USA,porque te cederan mejor o peor Stealth dependiendo de tu amistad.

Informe GAO 2000

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ns00074.pdf

informe gao 2009 (incremento del costo del 350%

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09303.pdf

¿Donde esta ese caza a 50 millones?

Rumores dicen que se escucha reduccion de produccion y ciertos paises sin capacidad para comprar el numero de unidades que necesitaban.

Saludos

Si pagaron por ser los primeros en la lista de compra, y sólo por eso, pues es normal que no tengan compensaciones... aunque se supone que Italia montaba una linea de construcción

Vaale... si lo dices por precio... pues sí todos los cazas nuevos se han salido de presupuesto y los stealth han sido los peores (es lo que tiene abrir nichos tecnológicos... que los inicios son carísimos).

Al fin y al cabo el EFA ha mejorado mucho sus antecesores pero sigue volando con los mismos principios. Ha mejorado mucho la programación, la interfaz hombre-máquina, motores más robustos, mayor sencillez de mantenimiento, la capacidad de cálculo ha permitido un multirol completo (puede que el mejor del momento), pero es simplemente la evolución máxima del avión de caza... Los F22 y F35 aspiran a ser los que inicien un nuevo sector: aviación de caza stealth. Podemos discutir si la furtividad será una tecnología futura o simplemente un canto de cisne... pero eso ya es otro tema.

November 12, 2009

The Pentagon's Self-Dismembering F-35

Two weeks ago, with help from combat aviation innovator and designer Pierre Sprey, I circulated a piece about the self-dismembering F-35 program. More recently, I submitted a revised and updated version to Military.com, but even before the editors there had a chance to run the piece, the F-35 disemboweled itself some more. While reports two weeks ago had the new estimate for cost overruns to be "as bad" as those the program's uniquely qualified Joint Estimating Team (JET) found in 2008, newer reports state them to be perceptibly worse and that nothing has happened to fix the problems identified last year. Also, new doubts about the program have emerged with another foreign partner (Denmark), and today we are told by an Inside the Navy article that "the test article of the Marine Corps’ short-take-off, vertical-landing variant of the JSF -- has once again been delayed until December due to poor weather, Kent (John Kent, Lockheed Martin spokesman) said." That would give a new meaning to the term "all weather fighter aircraft" - that is, a fighter that cannot fly in all, rather any, weather.

Cutting edge, indeed.

At least as interesting is the reaction to the - unsurprising - unraveling of the program by Pentagon management. The JET report is described inside the Pentagon as "radio active" - and management as desperate to find a way out of the new numbers, which - by the way - the QDR's experts on aviation have apparently decided to ignore. Some are now suggesting inside the building that the JET analysis should be whittled down to something that top management finds more (politically) acceptable.

Pray tell: all this shows that the Pentagon has changed its stripes and is reforming exactly how?

"Tactical Air's Gloomy Future" was first published by Military.com on Nov. 9, 2009. It is reproduced below.

"Tactical Air's Gloomy Future"

by Winslow Wheeler

The Defense Authorization bill just signed into law by President Obama pretends a bright future for the Pentagon's Joint Strike Fighter. The program is fully funded, and Congress even added separate authority for the alternate GE engine, advice sure to be taken when the definitive DOD Appropriations bill is enacted later this year. Meanwhile, in the real world, the F-35 program continues to fall apart. The latest - but hardly last - shoe to drop is a new internal analysis (breathlessly refuted by Lockheed) that the cost growth stage for this airplane is just beginning.

Lockheed's refutation of the Joint Estimating Team (JET) analysis of cost growth and delays in the F-35 program borders on the hilarious: new computer aided design, simulation, and desk studies (un-validated by empirical testing) make cost growth in truly modern defense technology a thing of the past, they assert. Indeed, just like in DDG-1000, LCS, FCS, VH-71, etc., etc., etc.....

How pathetic.

Even sadder than Lockheed's desperate grasp for reasons to do nothing to fix the self-dismembering F-35 program is the fact that the future of Western combat aviation relies on it. The 2,456 models of it on order for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps will ultimately replace almost all tactical aircraft now in our inventory, except for the F-22, for which production beyond 187 aircraft was cancelled this past summer. Major allies, including Britain and much of the rest of Western Europe, Canada, Australia, Japan, and Israel have all made commitments to buy the aircraft. Sales to many others (there's a long list) are postulated, and those who do not intend to buy the F-35 will probably copy it to the extent their treasuries, government bureaucracies, and technological development permit.

Unfortunately, the F-35 is unaffordable, and it is a technological kluge that will be less effective than airplanes it replaces. It will undo our air forces and our allies', not help them.

Few agree now, but in time the finger pointing will start. That's when someone will have to pick up the pieces to give our pilots a war winning aircraft. The road between here and there will be neither smooth, pretty, nor short, but it is time to take the first step.

A financial disaster? Impossible. Visiting the F-35 plant in Fort Worth, Texas last August, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates assured us that the F-35 will be "less than half the price … of the F-22."

Technically, Gates is right – for now. At a breathtaking $65 billion for 187 aircraft, the F-22 consumes $350 million for each plane. At $299 billion for 2,456, the F-35 would seem a bargain at $122 million each.

However, F-35 unit cost has barely begun to will climb. In 2001, the Pentagon had planned to buy 2,866 aircraft for $226.5 billion – $79 million per airplane. In 2007, that unit cost increased to $122 million, thanks to more cost and fewer airplanes being planned.

In the next few weeks, the program will have to admit to another increase. Gates and Deputy Secretary William Lynn have re-convened a "Joint Estimating Team" (JET) to reassess F-35 cost and schedule. Last year, while a part of the Bush administration, Gates basically ignored the Team's recommendations, but the new JET is about to reconfirm them: the F-35 program will cost up to $15 billion more, and it will be delivered about two years late, and there are rumors the JET's findings may even be worse.

Moreover, those address only the known problems. With F-35 flight testing barely three percent complete, new problems – and big new costs – are sure to emerge. Worse, only 17 percent of the aircraft's characteristics will be validated by flight testing by the time the Pentagon has signed contracts for more than 500 aircraft. Operational squadron pilots will have the thrill of discovering the remaining glitches, in training or in combat. No one should be surprised if the final F-35 total program unit cost reaches $200 million per aircraft after all the fixes are paid for.

This kluge is not "affordable," either. The latest version of the F-16, heavily laden with complex electronics and other expensive modifications, costs about $60 million, twice its original price - in today's dollars. The A-10, which the F-35 will also replace, cost about $15 million in today's dollars. Thus, to replace the almost 4,000 F-16s and A-10s built with just over 1,700 F-35s, the Air Force will have to pay far more to buy less than half as many airplanes.

In an age when the Air Force budget looks to increase only marginally, if at all, while simultaneously planning to buy several other major aircraft (new aerial tankers, new transports, new heavy bombers, and new helicopters), the plan to distend the fighter-bomber budget is a pipe dream.

While most, but not all, in the Pentagon and Congress remain oblivious to the unaffordability of the F-35, some of its foreign buyers are becoming horrified. Despite their governments' investment of hundreds of millions, parliamentarians and analysts in Australia, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands are expressing real concerns. The F-35's single largest international partner is the United Kingdom. There, the Royal Navy and Air Force have just decided to reduce their F-35 buy from 138 aircraft to 50. The reason: "We are waking up to the fact that all those planes are unaffordable."

The problems with the F-35 are not limited to its cost.

As a fighter, the F-35 depends on a technological fantasy. Having failed to develop in the 1950s, the 1960s, and the 1970s an effective (and reliable) radar-based technology to shoot down enemy (not friendly) aircraft "beyond visual range," the Air Force is trying yet again with the F-35, like the F-22 before it. Both have the added development of "stealth" (less detectability against some radars at some angles), but that new "high tech" feature and the long range radar have imposed design penalties that compromised the aircraft with not just high cost but also weight, drag, complexity, and vulnerabilities. The few times this technology has been tried in real air combat in the past decade, it has been successful less than half the time, and that has been against incompetent and/or primitively equipped pilots from Iraq and Serbia.

If the latest iteration of "beyond visual range" turns out to be yet another chimera, the F-35 will have to operate as a close-in dogfighter, but in that regime it is a dog. If one accepts every aerodynamic promise DOD currently makes for it, the F-35 will be overweight and underpowered. At 49,500 pounds in air-to-air take-off weight with an engine rated at 42,000 pounds of thrust, it will be a significant step backward in thrust-to-weight and acceleration for a new fighter. In fact, at that weight and with just 460 square feet of wing area for the Air Force and Marine Corps versions, the F-35's small wings will be loaded with 108 pounds for every square foot, one third worse than the F-16A. (Wings that are large relative to weight are crucial for maneuvering and surviving in combat.) The F-35 is, in fact, considerably less maneuverable than the appallingly vulnerable F-105 "Lead Sled," a fighter that proved helpless in dogfights against MiGs over North Vietnam. (A chilling note: most of the Air Force's fleet of F-105s was lost in four years of bombing; one hundred pilots were lost in just six months.)

Nor is the F-35 a first class bomber for all that cost: in its stealthy mode it carries only a 4,000 pound payload, one third the 12,000 pounds carried by the "Lead Sled."

As a "close air support" ground-attack aircraft to help US troops engaged in combat, the F-35 is too fast to identify the targets it is shooting at; too delicate and flammable to withstand ground fire, and too short-legged to loiter usefully over embattled US ground units for sustained periods. It is a giant step backward from the current A-10.

It is time to start fixing this mess. Needless to say, the complexities of Pentagon procurement regulations and especially the circle-the-wagons mentality of the Pentagon and Congress present serious hurdles to be overcome, most of them ethical.

First is the need is to accept the facts as they exist, rather than as Lockheed and self-interested bureaucrats in the Pentagon would prefer them to be. That will mean accepting the JET recommendations as currently written – not watering them down to make them palatable, or ignoring them as they were in 2008 under Gates' first term as SecDef.

Let's watch closely and see if the original JET findings are watered down by Deputy Secretary Lynn or others who helped to father the Joint Strike Fighter in the Clinton Administration, or others, such as Acquisition Czar Ashton Cater, who will have to re-jigger the Air Force's entire long range budget to accommodate more F-35 cost. His having been forthright about underhanded Air Force behavior on the F-22, perhaps we can hope that Gates will insist on ethical behavior on the F-35. We shall see.

Comparing the original JET findings with whatever comes out the other end should be easy. The details of the study were reported by Jason Sherman at InsideDefense.com; other outsiders are familiar with just what is in the JET analysis, and quick reaction professionals like Colin Clark at DODBuzz will surely have a field day if top Pentagon management tries to fudge what's in the JET study. The glare of public understanding is always a good way to appeal to the patriotism of top Pentagon management.

In addition to listening to the facts, we will need to exercise the professed spirit of the new Weapon System Acquisition Act, signed into law by President Obama last May. While the fine print of the new law is hopelessly riddled with loopholes to protect business as usual, the bill purports to control costs and inspire competition, especially the "fly-before-buy" competitive approach that has worked so marvelously well the few times it's been tried.

This is the same vision that President Obama expressed to the VFW in Phoenix last August when he said he wanted to stop "the special interests and their exotic projects that are years behind schedule and billions over budget." Clearly, no one has told the President that the F-35 is a leading poster child for those evils.

Finally, the biggest step, would be to suspend further F-35 production until the test aircraft, all of them now funded, can complete a revised, much more thorough flight test schedule. Once we know the F-35's realistically demonstrated performance and problems, and the full extent of its costs, we can make an informed decision whether to put it into full production. To do that, the upside down F-35 acquisition plan -- which buys 500 aircraft before the "definitive" test report (the one that only flight tests 17 percent of F-35 characteristics) is on Gates' desk -- needs to be radically recast into real fly-before-buy plan. Just the kind of plan the new Acquisition Reform Act pretends to advocate.

In the almost certain event that the F-35 is found by uncompromised, realistic testing to be an unaffordable loser, there are viable alternatives. If an active consensus develops to reverse the current aging and shrinking of the existing tactical aviation inventory (as opposed to today's silent conspiracy encouraging those trends to worsen), a short term, affordable fix to restore combat adequacy is needed: Extend the life of existing F-16 and A-10 airframes for the Air Force and continue purchasing F-18E/F aircraft for the Navy and Marine Corps. For the part of the inventory that most urgently needs immediate expansion, the A-10 and the close support mission, hundreds of airframes now sitting in the "boneyard" can and should be refurbished – something that can be done at extraordinarily modest cost.

Just a life-extension program will not address long term needs. Accordingly, competitive prototype fly off programs should be immediately initiated to develop and select new fighters to build a larger force that is far more combat-effective than existing the F-16s, F-18s, and A-10s. Just such programs -- that lead to an astonishing 10,000 plane Air Force within current budget levels -- are described in detail in "Reversing the Decay in American Air Power," a chapter in the anthology America's Defense Meltdown: Pentagon Reform for President Obama and the New Congress (Stamford University Press).

You can almost literally hear the howls of protest right now. The F-35 is too big to fail. Gates himself seems trapped by that logic; he said "My view is we cannot afford as a nation not to have this airplane." We take the opposite view. The F-35's bloat -- in cost, leaden weight, and mindless complexity -- guarantees failure. It will shrink our air forces at increased cost, rot their ability to prevail in the air and support our ground forces, and will needlessly spill the blood of far too many of our pilots.

We have to take the first steps to better understand the extent of the F-35 disaster and to reverse the continuing decay in our air forces.

http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm ... /index.cfm

saludo

Demoledor....

Bueno, sin entrar a quien ha escrito esto, que autoridad o capacidad tiene, remarco lo siguiente:

RGSS escribió:November 12, 2009

...The F-35's single largest international partner is the United Kingdom. There, the Royal Navy and Air Force have just decided to reduce their F-35 buy from 138 aircraft to 50. The reason: "We are waking up to the fact that all those planes are unaffordable."

No es pequeña precisamente la reduccion, y eso sin saber aun el precio final. Al menos saben que los/el porta/s solo los pueden equipar con F35 o renunciar al ala embarcada. O mas harriers...

Aun asi hay quien niega aun reducciones en los pedidos de F35, increible.

RGSS escribió:The problems with the F-35 are not limited to its cost.

As a fighter, the F-35 depends on a technological fantasy. Having failed to develop in the 1950s, the 1960s, and the 1970s an effective (and reliable) radar-based technology to shoot down enemy (not friendly) aircraft "beyond visual range," the Air Force is trying yet again with the F-35, like the F-22 before it. Both have the added development of "stealth" (less detectability against some radars at some angles), but that new "high tech" feature and the long range radar have imposed design penalties that compromised the aircraft with not just high cost but also weight, drag, complexity, and vulnerabilities. The few times this technology has been tried in real air combat in the past decade, it has been successful less than half the time, and that has been against incompetent and/or primitively equipped pilots from Iraq and Serbia.

Interesante, si desde el 50 llevan intentando hacer un caza efectivo BVR y no lo han conseguido, que pasa si les sale malo el intento con los F22/F35. Toda la fuerza de estos se basan en que te derriban (BVR) antes que tu los veas (Stealth). Si los derribos BVR no salen al % deseado, solo te quedara la furtividad para salir por patas, y eso el F22, el F35 ni eso!!!.

Damos por hecho que el BVR es infalible. Creo que es mucho suponer, o mejor dicho aun por demostrar. Y que le cargamos al F35, 2 misiles BVR (para un solo objetivo), 2 corto alcance, y cuantas bombas de ataque a tierra?. Han apostado todo a una, BVR, y siempre ha sido la mas fea del baile!!

RGSS escribió:If the latest iteration of "beyond visual range" turns out to be yet another chimera, the F-35 will have to operate as a close-in dogfighter, but in that regime it is a dog. If one accepts every aerodynamic promise DOD currently makes for it, the F-35 will be overweight and underpowered. At 49,500 pounds in air-to-air take-off weight with an engine rated at 42,000 pounds of thrust, it will be a significant step backward in thrust-to-weight and acceleration for a new fighter. In fact, at that weight and with just 460 square feet of wing area for the Air Force and Marine Corps versions, the F-35's small wings will be loaded with 108 pounds for every square foot, one third worse than the F-16A. (Wings that are large relative to weight are crucial for maneuvering and surviving in combat.) The F-35 is, in fact, considerably less maneuverable than the appallingly vulnerable F-105 "Lead Sled," a fighter that proved helpless in dogfights against MiGs over North Vietnam. (A chilling note: most of the Air Force's fleet of F-105s was lost in four years of bombing; one hundred pilots were lost in just six months.)

Esto es el remate de lo anterior, si por BVR no te cargas nada, y por corto alcance no maniobras (cosa que ya sabiamos del F22), siempre quedara el cañon!!!. ¿Los F35B montan cañon?

Esta claro que aun queda mucho por resolver, si invierten mas para sacar lo que se espera o recortan gastos y sale lo que hay. Una u otra opcion son problematicas. Los USA invertiran mas, sino se quedan sin fuerza aerea moderna. Pero podran los demas paises pagar los sobrecostes?

Saludos

Editado:
A esto que tambien recuerdo un relato de VST:
http://www.maclittle.es/2009/04/13/

De como un Awacs puede salir por patas, dejando a toda la flota que da cobertura con el cul* al aire y dependiendo de si mismo.

Pregunta "técnica":

Julian Vazquez escribió:

Dejo esas dos fotos: la "antenorra" que tiene el segundo, pero no el primero, ¿de qué es?

Supongo que preguntar qué efecto tiene en la RCS del aparato ya sería para nota ....

Un saludo