Guerra de Etiopia: El Ejercito Somali que enfrento Cuba

[guerra1]

Me gustaria conversar con algun forista cubano conocedor de la guerra del Ogaden,ya que mucho aqui se habla de Angola pero poco de Etiopia donde las armas cubanas lograron derrotar al ejercito de Siad Barre.

Aqui les dejo un largo articulo sobre el tema.

http://wardheernews.com/Articles_06/may ... bdoon.html

[rio-campo]

Bueno me gustaria seguir conversando del ejercito somali,mucho se ha hablado otros enemigos de los cubanos en Africa pero de este ejercito poco se dice,nadie menciona su potencia y preparacion,ademas de la forma tan valiente como peleo,de hecho pocos prisioneros somalies fueron tomados por los aliados.Y por supuesto nadie menciona a los yemenies quienes peleararon valientemente por Ethiopia.

Aqui mando un articulo sobre lo que paso en Ogaden despues de 1978,porque a pesar de lo que muchos creen en el ejercito somali fue recien expulsado en 1981 y no en 1978.

SOMALIA CONCEDES DEFEAT IN OGADEN

Feburary 28th 1981

Source: The Economist

In Somalia's dilapidated capital, crudely painted hoardings incite the population to destroy the ''imperialist'' army of neighbouring Ethiopia. The hate remains real, but no longer the intent. Somalia has more or less given up its war against Ethiopia for possession of the Ogaden. After four years of fighting the last units of the regular Somali army were pulled out last month, leaving the Soviet-backed Ethiopians in unquestioned control of the disputed territory. The only ray of light for President Siad Barre is the prospect of American support to balance Russia's muscular presence in Ethiopia.



This support began taking shape this month with the Reagan administration's decision to supply the Somali army with radar and anti-aircraft weapons worth $45m--a modest offering, which reflects America's wariness about getting sucked into a superpower clash in the Horn. The military aid was conditional upon the Somali army's complete withdrawal from the Ogaden. President Barre was supposed to have removed his troops two years ago, but they are known to have continued a rearguard action. It was only in January that the A

Si pues asi mismo fue,en si lo que paso es que los somalies se retiraron en 1978,pero Siad Barre lo volvio a intentar en 1979 y a pesar de que lucharon duramente,la falta de aviacion y recursos hicieron que fueran derrotados y expulsados en 1981,ya desde aqui la ofensiva paso a manos etiopes.

Para detalle de estos combates uno puede leer a Ana Simmons y Lefebvre.

Ellos mencionan este episodio,claro con mas detalle.

http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-12043.html

After the SNA withdrawal, the WSLF reverted to guerrilla tactics. By May 1980, the rebels had established control over a significant portion of the Ogaden. Eventually, Ethiopia defeated the WSLF and the few small SNA units that remained in the region after the Somali pullout. In late 1981, however, reports indicated that the WSLF continued to conduct occasional hit-and- run attacks against Ethiopian targets.

Supongo que te referiras al antiguo Yemen del Sur, pues el del norte no creo que lo apoyara.

[guerra1]

Si asi es fue Yemen del Sur quien apoyo a Mengistu.

[guerra1]

Testimonio de un soldado cubano en Ogaden

http://cubalagrannacion.wordpress.com/2 ... n-etiopia/

Gracias Mariana por tu invitación. Aprovecho tu espacio ante todo, para rendir homenaje a mis compañeros caídos y en segundo lugar a precisar algunos elementos que andan por Internet totalmente falsos.

Para situarnos en tiempo y espacio, estamos hablando de una Guerra en que la participación cubana la podemos medir desde diciembre de 1977 a marzo de ese mismo año, enmarcada fundamentalmente en el desierto del Ogadén en dirección a Dire Dawa, Harar, Arabí, Lewinaje, Goloche, Jijiga, Daga Habur. Por ahí se dice que en ese tiempo habíamos unos 18mil cubanos, no es cierto. A lo sumo, al final, en el mes de marzo, no rebasaba los 10mil hombres y en mi criterio es sobredimensionado la cifra.

Por otra parte nunca escuchamos hablar de tropas soviéticas ni nada parecido, si habían asesores, como el General Petrov que con tablilla en mano a pecho descubierto, tarjaba los obuses que caían y los descontaba de los que sabía tenían los somalos.

Te puedo decir que a finales de marzo o principios de abril asistí a las honras fúnebre de un compañero en el cementerio de Harar, el fué el número 33.
Es decir en solo 4 meses 33 muertos, de veras que fue un guerra relámpago.

Te puedo comentar de la valentía de los etíopes. La infantería etíope se montaban encima de los tanques cubanos. Los Jefes de los tanques no alcanzaban a establecer amistad con ellos, pués los proyectiles de alto explosivos aniquiliban a toda la infantería etiope y esa fue la causa de que fueramos nosotros a proteger a nuestros tanquistas. La infantería etíope no hacían pozos de titradores y mucho menos trincheras, tan solo unas pequeñas hendiduras en la tierra las que para dormir le echaban un poco de paja, mas bien parecían nidos de gallina, por lo que no se protegían.

Por su parte el soldado somalo también fue muy valiente, recuerdo que en una ofensiva se encimaron hasta muy cerca de nosotros, caían y caían y los demás seguían avanzando, era increíble. Una de sus rastras de municiones fue impactada por nuestros artilleros, se incendió. El conductor y su ayudante se tiraron al suelo y en lugar de salir corriendo hacia la retaguardia, sacaron no sé de donde, una ametralladora calibre 50 de ruedas y arremetieron contra nosotros desde detrás de un arbol de marabú, bueno el final te lo imaginarás.

Esa fue una ofensiva suicida que ordenó el mando somalo a sabienda que no tenia posibilidad alguna de victoria, pues estaban informados por su aviación de la fortaleza de nuestras posiciones. En una oportunidad, tres MIG 17 camuflados, nos entraron por el frente hacia la profundidad y después recorrieron toda nuestro primer escalón, al final escuchamos que alguien gritaba…son somalos!!! son somalos!!! y se abrió fuego contra ellos.

Se cuenta que los pilotos se entregaron junto a sus aviones en la Base de Dire Dawa, nunca supe si era verdad, decían que lo no combatían contra los cubanos pues habáin estudiado en Cuba.

Después de tomar Jijiga se le facilitó la retirada a los soldados somalos, se hizo un corredor de salida por el que se les obligó a replegarse a su frontera; podían haber sido masacrados por nuestra aviación y artillería, pero eso no ocurrió, no había necesidad de ello.

Si de anécdotas se trata te diré que pasamos mucha hambre y mucha sed. Desde que salímos de Arba donde estaba el Centro de Recepción y Preparación en dirección al frente, los niños a lo largo de toda la trayectoria nos gritaban “guardiña manllare” fonéticamente sonaba así; lo cierto es que comezaron las acciones combativas y los combates y los carros de retaguardia no podían llegar hasta nosotros pues eran blanco de la artillería enemiga, habíamos regalado todas nuestras raciones de comida fría, solo en la torreta de nuestro BMP había un saco grande de nylon de pan duro y negro ruso, que ni con la culata del fusil se partía, aprendimos a comerlo de todas maneras; fueron días y días de mucha hambre y mucha sed, sin comida y sin agua, debajo de una fuerte lluvia que no cesaba, un calor intenso de día y un frío que calaba los huesos de madrugada, eso es angustioso, miéntras tanto el fuego artillero somalo no paraba y una BM13 nos tenía creo que su mira, pues todo nos caían encima.

Al cuarto día logró llegar el camión de retaguardia que fue caminando a lo largo de la línea del frente, con una cazuela de leche y una de carne cocinada desde hacía varios días. El médico prohibió dar la leche, yo logré servirme por mi cuenta la leche y coger mi ración de carne, creo que eso me salvó, parece que la leche cortó la reacción de la carne, mis compañeros no tuvieron esa suerte.

Ya estando en Daga Habur, en la frontera donde nos habíamos concentrado, llegó un carro cisterna con agua, para podernos bañar, ya tenía 32 días en mi haber, olía a cualquier cosa. Ahí fue donde matamos a un dromedario y nos lo comimos. En lo adelante todo lo que narraría sería a lo que se conoce como paz, que a mi me duró hasta el 22 de marzo de 1980 en que después de una travesía de 22 días en el buque Fiodor Shaliapin llegué a Cuba nuevamente

[guerra1]

Hola me gustaria conversar con algun forista cubana sobre la guerra del Ogaden y el desempeño cubano en esta.

[hotarou]

bien eso fue en los 80s pero alguien me podria decir el armamento que tiene somalia hoy en dia tambien la cantidad de soldados, y principal fusil de asalto que ahora usan porque se dice que etiopia usa el ak 103 (7,62x39mm) creado en los años 2000

[vet327]

Hoy en dia Somalia no tiene ejercito y de hecho ni existe como pais.

[guerra1]

Gaspacher en vista de que te noto muy confundido con respecto a lo que paso en la guerra del Ogaden y el porque las hostilidades continuan en dicho lugar,te mando un resumen del cual como es tu costumbre encontraras peros,sin embargo no podras probar que estoy equivocado.

http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcoun ... rn_Africa#

During colonial times, the Somali people were divided among no less than five states: Ethiopia, Italian Somalia, French Djibouti, British Somaliland and British Kenya. The independent Somali Republic was created in 1960 by the merger of only two of these entities (British Somaliland and Italian Somalia); something that did not satisfy the aspirations of Somali nationalism. Subsequently, in August 1960 the government of the newly independent state published a manifesto that called for the formation of a Greater Somalia, which would include Djibouti, the Northern Frontier District of Kenya, and above all the Ogaden desert and adjacent areas in south-eastern Ethiopia.

The Somali population in Ethiopia had received little from the Addis Ababa government since it came under its rule in the late 1880s. When Somalia became independent and began spreading the idea of Somali nationalism, it found fertile soil in the Ogaden region. Irredentist agitation and armed clashes soon commenced, and increased as the Ethiopian government launched its first systematic attempt to collect taxes in the region

After some years of irredentist agitation and armed clashes carried out by what was reported as "armed bands", the opposition in the Ogaden region eventually evolved into an organized actor known as the Ogaden Liberation Front. It is unclear when, exactly, the group was established, but by 1963 it was reported that it had established a "Liberation Government" in the region, under the leadership of Muktal Dahir (Maqtal Dahir,), a former district officer who had served a considerable period of time in Ethiopian jails.

The Ogaden Liberation Front from its inception called for both "retraction of taxation that caused nomads to lose their land and possessions" and for regional autonomy. This was rejected by the Emperor, who also ordered the closure of Koran schools and changes in marriage and divorce customs. Subsequently, the rebels launched an armed rebellion and by mid-1963 fighting was ongoing in both lowland Harerghe and Bale. The guerrillas were heavily reliant on the Somali government for support, which they readily received, with the Mogadishu regime viewing the newly formed movement as a strategic partner for its own goals. Over the year the rebels grew in number to about 3000 and in January some heavy fighting was reported between the two parties.

In the end, the Oganden Liberation Front was too weak to pose a challenge to the Ethiopian regime and after the first months of 1964 the group failed to make any military impact. Instead, the region became the scene of a brief interstate conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia, as the latter tried to press its demand for the formation of a Greater Somalia (see the Ethiopia - Somalia section).

After the 1963-64 rebellion had been suppressed the Ethiopian regime initiated a process of pacification that hit the Ogaden population hard. Apart from carrying out atrocities such as killings and beatings, the imperial regime also launched what knowledgeable sources call an economic war against the Ogaden. The pastoralist Somali population was deprived of large numbers of their animals, with thousands being either confiscated or killed. Furthermore, a policy of encouraging Amhara farmers to settle in the region's most fertile areas was pursued, whereby the Somali population could no longer use these areas for pasture. Finally, the government imposed its control over the waterholes and there were many reports of wells dug by the Ogaden population being poisoned by. Instead the government built new reservoirs which mainly served the interests of the settled Amhara farmers.

In 1974 the region was struck by drought and because of the loss of pasture to settled farmers and restrictions on movement, this lead to famine. By 1975 more than 80 000 Ogadenis were living in relief shelters, where the government had the explicit intention of turning the inhabitants into settled farmers. Due to the strict rules of the camps that made it impossible to retain animals, a vast majority of the region's men stayed outside the camps, where they made up a ready pool of recruits when a new rebel group with irredentist intentions emerged in 1976.

As these events were unfolding in the Ogaden region, the Somali regime was considering its options. Having called a temporary halt the armed struggle in 1964, Mogadishu retained its expansionist ambitions and by the early 1970s, border skirmishes started to recur and relations between the two states deteriorated once again. In the mid-1970s events in Ethiopia led the government in Mogadishu to believe that it had a good chance of achieving its goal of incorporating the Ethiopian Ogaden region into Somalia. The Ethiopian Imperial regime under Emperor Haile Selassie had been ousted in 1974 and the country subsequently experienced increasing internal problems. Apart from a bloody power rivalry within the ruling military council (the so-called Derg), the conflict in the then-Ethiopian region of Eritrea had escalated and a number of rebellions had broken out in other regions of the country (see the sections on the numerous intrastate conflicts in Ethiopia). At the same time the army was weakened and by 1976 the country's main military backer, the United States, withdrew its support due to the Derg's clear turn to the left. Somalia, in contrast, had received large-scale military support from the Soviet Union and actively built up its forces.

The Somali regime initially tried to accomplish its goal by helping to set up a new rebel group consisting of Somalis living in the Ogaden region. WSLF (Western Somali Liberation Front) was subsequently set up in 1974 or 1975, reports diverge and was given large-scale military support by Mogadishu

In late 1975 the newly established rebel group WSLF (Western Somalia Liberation Front) began infiltrating fighters across the border into Ethiopia and from early 1976 intermittent fighting was reported in the contested region. Maintaining rear-bases in Somalia, the rebels infiltrated across the border into Ethiopia, where they carried out guerrilla raids, targeting the state apparatus in the region; government offices were destroyed and the police was attacked. During the year the rebels' capacity improved and attacks became both more frequent and effective. They attacked army convoys, police stations and even fixed army positions and with the large popular support that they enjoyed, they were able to melt back into populace after each attack. This eventually led to the Ethiopian army largely being confined to garrison towns in the region, with WSLF controlling as much as 60 per cent of the countryside.

The main reason for WSLF's increasing effectiveness was the large-scale support that it received from Somalia (see the section "WSLF enters the fray"). With all this support, Mogadishu expected results. However, by early 1977 it was becoming clear that the WSLF's progress was too slow for Somalia's liking and President Siad Barre subsequently sent in around 3000 Somali soldiers to fight alongside the rebels, thus providing what is termed secondary warring support by UCDP. Even this did not improve the situation, however, as the Somali soldiers entered Ethiopia disguised as rebels, having removed their uniforms and heavy equipment, and were thus obliged to resort to guerrilla warfare, in which they were not trained. In July Somalia subsequently decided to cut its losses and opted for a regular invasion, aiming for the Ogaden region to be included into a so-called "Greater Somalia" (see the section on the Ethiopia - Somalia conflict). During the rest of the year, two parallel conflicts raged in the region; the interstate one pitching Ethiopia against Somalia, and the intrastate one, in which WSLF continued to fight the Addis Ababa regime. In practice these two conflicts played out as one, as Somalia and WSLF coordinated their armed struggle and the latter more or less functioned as the former's ancillaries.

The Somali and WSLF troops were initially successful, managing to push the Ethiopian troops out of Ogaden in only a few days. By mid-September they also succeeded in capturing Jijiga, after a couple of weeks of bloody battles. However, by late September the tide began to turn, with the Somali advance coming to a virtual standstill. This was mainly due to overextended fronts, bad weather and the harsh climate in the region. The rest of the year was characterized by a military stalemate, which neither side was able to break. In late January 1978, Ethiopia launched its counter-offensive, planned together with Russian and Cuban officers. The Ethiopian army quickly pushed the Somali and WSLF troops eastwards and on 5 March Jijiga was re-captured. After this the Somali defeat was imminent. On 8 March Barre announced the unilateral withdrawal of the Somali troops and on 23 March Addis Ababa declared that the last frontier post had been regained and that the war was officially over.

However, for the WSLF fighters this was not the case. After retreating from Jijiga, WSLF officials stated that that their war would still continue with them returning to guerrilla warfare, operating to cut the communication of Ethiopia's forces. Over the next few months, this was exactly what the rebels did, with Mogadishu radio broadcasting announcements of a range of operations. While it is very probable that the Ethiopian casualty figures given in these announcements were grossly exaggerated it is clear that WSLF constituted a real problem for Addis Ababa, with the latter threatening to invade Somalia unless Mogadishu withdrew its support to the rebels.

WSLF continued to be a threat to the Ethiopian government through 1978 - 79, but by 1980 the rebellion had been considerable weakened by the army's effective counterinsurgency strategy, whereby the civilian population was forced into so-called protected villages so as to deprive the rebels of their support, and massive armed force was used in order to break and destroy the WSLF militarily. In August 1980 a large-scale military offensive was launched by the Ethiopian government, aided by the Cuban mechanized brigade. Named "Operation Lash", the offensive had by year's end succeeded in pushing the rebels out of Ethiopia and into northern Somalia and even though WSLF continued to carry out intermittent hit-and-run attacks during the following three years, the group had been drastically weakened. Also putting a strain on the rebel group were increasing attacks by SNM (Somali National Movement) - a Somali rebel groups that Ethiopia supported and that functioned as a proxy for the Addis Ababa regime.

The group also suffered from political differences with its main supporter - the regime in Mogadishu - which weakened it substantially. This was tied to the internal differences that racked the group, with its long-time leaders being challenged by young radicals who wanted to distance the movement from Somalia, aiming for what they called "true self-determination". A conference was convened and the veteran Central Committee led by Abdullahi Hassan Mahmoud and his deputy, Abdi Nasir was overwhelmingly defeated. A new executive was elected with a "progressive", Mohammed Diriyeh Urdoch, as secretary-general. However, by and large WSLF increasingly came to resemble a spent force, and after 1983 the group was no longer a military threat to the Addis Ababa regime.

ONLF (Ogaden National Liberation Front) was formed in 1984, at a time when the region's historic liberation front, WSLF (Western Somali Liberation Front), suffered from internal splits (see the section "Guerrilla struggle in tandem with interstate war"). Some of its founders were defectors from WSLF, and from its inception the new organization set out to distance itself from the older movement. This is evident just by contrasting the name chosen for the new group with that of the mother organization:"Ogaden Liberation Front" instead of "Western Somali Liberation Front".

While it is clear that the group was formed in August 1984 - some say in Mogadishu and others claim in the Gulf - it was not until in March 1986 that a public announcement of its existence was made. In this initial statement, ONLF chairman Sheikh Ibrahim Abdulah defined the Ogaden as "an op-pressed nation colonised by Ethiopia", and pledged to establish' an independent Ogaden state with full sovereignty in line with the aspirations of its people.

During the first years after its formation, ONLF did not have any significant military capacity. In fact, while some sources talk vaguely of the group gaining a foothold in the Ogaden region in the late 1980s, there are no reports of it actually challenging the Addis Ababa regime militarily.

After the military regime in Addis Ababa had been ousted by the EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front) rebel group in May 1991 (see the Ethiopia (government) section), ONLF, having lost its main backer when President Barre in Somali was ousted, decided to take the offer of prospective regional autonomy offered by the new regime, even though the ultimate goal remained independence. The group subsequently received one seat in the council and was thus part of the government from 1991.

When the first local and regional elections were held in 1992 ONLF won with a wide margin and its inexperienced officers took over the newly named "Somali" region's administration. Coexisting uneasily through 1992 and 1993, the relationship between ONLF and the central government broke down in February 1994, after regional parliamentarians voted to exercise the right of self-determination, enshrined in the national charter. ONLF official Abdulrahim Osman Hassen elaborated, saying that the region had "neither the same culture, nor the same history, nor even the same religion as Ethiopia" and that it had been "colonized since 1905". After this move the situation in the Somali region became increasingly chaotic. In late 1994 ONLF split in two, with one faction continuing to function as a political party, and the other one going underground to wage an armed struggle. The new armed wing, ONLA (Ogaden National Liberation Army), began sporadic guerrilla attacks against government forces within Ogaden before the end of the year

In 1993, when the ONLF was still controlling the regional government in the newly-formed Somali region, the conflict fought over the Ogaden region became active for the first time in ten years. Processes in both Ethiopia's Ogaden region and in Somalia led to the renewed outbreak of violence in 1993. In Somalia, the Islamic movement AIAI (Al-Itahad al-Islami) had emerged in the 1980s, aiming to spread political Islam and establish a pan-Somali, Salafist emirate. With the opening up of the political space in Ethiopia after the fall of the Derg regime in 1991, an Ethiopian branch of AIAI, al-Itihaad al-Islaami ee Soomaaliya Galbeed (the Islamic Union of Western Somalia), present in the country since 1990, was registered as an official political party and its members were granted the right to campaign and express their views in the media. However, in parallel, the group continued to build up its military wing, convinced that its ultimate goal of liberating the Muslim population of the Ogaden region from what they viewed as a Christian, highland oppressor, could only be achieved by force. Training camps were set up across the region and military instructors from al-Qaida were brought in for assistance.

In late 1992, the Ethiopian wing of AIAI was joined by a large group of Somali AIAI fighters. The mother movement had left its main base at Laas Qoray and split into several groups, one of which crossed the border into Ethiopia, and another establishing a large presence in the Somali Gedo region, near the Ethiopian border. During 1993 AIAI escalated its guerrilla activities and the Ethiopian government responded in kind, by stepping up ground and air attacks on the rebels along the Somali border. Furthermore, the group also claimed responsible for bombings and assassination attempts.

The year 1996 saw further AIAI attacks and a statement by the movement's spokesman in Mogadishu, Abdulkadir Mohamud Dhaqane, saying that the group would continue attacking senior Ethiopian officials and pursue its guerrilla attacks in the Ogaden until the region became independent. Apart from stepping up military operations in Ogaden, the Ethiopian government in August responded by launching a military assault on the Somali AIAI branch's main base area in Gedo region. In heavy fighting the group's main base at Luuq was destroyed. Further fighting was announced in Dolow, Somalia, in September, and again in December. After yet another bout of fighting in 1999, AIAI was a spent force militarily.

The 1994 split in ONLF produced one more moderate political party that in 1998 merged with the rulings EPRDF's (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front) affiliate party ESDL (Ethiopian Somali Democratic League), creating SPDP (Somali People's Democratic Party). The other faction right away went underground and set up the Ogaden National Liberation Army. By 1996 this group had become effective to the extent that it could make a military impact, launching guerrilla operations in the Ogaden region.

From 1998 ONLF activity increased. This was largely due to military support forthcoming from Eritrea. With the eruption of an interstate conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea in May (see the Eritrea - Ethiopia section), Asmara's policy towards the rebels fighting against Addis Ababa changed substantially. Eritrea subsequently started providing support to among other groups ONLF as a part of its military strategy in the interstate conflict. This was done so that Addis Ababa would be forced to redeploy some of its troops from the northern border to the south.

Through the first years of the 2000s, ONLF continued to carry out hit-and-run operations on troop movements in the Ogaden region, as well as launching attacks on military barracks and arms depots. In 2005 an infiltration of some 300 rebels from Somalia caused increasing insecurity, which prompted the government to postpone parliamentary elections there from May to August. The following year saw a military build-up in the region probably due to two things. For one, ONLF had made statements in world media in April, warning off international oil firms from exploring oil and gas in the region. Many military personnel were directed to areas where exploration had been discussed and the troop deployment coincided with a seismic survey in the region in the following month by Chinese oil firm Zhongyuan Petroleum Exploration Bureau (ZPEB) and Malaysian oil giant Petronas. With the increased troop presence came more frequent clashes with the rebels.

Another reason for Addis Ababa's heightened military activity in Ogaden in 2006 was to secure the long porous border that the region shares with Somalia and thus to counter what was perceived as a threat by the Supreme Islamic Council of Somalia (see Somalia section). The Ethiopian government has supported the embattled transitional government in Somalia, led by Ethiopian close ally Abdullahi Yusuf, and were alarmed by the rise of the Islamic courts and their militia. Not wanting an Islamic state for its south-eastern neighbour, and worrying about the Pan-Somali nationalism used by the courts, which resonates deeply in some parts of the Ogaden region, Addis Ababa eventually openly sent in troops to Somalia, that by the end of the year had helped rout the militias.

In 2007 the conflict escalated further. With arms entering the region from the war in Somalia, ONLF became more active and in late April the group stormed a Chinese-run oil field in Abole locality, Degehabour Zone, killing 74 people. This led to a major increase in counter-insurgency operations by the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) and in July a major military campaign was initiated, with large part of Somali regional state being cut off from the outer world. In late July the Ethiopian government ejected the ICRC from Somali region, announcing that the organisation had sided with the opposition forces and a few weeks later MSF were also forced to leave due to the security situation. While independent coverage of events in the region was thus largely lacking for a long time, some reports emerged, indicating that gross human rights abuses were taking place, mainly carried out by the government forces.

Fighting continued on a relatively high level during the following years. The year 2010 was also characterized by the increasingly visible crack between two factions of the rebels. Already in 2006, growing leadership division resulted in a faction under Dr Mohamed Sirad Dolaal breaking away. When he was killed in January 2009, the leadership of the break-away faction was taken over by Salahdin Abdulrahman Ma'ow. Despite attempts at reconciling the two groups, they remain divided on important issues such as the relationship with Eritrea (ONLF's chairman Osman Mohammed Omar being in favor of cooperation and ONLF - Ma'ow being opposed to it) and whether or not to initiate negotiations with the government. It was the latter question that led the divide to come into the limelight in 2010. During the year it became apparent that ONLF-Ma'ow was involved in negotiations with the government, as Addis Ababa announcements were made intermittently, hinting at the probability of an accord to be signed. Subsequently, in June a ceasefire was signed, and on 12 October a peace agreement was concluded. Throughout, the main ONLF body issued statements condemning the peace process, claiming that ONLF - Ma'ow did not have any forces on the ground, wherefore an accord would not have any actual impact.

In parallel to continued fighting, the year 2011 was characterized by a severe drought, which hit the Ogaden region, as well as parts of Kenya and Somalia. In August the BBC aired a commentary accusing the Ethiopian government of using food aid as a weapon in its conflict with ONLF. According to the report, food was only delivered to those supporting the regime, whereas villages classified as rebels supporters did not receive any, which had disastrous consequences. The Ethiopian government strongly denied these allegations, and since the region remained closed to organisations intending to investigate the human right situation and independent coverage of events in the region was thus largely lacking, the claims were impossible to substantiate.

Te explico porque la lucha continua en el Ogaden,en dicho lugar a lo largo de la historia ha habido muchos movimientos independentistas,el WSLF de los años 70 fue vencido por las tropas etiopes(convencionales) y las guerrillas anti-Barre como el SNM de los Issaqs,despues de eso le sucedio en el terreno el ONLF pero como puedes leer en el articulo,el ONLF no era una fuerza de temer en la epoca de Mengistu,fue creado en 1984 y hasta 1991, año en que cayo Mengistu,no era una guerrilla poderosa es mas el articulo dice que no tenia poder alguno.Osea que bajo Mengistu,no habia ninguna amenaza seria en el Ogaden.

A Siad Barre los que lo derrotaron fueron los cubanos y los etiopes.

Esto cambia en 1994,cuando el ONLF se rebela contra los tigriños de Meles Zenawi(supongo sabes quien es Meles Zenawi) y empieza otro conflicto contra una Etiopia muy diferente a la de Mengistu,como vez son dos conflictos muy diferentes

Te mando ese articulo para que tengas una idea de lo que pasa en el Ogaden y asi te informes un poco mas.