Saladin, newly appointed as chief wazir to the young Fatimid Caliph al-’Adid, invited his elder brother Shams al-Dawla Turan Shah to join him in Cairo. However, Turan Shah not only brought his family and retinue but also a substantial army provided by Saladin’s sovereign, Nur al-Din of Syria. Although the 19-year-old Caliph al-’Adid, a sickly youth who would die only two years later, welcomed Turan Shah as a friend, many in the Fatimid court saw these newcomers as strengthening Saladin’s position while weakening their own. One of the most worried was the caliph’s close advisor, the Nubian eunuch al-Mu’tamin al-Khilafah, who was a close ally of the Fatimid ‘abid guard regiments recruited from Sudanese slaves
'Saladino y su hijo al-'Afdal en la batalla de los Cuernos de Hattin, 4 de julio de 1187'
Peter Dennis
- Aquí moriría Guillaume Borrel, grand commandeur de l'ordre des Hospitaliers de Saint-Jean de Jérusalem. Le pilló la batalla como Supérieur ad interim de l'Ordre, cargo que asumió tras la muerte de Roger de Moulins, 8ͤ supérieur de L'Hospital, caído en la batalla de La Fontaine du Cresson contra Saladino, cerca de Nazareth, el 1 de mayo de 1187.
Hermangard d'Asp sería considerado el 9ͤ supérieur de L'Hospital. El de Borrel no cuenta.
'Batalla de La Fontaine du Cresson, 1 de mayo de 1187'
Jean Colombe
Aquí sí voy a citar a la innombrable (en castellano la llaman 'Batalla de Seforia') porque en francés, con perdón, han sacado la frase de Alain Beltjens, de la obra Prier et Combattre, sous la direction de Nicole Bériou et Philippe Josserand:
C'est une défaite largement due à la «l'orgueil insensé du maître du Temple Gérard de Ridefort, qui estimait combattre l'ennemis, fût-on un contre cinquante, Roger de Moulins, maître des Hospitaliers, trouva une mort héroïque, avec la plupart de ses compagnons»
Prix imprimé: 182.60 €.
A ver si desmitificamos de una vez a esa cuadrilla de herejes adocenados y cebados del Temple.
Retomamos el tema, caballeros. Empezaremos con el mismo autor con el que lo dejamos...
British guns at Kimberley Frank Feller
The Siege of Kimberley took place during the Second Boer War at Kimberley, Cape Colony (present-day South Africa), when Boer forces from the Orange Free State and the Transvaal besieged the diamond mining town. The Boers moved quickly to try to capture the British enclave when war broke out between the British and the two Boer republics in October 1899. The town was ill-prepared, but the defenders organised an energetic and effective improvised defence that was able to prevent it from being taken.
Cecil Rhodes, who had made his fortune in the town, and who controlled all the mining activities, moved into the town at the onset of the siege. His presence was controversial, as his involvement in the Jameson Raid made him one of the primary protagonists behind war breaking out. Rhodes was constantly at loggerheads with the military, but he was nonetheless instrumental in organising the defence of the town. The Boers shelled the town with their superior artillery in an attempt to force the garrison to capitulate. Engineers of the De Beers company manufactured a one-off gun named Long Cecil, however the Boers soon countered with a much larger siege gun that terrified the residents, forcing many to take shelter in the Kimberley Mine.
The British military had to change its strategy for the war as public opinion demanded that the sieges of Kimberley, Ladysmith and Mafeking be relieved before the Boer capitals were assaulted. The first attempt at relief of Kimberley under Lord Methuen was stopped at the battles of Modder River and Magersfontein. The 124-day siege was finally relieved on 15 February 1900 by a cavalry division under Lieutenant-General John French, part of a larger force under Lord Roberts. The battle against the Boer general Piet Cronjé continued at Paardeberg immediately after the town itself was relieved.
The Battle of Majuba Hill (near Volksrust, South Africa) on 27 February 1881 was the final and decisive battle of the First Boer War. It was a resounding victory for the Boers and the battle is considered to have been one of the most humiliating defeats of British arms in history. Major-General Sir George Pomeroy Colley occupied the summit of the hill on the night of 26–27 February 1881. His motive for occupying the hill remains unclear. The Boers believed that he may have been attempting to outflank their positions at Laing's Nek. The hill was not considered scale-able by the Boers for military purposes and thus it may have been Colley's attempt to emphasize British power and strike fear into the Boer camp.