Armada de Israel

[Mauricio]

Israeli Navy Wants Stealth Corvettes

May 18, 2010

By David Eshel



Israel wants to acquire two corvettes that would permit missions beyond the Mediterranean and extend its fleet air defense capabilities. The navy was planning to purchase a variant of Lockheed Martin’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), but after an evaluation decided the vessel was too costly.

The navy is now interested in the Meko A-100 multimission corvette, built by Blohm and Voss, part of Germany’s Thyssen-Krupp Marine Systems (TKMS) Group. For such a vessel to outperform the current Eilat class, Israel will probably opt for the latest stealth version known as the Meko CSL, which can be adapted to meet Israeli requirements for versatility, sensors and deck space. The CSL corvette is a modular vessel that can be rapidly configured for different missions.

Israel’s navy has been focused on defending the nation’s coastline and strategic shipping routes in the Mediterranean. Since Iran became the main supplier of weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, intercepting arms-smuggling routes has redirected the mission of Israel’s naval forces to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Israel’s reach in these areas was demonstrated by the recent transit of a Dolphin-class submarine and Saar 5 corvettes through the Suez Canal, en route to temporary deployments in the Red Sea.

The Meko CSL is 108 meters (354 ft.) long, with a beam of 21 meters and full-load displacement of 2,750 metric tons. Propulsion is by a combined diesel-and-gas/water-jet system that reaches 40 kt. Cruising range at 15 kt. is 3,500 nm., and endurance is 21 days. The vessel can put to sea with a crew of 75.

Armed with the Barak 8 extended-range air-defense system from Israel Aerospace Industries, the two CSLs are expected to become the world’s first air-defense corvettes. This will give the Israeli surface fleet independent air cover for the first time, enabling ships to deploy farther from home. With a large deck surface and conformal mast, the new vessel can be equipped with more missiles than the current Saar 5 and, importantly, its superstructure can mount Elta’s MF-Star radar. This 360-deg. phased-array radar supports simultaneous surface search operations and multiple antiaircraft, antimissile and surface-attack weapons. The vessel will also carry antisubmarine weapons and a helicopter. As with all Israeli purchases, an important issue is the integration of locally designed and produced electronic systems. The navy uses the Elbit/Elisra Aqua Marine integrated electronic support measures/electronic countermeasures warfare suite on its Saar 5 corvettes. It is expected that the Meko will include the latest advanced electronic warfare systems.

Another advantage of the vessel would be accommodating the navy’s robotic systems. The ship could become a support platform for unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned surface vessels and unmanned underwater vehicles, since it would have adequate deck space and launch and retrieval capabilities.

A major advantage of the Meko CSL design is stealth. By employing technologies developed for the latest German warships and Sweden’s Visby-class stealth corvettes, Meko designers reduced the ship’s infrared signature by 75% through elimination of the conventional uptakes. Exhaust gases are ducted through a horizontal system, cooled by sea water and expelled underwater. Smooth hull-plating and concealed deck equipment are other stealth enhancements from the Visby class. Other features include a water-jet propulsion system that reduces the wake, the use of composite (nonmagnetic) structures and advanced sensors. Research on the Visby-class vessels began in the 1990s by Swedish ship designer Kockums, now part of TKMS.

Israel regards its German shipbuilders as reliable suppliers. The Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werf of Kiel and Nordseewerke of Emden have delivered three Dolphin-class submarines to the navy, and two more are under construction. Each new sub reportedly includes an additional 10-meter section for installation of an air-independent propulsion system, which enables the vessel to remain submerged for several weeks.

Israel’s submarines are believed to be equipped with underwater-launched cruise missiles capable of striking land targets at long range. With such capability, Israel could possess a potential second strike option in a nuclear confrontation with Iran.

Should all go according to plan with its modernization program, the navy would become Israel’s second strategic arm after the air force.

Credit: Lockheed Martin

[Mauricio]

Aprovechen señores, que fotos del interior de un Dolphin son más raras que diente de gallina.

Published 27.09.10

Israel Navy's submarine fleet: an intimate but demanding unit

The navy's submarine fleet is due to triple in size in the coming years. A glance into the intense lifestyle of soldiers in this most secretive unit.

By Anshel Pfeffer



The Israel Navy's submarine fleet is one of the Israel Defense Forces' most intimate units. The atmosphere in the unit derives not only from the nature of its missions, which require several dozen men to remain together underwater in an iron tube for many long days, but also because very few soldiers serve in the unit.

In the coming decade, the fleet is to undergo a revolution. It will start when two upgraded versions of the Dolphin submarine join the ranks in the coming two years. But the most significant change will be the expansion of the fleet's manpower from the three existing teams to ten teams by the year 2018. This will allow the fleet to carry out many more long-range missions.

In the past few years, as the hidden battle intensified against arms shipments from Iran to Hezbollah and Hamas, the navy has taken over from the air force the role of the IDF's long arm. "From our perspective, the professional achievement of an underwater commando is to be part of the first crew to go into a new arena and study it in depth," says one officer, with a smile.

The IDF rarely publishes details about the submarines' operations, but according to foreign publications, in addition to collecting intelligence and conventional sea warfare, the three Dolphins are equipped with both torpedoes and the ability to launch guided missiles armed with a nuclear warhead. When a Dolphin submarine passed through the Suez Canal a few months ago, the foreign media interpreted this as an intention to station an Israeli submarine in the Persian Gulf.

Secrecy is second nature to the submarine crews. "There are many missions where we ourselves don't know what exactly we are supposed to do," says a former soldier who recently completed his service in the unit. "We get an order to reach a certain spot and that's it. Much of the time, even the officers understand what they were doing there only after the mission."

Cut off from the world

The soldiers begin experiencing isolation already at the initial stages of their training. The training school is part of the busy general Navy training base in Haifa, but their commanders make sure the atmosphere is closed and isolated, like that of basic training in the desert 20 years ago.

"They come for three weeks and the moment they enter, they hand over their cellphones," explains the commander of the school, Maj. Yisrael. "They can speak with their parents once a week, on Fridays, from a public telephone."

Demand to join the unit has increased in recent years, and five recruits now compete for every place. However, more than 40 percent drop out during the first few months. "I take them to see a submarine at the beginning of the course," says Maj. Yisrael. "I tell them that's the place they will live for four and a half years [since submarine crewmen sign on for an additional year and a half of career army service]. There are some who leave the course voluntarily at the beginning because they feel it's not sufficiently combative. They want to see the white of the enemy's eyes."

During the first four and a half months of the course, the trainees at the base are permitted to move only between the school building, the dining hall and their dormitories. Anyone who leaves the area is punished. "They will live in a submarine for periods of 18 to 30 days," Yisrael explains. "If we catch them speaking to someone else on the base, the first time they do so they will receive a warning, the second time they will be severely punished, and the third time we will simply have to say goodbye to them."

He explains that "during the first few months, the instructors are with the trainees all the time and they are under 24-hour surveillance. We see who gets irritated, who is careless, how they work and talk with one another. We take note of the most minute details, and punish them for everything. A submariner has to understand that he has left behind his entire civilian life. This is discipline and meticulousness at a completely different level."

During the 13 months of training, the soldiers are required to memorize thousands of pages of complicated technical details, and learn not only to operate their own combat positions but also to repair them underwater if necessary. "We look for people who value fellowship, and show responsibility and technical skills," Yisrael says, "but mainly people who are able to learn a huge quantity of material in a short period. Even after they complete the course, they study all the time in the submarine."

During the first stage of the course, the soldiers still go out on marches, mainly in order to create a feeling of camaraderie and team spirit, but later the physical side is emphasized less. Submarine crewmen are defined as combat soldiers in every sense, but in terms of weapons training they undergo the same course as non-combat soldiers ("Gunner 02" ). Their combat experience takes place in shorts and T-shirts opposite flickering screens, but they are sent to the most dangerous of arenas, far from the Israel's borders.

1,900 tons under the sea

In order to expand the training possibilities, two advanced simulators were built in the past two years; the trainees practice there for hundreds of hours before they go out on an operational mission. The simulators accurately imitate the combat positions in the submarine's operational spaces: the combat information center from which all operational systems are deployed and the technical center that controls the 1,900-ton submarine's engineering systems.



In the technical center, one can generally find a helmsman and two operators (one junior and one senior ) as well as a duty officer. They will be the first who need to react in case of an emergency such as water penetrating the submarine or other physical damage. When there is a real fear of serious damage to the vessel, they have to carry out an emergency weapons delivery, and the submarine then empties all its containers simultaneously and surfaces immediately.

The combat information center simulator is defined as a tactical trainer that is capable of creating a scenario of an entire operational mission. It includes 60 computers and setting it up, which is nearing completion, has taken more than a year. The project cost some NIS 30 million.

The center has two periscopes that enable the men to look out of the submarine, a radar detection position, control and supervision positions, weapons, sonar and a navigation table. In a routine sailing, two officers and five other crew members man the center. One officer always has an eye glued to the periscope, and the senior officer in the group is the duty officer effectively in charge of the submarine at a given moment. In addition to the submarine's commander, the team includes three officers who can fulfill this task. "This officer has immense responsibility," explains one submarine officer. "You are close to a hostile shore, looking through the periscope alone at a target, and if you are discovered you have only a few seconds to respond and make a decision."

During an operation, the tiny combat center is filled with some 20 officers and other crew members. "Everyone here knows exactly where he has to stand and when to talk," explains Major Menahem, the commander of the simulator who was the deputy commander of a submarine until a year ago. "It is very crowded here but also very quiet. Messages are conveyed by glancing or uttering one word."

Only some of the people in the center have a chair or a screen of their own. Even the commander of the submarine does not have a chair when there is an emergency, and generally takes his place somewhere between the two periscopes from where he can see all the most important screens. The rest of the crew know which positions they have to take so they can view relevant information without getting in each other's way.

Everything is documented

A large part of the submarines' work is gathering intelligence. The fleet does not give out details relating to the technical capabilities of the detectors and cameras on the two periscopes, or the distance from shore at which they can operate. "Let's just say that I can see inside people's homes," says Maj. Menahem. "We synchronize the equipment with the traffic lights on the coastal highway."

The tactical simulator allows a wide variety of training possibilities, from preparing an individual for the specific position he will man in the submarine to training future team heads and duty officers, and also entire crews. The simulator's instructors feed the positions with the mission plan and unexpected situations. All activities are filmed and after the training session they go to a debriefing room to examine their moves. The facility makes it possible to create an entire mission for the crew, both of the routine and emergency types.

The simulator has also enhanced the competence test that crewmen have to pass every year. The test begins with a variety of scenarios on the simulator, and then Maj. Yisrael and several instructors go out with the crew on a three-day test at sea.

The officers and crew members who will man the fourth Dolphin, which is due to arrive from a German shipyard next year, are currently undergoing training. The fifth submarine will arrive in Israel in 2012. At this stage, the navy is planning to train two crews for every submarine. The main obstacle today to keeping the submarines at sea for longer periods is the need for crews to rest, study, prepare for operations and spend time with their families.

In the future, the navy plans that the moment a submarine returns to base, it will fuel and leave again with a fresh crew. In numerical terms, manpower will be trebled. Veteran officers in the unit - in its 51 years of existence only some 2,000 officers and combatants have served there - are afraid that, at the same time as the unit increases its operational strength, something of the familial feeling will be lost.

[iguecoff]

¿Estos marinos no tienen alguna fragata o no la necesitan? Porque de poder no creo que les haga falta.

[Experten]

El alcance de las operaciones de la Marina Israelí es el más amplio de Oriente Medio y del Este del Mediterráneo, si Israel no necesita fragatas es simplemente porque con lo que tiene supera ampliamente a sus potenciales adversarios y vecinos, que en su mayoría tienen equipo obsoleto y muy pobre.

[__DiaMoND__]

con las saar 4,5 pueden ir y volver desde haifa hasta la costa española del mediterráneo sin problema en operaciones

a todas luces suficiente

si piensan en algo de 2200 toneladas están doblando la capacidad de las saar 5

[Mauricio]

No puedo estar en más DES-acuerdo.

Las lecciones del INS Eilat demuestran que HHY necesita de modo urgente de una fragata. Una fragata de verdad con capacidad AAW de verdad y no un sistema de última instancia cuando ya todo ha fallado (CIWS) y un misil que es poco más que eso (Barak). Una plataforma además capaz de dar apoyo de fuego de verdad a fuerzas operando en un litoral. Y no, el Oto de 76 no cuenta porque para que cuente hay que acercarse tanto a la costa que luego pasa lo que pasa. Se necesita urgentemente de una plataforma con una pieza de 127, capaz de operar uno o más helicópteros y preferiblemente un radar y sistema misilístico capaz de derrotar misiles enemigos.

El LCS-I era para mí el mínimo pasable. Ni siquiera ideal, sino pasable.

[SAAB]

El alcance de las operaciones de la Marina Israelí es el más amplio de Oriente Medio y del Este del Mediterráneo, si Israel no necesita fragatas es simplemente porque con lo que tiene supera ampliamente a sus potenciales adversarios y vecinos, que en su mayoría tienen equipo obsoleto y muy pobre.

Hola.

No exactamente.Las armadas con mas alcance en el Este del mediterraneo,podrian ser las de Turquia y Grecia.La de Egipto,no se si se deberia de considerar,ya que tiene algunas unidades de consideración como las FFG7 y las Descubierta.

Sobre lo que comenta Mauricio,si necesitan una unidad con mas potencia AAW y un mayor cañon para proporcionar apoyo,se podrian considerar mas las F124 Alemanas o las FREEM.

Un Saludo.

[reytuerto]

Hola Mauricio:

Pienso de manera semejante, pero pensando no en ESSM sino en SM-3, un misil en trayectoria balística desde Siria podría ser interceptado desde el mar . Un cañón de 5' o superior me parece correcto, pero ¿qué pieza? Un abrazo.

[Malcomn]

Una muy interesante opción esta que comenta ReyT, no creo que nadie pusiera ojitos malos a tener algun AEGIS dando vueltas por allí. El problema radica, como casi siempre, en si se lo pueden permitir teniendo en cuenta todo el resto de los gastos. Aunque me extrañaría que no lo hubieran estudiado ¿no se les ha ofrecido nada similar por parte de USA alguna vez?

Saludos.

[bentexui]

Si, las AFCON españolas, pero al final quedo en nada.

[Experten]

No puedo estar en más DES-acuerdo.

Las lecciones del INS Eilat demuestran que HHY necesita de modo urgente de una fragata. Una fragata de verdad con capacidad AAW de verdad y no un sistema de última instancia cuando ya todo ha fallado (CIWS) y un misil que es poco más que eso (Barak). Una plataforma además capaz de dar apoyo de fuego de verdad a fuerzas operando en un litoral. Y no, el Oto de 76 no cuenta porque para que cuente hay que acercarse tanto a la costa que luego pasa lo que pasa. Se necesita urgentemente de una plataforma con una pieza de 127, capaz de operar uno o más helicópteros y preferiblemente un radar y sistema misilístico capaz de derrotar misiles enemigos.

El LCS-I era para mí el mínimo pasable. Ni siquiera ideal, sino pasable.

Bueno, es cierto que para una operación sostenida como la del Líbano si hace falta una embarcación mas grande, con armamento más pesado, pero en una guerra convencional, la Marina Israelí lo ha hecho muy bien sin necesidad de buques mas grandes.

En General, creo que la Marina Israelí cumple muy bien con todos sus propósitos, hace falta algo más de poder, es cierto, en eso estoy muy deacuerdo, pero en General esta varios escalones por encima del resto de las Marinas de la región.

Respecto a la Marina Helena y Turca, si bien sus flotas de superficie son más grandes y están mejor equipadas, la flota Submarina Israelí tiene una capacidad de ataque que no tienen estas dos.

Saludos SAAB y Mauricio.

[SAAB]

Respecto a la Marina Helena y Turca, si bien sus flotas de superficie son más grandes y están mejor equipadas, la flota Submarina Israelí tiene una capacidad de ataque que no tienen estas dos.

Saludos SAAB.

Hola.

¿A que capacidades de ataque te refieres?

Por que en pocas cosas,la marina Israelí supera a la Turca y Griega.Lo unico que destacaria sobre estas 2 seria la capacidad de lanzar el Deliah.En todo lo demas es superada por ambas armadas.

Un Saludo.

[Mauricio]

No puedo estar en más DES-acuerdo.

Las lecciones del INS Eilat demuestran que HHY necesita de modo urgente de una fragata. Una fragata de verdad con capacidad AAW de verdad y no un sistema de última instancia cuando ya todo ha fallado (CIWS) y un misil que es poco más que eso (Barak). Una plataforma además capaz de dar apoyo de fuego de verdad a fuerzas operando en un litoral. Y no, el Oto de 76 no cuenta porque para que cuente hay que acercarse tanto a la costa que luego pasa lo que pasa. Se necesita urgentemente de una plataforma con una pieza de 127, capaz de operar uno o más helicópteros y preferiblemente un radar y sistema misilístico capaz de derrotar misiles enemigos.

El LCS-I era para mí el mínimo pasable. Ni siquiera ideal, sino pasable.

Bueno, es cierto que para una operación sostenida como la del Líbano si hace falta una embarcación mas grande, con armamento más pesado, pero en una guerra convencional, la Marina Israelí lo ha hecho muy bien sin necesidad de buques mas grandes.

En General, creo que la Marina Israelí cumple muy bien con todos sus propósitos, hace falta algo más de poder, es cierto, en eso estoy muy deacuerdo, pero en General esta varios escalones por encima del resto de las Marinas de la región.

Estimado Experten,

La Armada era capaz de cumplir con éxito sus misiones de los '70s y '80s. Pero la amenaza que enfrenta Israel desde el mar ha ido evolucionando. Por un lado se necesita de un número importante de lanchas pequeñas, muy rápidas y de buena pegada para su tamaño, armadas con piezas capaces de sostener altas tasas cíclicas de fuego, de prevenir con éxito operaciones de infiltración y de apoyar a FOES en el litoral. Este tipo de unidad si existe en cantidad adecuada en HHY en la forma de Super Dvora y Shaldag. Entre Shaldags y Dvoras de distintas variantes hay como 30 unidades en servicio.



Pero luego tenemos los barcos de verdad y aquí es donde vamos flaqueando. Recordemos que los tres Eilats son corbetas que a lo mejor pueden defenderse a sí mismas, pero no mucho más que eso. Durante la guerra del 2006 se plantearon estacionar una en medio de la bahía de Haifa para defenderse de misiles de cierta entidad, pero al final eso no funcionó. Por un lado tenemos que tres barcos de verdad son muy pocos para permitir a HHY cumplir sus misiones en dos mares, especialmente ante la posibilidad que se "presenten dificultades" ( ) en trasladar barquitos de un mar al otro. Mi opinión coincide con la del Rey: HHY necesita de algo con SM-3, con capacidad ABM creíble y preferiblemente integrada al sistema Homa. Ya me dirán que para eso existe el Arrow 2/3, pero de cualquier modo la capacidad de estacionar una fragata a distancia de Israel y fusionar los datos obtenidos por su radar a la información obtenida por los radares del Homa solamente pueden mejorar las probabilidades de bajar todos los misiles enemigos.

Luego tenemos el asunto de equipamiento para las amenazas convencionales que históricamente HHY ha enfrentado. Se suele decir que las Eilat son hormigas atómicas, pero no se suele mencionar la cantidad de equipos que se deseaban incorporar pero nunca llevaron por el serio sobrepeso y la falta de espacio. Por ejemplo... ¿El array remolcado? Nunca lo instalaron. Pudiera llevar el Coris-TAS, pero no lo lleva. O sea, depende del sonar de casco para la misión ASW. Uno pudiera pensar que para eso se lleva el helicóptero, pero los Atalef son versiones MA del Dauphin, o sea... la versión SAR con radar Telephonics.

Luego están las Saar 4.5, que no tengo idea hasta cuándo planeen usar. Recordemos que son cascos modernizados entre finales de los '80s y los '90s, pero de construcción de principios y mitad de los '70s. Además limitados por su tamaño. Como llevan una suite electrónica más acorde a una corbeta bien armada la gente se engaña y asume que pueden hacer lo que una corbeta, pero no es así. Un barquito de 500 TM no va a poder acomodar un mástil importante y los sensores van a ir más apretados, más bajos y con su performance degradado de modo acorde. Y eso es antes de comerse un misil. Un 4.5 se hubiera partido en dos si se comía un C-802 como el que sacó de combate a la Hanit.

En resúmen: necesitan algo que pueda acomodar un radar importante, SM-3, una suite ASW de verdad y uno o más helicópteros en la clase del LAMPS III.

[Mauricio]

Fotos de antaño. Una de las unidades olvidadas de las IDF - Shayetet 11, las fuerzas anfibias:

Ejercicio de desembarco anfibio, Ras-a-Tantour, 1973. Nótese el uso extendido de blindados Soviéticos. Y si... las primeras fotos muestran un Tiran ligeramente hundido, los otros carros lo están remolcando...

[alejandro_]

Fotos de antaño. Una de las unidades olvidadas de las IDF - Shayetet 11, las fuerzas anfibias:

Excelentes fotos Mauricion, gracias.

Saludos.