maximo escribió:Te contaré otro secreto: Las chorradas sectarias que sueltas conforme las leo las voy olvidando, así que puedes ahorrarte el trabajo.
Cada vez que alguien escribe algo asi, Dios mata a un gatito.A lo que hay que llegar es que son tan listos que a nadie más se le pudo ocurrir una obviedad como el A400.
Esta me la guardo para cuando la USAF haga su pedido de A400.Lleva una década excediendo las promesas hechas en papel.
Pues te lo repito: revisa lo que el C-17 tenia que hacer y comparalo con lo que hace. Y yo no digo que sea malo. Seguro que es muy bueno... en su extraño segmento. Pero con los criterios que aplicais al A400, el C-17 es una mierda igual. Bueno, un poco mas grande por aquello del tamaño.
Para los "sectariofilicos" advierto que lo siguiente no les va a gustar.... Es un estracto de una fuente secreta de informacion llamada "wikipedia" sobre el desarrollo del C-17:Development continued until December 1985 when a full-scale production contract was signed for 210 aircraft.[13][14] Development problems and limited funding caused delays in the late 1980s.[15] Criticisms were made of the developing aircraft and questions were raised about more cost-effective alternatives during this time.[16][17] In April 1990, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney reduced the order from 210 to 120 aircraft.[18]
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In late 1993, the DoD gave the contractor two years to solve production and cost overrun problems or face termination of the contract after the delivery of the fortieth aircraft.[21] By accepting the 1993 terms, McDonnell Douglas incurred a loss of nearly US$1.5 billion on the development phase of the program.[20]
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In April 1994, the C-17 program was still experiencing cost overruns, and did not meet weight, fuel burn, payload and range specifications. It also failed several key criteria and tests that had been conducted to evaluate its air-worthiness
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Air Force and DoD studies from 1986 and 1991 had claimed that the C-17 could use 6,400 more runways outside the US than the C-5; it was later discovered that this study had only considered the runway dimensions, but not their strength or Load Classification Numbers. The C-5 has a lower LCN than the C-17
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A January 1995 GAO report revealed that while the original C-17 budget was US$41.8 billion for 210 aircraft, the 120 aircraft already ordered at that point had already cost US$39.5 billion
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It was decided not to conduct C-17 LAPES training beyond the testing of a 42,000 lb (19,000 kg) LAPES delivery. There were still airflow problems making it impossible for the C-17 to meet its original airdrop requirements.
(...)The C-17 aircraft program had been plagued by technical difficulties, cost overruns, and related contracting/program management problems.
Esa es de otra fuente secreta de informacion "global security".
Algunos han considerado una tragedia el posible recorte del pedido de A400....¿Como habrian considerado esto?The program was restructured following the OSD Major Aircraft Review in 1990, reducing the planned buy from 210 to 120 aircraft.In January 1995, DoD, Congress, and McDonnell Douglas agreed to decrease the payload requirement. If the C-17 were to carry a 160,000-pound payload using short-field take-off and landing capability with the weight of the plane and the required fuel, it needed more powerful engines. Pratt & Whitney and Rolls Royce, had produced more powerful engines, but the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, John M. Deutch, said changing to more powerful engines was too costly. He preferred to reduce payload specifications rather than change engines, especially since the C-17 did not need to carry a greater payload to perform its mission.
O sea, que problemas en el desarrollo del C-17.... Los que quieras. No me vengais a contar cuentos de hadas.
Los asuntos de desarrollo del C-17 están más que resueltos, como corresponde a un aparato con más de 15 años de servicio a cuestas. No solamente resueltos, sino que con el paso del tiempo cada bloque de producción ha incorporado mejoras y el avión que sale de la línea hoy es mejor que el prometido en papel en los '80s.
Sutil diferencia. Al A400M le queda una década de desarrollo antes de alcanzar un nivel de madurez asimilable. Una cara, cara década para un avión que ya tiene sobrecostos de 50% y no alcanza aún las prestaciones prometidas. Pueden vivir de sueños y anhelos, pero al menos para mí es claro que en este momento la mitad de los socios del programa simplemente no se pueden permitir un proyecto de este calibre.
