Comprendiendo a Josef Stalin: ¿Héroe de la Guerra o lastre?

[DQT]

Sam debatir contigo no tiene mucho sentido, pero no se debe a q no se posea buenos argumentos, si no a q tu punto de vista es muy sesgado. Tus argumentos son normalmete arbitrarios, vacios y ofensivos. Hay q armarse de mucha paciencia para no responderte como te lo mereces.

Aunq creo q la raiz de todo eso es tu falta de humildad.

[antfreire]

Yo creo que Stalin fue muy deficiente, criminal e inexperto durante la SGM. La razon por la cual esos graves defectos no se notaron tanto fue porque Hitler fue a la guerra con la URSS no con la misma intencion que fue contra Francia, Inglaterra, Noruega, Dinamarca, etc. El fue a exterminar a un pueblo y los que quedaran convertirlos en esclavos de la raza dominante. Las diferentes nacionalidades en la URSS comprendieron eso muy temprano en la guerra y entonces combatieron con una fiereza inconcevible y una lealtad absoluta hacia el menos malo.
Por esto es que Stalin se siente completamente derrotado despues del ataque aleman. El piensa que sus subditos se iban a rendir en masa y pedir armas para luchar contra su sistema. Bueno al principio se rindieron en masa pero el trato fue tan brutal a los presioneros y a los territorios ocupados que Hitler termino convirtiendo a un ejercito desmoralizado y mal entrenado en una formidable fuerza que los derroto.

[Sam JOhnson]

Saludos,
Existe el mito de que en Kursk los Soviéticos triunfaron gracias a los grandes números de excelentes T-34 y aviones y a que los dirigentes actuaron con mas madurez e independentes de Stalin.
El hecho es que la calidad de las fuerzas blindadas, aviación y la artillería tiene que haber sido pésima dadas las siguientes cifras:
Al comienzo de la batalla (el ataque alemán), los dos bandos tenian:
Alemania: 518,000 hombres, 2,465 tanques, 7,417 cañones y morteros en movimiento, 2,100 aviones

URSS: 1,426,000 hombres, 4,938 tanques, 31,417 cañones y morteros emplazados, 2,800 aviones, cerca de medio millon de minas antipersonal y poco menos de minas antitanque y kilometros de fosas antitanque, trincheras y alambre de puas.

¡Sin embargo en esta fase los alemanes perdieron solo 323 tanques destruidos y 159 aviones y 54,000 hombres, mientras que los soviéticos perdieron 1,715 tanques, 449 aviones y 178,000 hombres!

En la segunda fase (el contrataque soviético):
Alemania: 625,000 hombres, 2,700 tanques, 9,467 cañones

URSS: 1,987,000 hombres, 8,200 tanques, 47,416 cañones

¡sin embargo en esta fase los alemanes solo perdieron 720 tanques y cañones autotransporados, 170,000 hombres, 681 aviones y los soviéticos perdieron 6,046 tanques o cañones autotransportados, 1,626 aviones y 863,000 hombres!

Stalin, que supuestamente dió libertad a sus generales, prohibió a sus generales cercar a los alemanes, satisfaciendose con hacerlos retroceder.

Por otra parte en Prokhorovka, el supuestamente derrotado Von Manstein imploró repetidas veces a Hitler que le permitiera destruir la mayoría de los tanques soviéticos restantes antes de retirarse, pero Hitler, apanicado por las bajas y preocupado por la invasión de Sicilia, le ordenó retirarse y mandó la division Panzer Leibstandarte SS a Italia.

Dadas estas cifras, ¿es justo concluir que el ejército y liderazgo soviético era eficiente?, ¿no es más logico asombrarse de que los Alemanes no fueran exterminados?.

¿Como es posible que contra tantos hombres, tanques, cañones, aviones, minas, etc, tan pocos hombres, tanques, aviones y cañones alemanes hayan hecho tantisimo daño y aún algunos lograr sobrevivir?

[Yorktown]

division Panzer Grossdeutschland de la SS

Las fuentes de las cifras son igual de fiables?

[DQT]

Bueno yo como q me fio mas de los numeros del Ministerio de Defenza de la Federacion Rusa, segun el cual para principios de junio, redondeando a groso modo:

URSS Alemania
Hombres 1,336,000 900,000
Artilleria, morteros 19,100 10,000
(Sin contar cohetes, ni morteros de 50mm)
Tanques y artilleria autopropulsada 3444* 2733**
Aviones*** 2172 2050


* Incluyendo 900 ligeros ** Incluyendo 360 anticuados *** Sin incluir bombarderos de largo alcance tipo PO-2

Segun tu las perdidas rusas totalizaron 1,041,00 hombres, 7,761 tanques, 2,075 aviones.

Simplemente los numeros no corresponden, si cruzamos datos, los rusos quedaron con algo mas de un centenar de aviones, perdieron el doble de blindados de los q disponian y quedaron con menos de 300 mil hombres.

Si talvez dieras alguna fuente, se te pudiera tomar medianamente enserio, pero esq ni en paginas poco especializadas como wikedia y cualquier otra de poca seriedad dan numeros tan atrevidos.

Esto me suena mucho a tus solidos argumentos tipo 10 rusos = 1 polaco y q Stalin mato ciudadanos de primera y dejo a ciudadanos de segunda ( en la cual estas incluyendo a padres, madres y abuelos de algunos foristas).

[Sam JOhnson]

Saludos DQT,

Si tus números son ciertos, entonces los soviéticos eran aún mucho más deficientes de lo que suponía. ¿de que les servía fabricar muchos más tanques, cañones y aviones que los alemanes, si solo lograban lanzar a la batalla de tanques mas grande de la historia muy pocos tanques, cañones y aviones mas que los alemanes, que los estaban repartiendo por todo el mundo?

Yo les creo mas a los occidentales, pero aún con tus números, cuando les añades las minas, fortificacion, etc, ¿no te parece asombroso que los alemanes hayan podido destruir tanto y escaparse con vida en lugar de ser extreminados?

No lo tomes personalmente, si Stalin mató al genio de Tukhachevski y dejó al inepto de Budyonny no tiene nada que ver con tus ancestros.

[Von Kleist]

Buenas

Por otra parte en Prokhorovka, el supuestamente derrotado Von Manstein imploró repetidas veces a Hitler que le permitiera destruir la mayoría de los tanques soviéticos restantes antes de retirarse, pero Hitler, apanicado por las bajas y perocupado por la invasión de Sicilia, le ordenó retirarse y mandó la division Panzer Grossdeutschland a Italia.

Estimado Sr. Johnson, nuevamente nos "abruma" con sus análisis pletóricos de sapiencia wikipedica... pero las cosas son como son. La situación de Manstein en el sur no era del todo mala, pero el contraataque en el sector de Orel y la entrada en liza de las reservas del 5º Ejército de tanques hacian del todo imposible continuar la operación con unas mínimas perspectivas de éxito. Manstein no podía seguir avanzando con Model luchando por la vida de su 9º ejército en Orel.

Saludos

[Sam JOhnson]

Saludos Von Kleist,
Me voy a tomar la libertad de incluir un archivo que me mando hace como 6 años Eduardo Belgrano, un argentino que vive en EU y es bastante conocedor de la historia y las armas, el barco argentino que hundieron en guerra de las Malvinas fué nombrado en honor a su ancestro. Tambien tengo un archivo de el acerca de Kharkov, si te interesa lo incluyo:

New evidence suggests that the Germans may have been closer to victory at Kursk than previously recognized.

By George M. Nipe, Jr.

Following their disastrous defeat at Stalingrad during the winter of 1942-43, the German armed forces launched a climactic offensive in the East known as Operation Citadel on July 4,1943. The climax of Operation Citadel, the Battle of Kursk, involved as many as 6,000 tanks, 4,000 aircraft and 2 million fighting men and is remembered as the greatest tank battle in history. The high-water mark of the battle was the massive armor engagement at Prochorovka (also spelled Prokhorovka), which began on July 12. But while historians have categorized Prochorovka as a victory of improved Soviet tactics over German firepower and heavy tanks, new evidence casts the struggle at the "gully of death" in a very different light.

The Germans' goal during Citadel was to pinch off a large salient in the Eastern Front that extended 70 miles toward the west. Field Marshal Günther von Kluge's Army Group Center would attack from the north flank of the bulge, with Colonel General Walther Model's Ninth Army leading the effort, General Hans Zorn's XLVI Panzer Corps on the right flank and Maj. Gen. Josef Harpe's XLI Panzer Corps on the left. General Joachim Lemelsen's XLVII Panzer Corps planned to drive toward Kursk and meet up with Field Marshal Erich von Manstein's Army Group South, Col. Gen. Hermann Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army and the Kempf Army, commanded by General Werner Kempf.

Opposing the German forces were the Soviet Central Front, led by General Konstantin K. Rokossovsky, and the Voronezh Front, led by General Nikolai F. Vatutin. The Central Front, with the right wing strengthened by Lt. Gen. Nikolai P. Pukhov's Thirteenth Army and Lt. Gen. I.V. Galinin's Seventeenth Army, was to defend the northern sector. To the south, the Voronezh Front faced the German Army Group South with three armies and two in reserve. The Sixth Guards Army, led by Lt. Gen. Mikhail N. Chistyakov, and the Seventh Guards Army, led by Lt. Gen. M. S. Shumilov, held the center and left wing. East of Kursk, Col. Gen. Ivan S. Konev's Steppe Military District (renamed Steppe Front on July 10, 1943) was to hold German breakthroughs, then mount the counteroffensive.

If their plan succeeded, the Germans would encircle and destroy more than five Soviet armies. Such a victory would have forced the Soviets to delay their operations and might have allowed the Wehrmacht desperately needed breathing room on the Eastern Front. Model's Ninth Army never came close to breaking the Soviet defenses in the north, however, and soon became deadlocked in a war of attrition that it could not win. On the southern flank, Kempf's III Panzer Corps, commanded by General Hermann Breith, also encountered tough Soviet resistance. By July 11, however, Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army was in position to capture the town of Prochorovka, secure a bridgehead over the Psel River and advance on Oboyan. The Psel was the last natural barrier between Manstein's panzers and Kursk. The Fourth Panzer Army's attack on the town was led by SS General Paul Hausser's II SS Panzer Corps, General Otto von Knobelsdorff's XLVIII Panzer Corps and General Ott's LII Army Corps. Hausser's corps was made up of three panzer divisions--the 1st Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler(Adolf Hitler's bodyguard), 2nd SS Das Reich (The Empire) and 3rd SS Totenkopf (Death's Head). Although all three were technically Panzergrenadier divisions, each had more than 100 tanks when Citadel began. Knobelsdorff's corps was composed of the 167th and 332nd infantry divisions, the 3rd and 11th panzer divisions, Panzergrenadier Division Grossdeutschland and Panther Brigade Decker, and Ott's corps contained the 25th and 57th infantry divisions.

Opposing Hausser at Prochorovka was the newly arrived and reinforced Fifth Guards Tank Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Pavel A. Rotmistrov. The Fifth Guards was the Soviet strategic armored reserve in the south, the last significant uncommitted armored formation in the sector, with more than 650 tanks. The Soviet operational armored reserve, General Mikhail E. Katukov's First Tank Army, was already in action against Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army south of the Psel. Katukov's army had been unable to prevent the Germans from reaching the river, however. His VI Tank Corps, originally equipped with more than 200 tanks, had only 50 left by July 10 and 11, and the other two corps of Katukov's army also had sustained serious losses. On July 10, the 3rd SS Division Totenkopf, commanded by SS Maj. Gen. Hermann Priess, had established a bridgehead over the Psel, west of Prochorovka. By July 11, the division's panzer group had crossed the river on pontoon bridges and reached the bridgehead. What was left of Katukov's armor regrouped to oppose the XLVIII Panzer Corps below Oboyan or counterattack the Psel bridgehead. Reinforced with the XXXIII Rifle Corps and X Tank Corps, Katukov launched continuous attacks on the Totenkopf units on the north bank of the river.

During the evening of July 11, Hausser readied his divisions for an assault on Prochorovka. Totenkopf anchored the left flank of the corps, while Leibstandarte, commanded by SS Maj. Gen. Theodore Wisch, was in the center, assembled west of the town between a rail line and the Psel. Das Reich, commanded by SS Lt. Gen. Walter Krüger, moved into its attack zone on the corps' right flank, which was several kilometers south of Tetrevino and southwest of Prochorovka.

While Hausser's SS divisions prepared for battle, there was feverish activity in the Soviet camp as well. On July 11, the Fifth Guards Tank Army arrived in the Prochorovka area, having begun its march on July 7 from assembly areas nearly 200 miles to the east. The army consisted of the XVIII and XXIX Tank Corps and the V Guards Mechanized Corps. Rotmistrov's 650 tanks were reinforced by the II Tank Corps and II Guards Tank Corps, increasing its strength to about 850 tanks, 500 of which were T-34s. The Fifth Guards' primary mission was to lead the main post-Kursk counteroffensive, known as Operation Rumyantsev, and its secondary mission was as defensive insurance in the south. The commitment of Rotmistrov's army at such an early date is stark evidence of Soviet concern about the situation on the Psel. The Fifth Guards' arrival at the Psel set the stage for the Battle of Prochorovka.

Prochorovka is one of the best-known of the many battles on the Eastern Front during World War II. It has been covered in articles, books and televised historical documentaries, but these accounts vary in accuracy; some are merely incomplete, while others border on fiction. In the generally accepted version of the battle, the three SS divisions attacked Prochorovka shoulder to shoulder, jammed into the terrain between the Psel and the railroad. A total of 500 to 700 German tanks, including dozens of Panzerkampfwagen Mark V Panther medium tanks with 75mm guns and Panzerkampfwagen Mark VI Tiger heavy tanks with deadly 88mm cannons, lumbered forward while hundreds of nimble Soviet T-34 medium tanks raced into the midst of the SS armor and threw the Germans into confusion. The Soviets closed with the panzers, negating the Tigers' 88mm guns, outmaneuvered the German armor and knocked out hundreds of German tanks. The Soviet tank force's audacious tactics resulted in a disastrous defeat for the Germans, and the disorganized SS divisions withdrew, leaving 400 destroyed tanks behind, including between 70 and 100 Tigers and many Panthers. Those losses smashed the SS divisions' fighting power, and as a result Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army had no chance to achieve even a partial victory in the south.

While it makes a dramatic story, nearly all of this battle scenario is essentially myth. Careful study of the daily tank strength reports and combat records of II SS Panzer Corps--available on microfilm at the National Archives in Washington, D.C.--provides information that forces a historical reappraisal of the battle. These records show, first of all, that Hausser's corps began with far fewer tanks than previously believed and, more important, that they suffered only moderate losses on July 12, 1943. As those reports were intended to allow the corps commander to assess the combat strength of his divisions, they can be considered reasonably accurate. Considering that information, it seems that the Germans may have been near a limited success on the southern flank of the salient.

The number of SS tanks actually involved in the battle has been variously reported as high as 700 by some authorities, while others have estimated between 300 to 600. Even before the Battle of Kursk began, however, the II SS Panzer Corps never had 500 tanks, much less 700. On July 4, the day before Operation Citadel was launched, Hausser's three divisions possessed a total of 327 tanks between them, plus a number of command tanks. By July 11, the II SS Panzer Corps had a total of 211 operational tanks--Totenkopf had 94 tanks, Leibstandarte had only 56 and Das Reich possessed just 61. Damaged tanks or tanks undergoing repairs are not listed. Only 15 Tiger tanks were still in action at Prochorovka, and there were no SS Panthers available. The battalions that were equipped with Panthers were still training in Germany in July 1943.

On July 13, the day after the Battle of Prochorovka, Fourth Panzer Army reports declared that the II SS Panzer Corps had 163 operational tanks, a net loss of only 48 tanks. Actual losses were somewhat heavier, the discrepancy due to the gain of repaired tanks returned to action. Closer study of the losses of each type of tank reveals that the corps lost about 70 tanks on July 12. In contrast, Soviet tank losses, long assumed to be moderate, were actually catastrophic. In 1984, a history of the Fifth Guards Tank Army written by Rotmistrov himself revealed that on July 13 the army lost 400 tanks to repairable damage. He gave no figure for tanks that were destroyed or not available for salvage. Evidence suggests that there were hundreds of additional Soviet tanks lost. Several German accounts mention that Hausser had to use chalk to mark and count the huge jumble of 93 knocked-out Soviet tanks in the Leibstandarte sector alone. Other Soviet sources say the tank strength of the army on July 13 was 150 to 200, a loss of about 650 tanks. Those losses brought a caustic rebuke from Josef Stalin. Subsequently, the depleted Fifth Guards Tank Army did not resume offensive action, and Rotmistrov ordered his remaining tanks to dig in among the infantry positions west of the town.

Another misconception about the battle is the image of all three SS divisions attacking shoulder to shoulder through the narrow lane between the Psel and the rail line west of Prochorovka. Only Leibstandarte was aligned directly west of the town, and it was the only division to attack the town itself. The II SS Panzer Corps zone of battle, contrary to the impression given in many accounts, was approximately nine miles wide, with Totenkopf on the left flank, Leibstandarte in the center and Das Reich on the right flank. Totenkopf's armor was committed primarily to the Psel bridgehead and in defensive action against Soviet attacks on the Psel bridges. In fact, only Leibstandarte actually advanced into the corridor west of Prochorovka, and then only after it had thrown back initial Soviet attacks.

Early on July 12, Leibstandarte units reported a great deal of loud motor noise, which indicated massing Soviet armor. Soon after 5 a.m., hundreds of Soviet tanks, carrying infantry, rolled out of Prochorovka and its environs in groups of 40 to 50. Waves of T-34 and T-70 tanks advanced at high speed in a charge straight at the startled Germans. When machine-gun fire, armor-piercing shells and artillery fire struck the T-34s, the Soviet infantry jumped off and sought cover. Leaving their infantry behind, the T-34s rolled on. Those Soviet tanks that survived the initial clash with SS armor continued a linear advance and were destroyed by the Germans.

When the initial Soviet attack paused, Leibstandarte pushed its armor toward the town and collided with elements of Rotmistrov's reserve armor. A Soviet attack by the 181st Tank Regiment was defeated by several SS Tigers, one of which, the 13th (heavy) Company of the 1st SS Panzer Regiment, was commanded by 2nd Lt. Michael Wittmann, the most successful tank commander of the war. Wittmann's group was advancing in flank support of the German main attack when it was engaged by the Soviet tank regiment at long range. The Soviet charge, straight at the Tigers over open ground, was suicidal. The frontal armor of the Tiger was impervious to the 76mm guns of the T-34s at any great distance. The field was soon littered with burning T-34s and T-70s. None of the Tigers were lost, but the 181st Tank Regiment was annihilated. Late in the day, Rotmistrov committed his last reserves, elements of the V Mechanized Corps, which finally halted Leibstandarte.

Das Reich began its attack from several kilometers southwest of Prochorovka and was quickly engaged by aggressive battle groups of the II Tank Corps and II Guards Tank Corps. Fierce, somewhat confused fighting broke out all along the German division's axis of advance. Battle groups of 20 to 40 Soviet tanks, supported by infantry and ground-attack planes, collided with Das Reich regimental spearheads. Rotmistrov continued to throw armor against the division, and combat raged throughout the day, with heavy losses of Soviet armor. Das Reich continued to push slowly eastward, advancing into the night while suffering relatively light tank losses.

Meanwhile, on the left flank, Soviet First Tank Army elements unsuccessfully tried to crush Totenkopf's bridgehead. The SS division fought off the XXXI and X Tank Corps, supported by elements of the XXXIII Rifle Corps. In spite of the Soviet attacks, Totenkopf's panzer group drove toward a road that ran from the village of Kartaschevka, southeast across the river and into Prochorovka.

The fighting, characterized by massive losses of Soviet armor, continued throughout July 12 without a decisive success by either side--contrary to the accounts given in many well-known studies of the Eastern Front, which state that the fighting ended on July 12 with a decisive German defeat. These authors describe the battlefield as littered with hundreds of destroyed German tanks and report that the Soviets overran the SS tank repair units. In fact, the fighting continued around Prochorovka for several more days. Das Reich continued to push slowly eastward in the area south of the town until July 16. That advance enabled the III Panzer Corps to link up with the SS division on July 14 and encircle several Soviet rifle divisions south of Prochorovka. Totenkopf eventually reached the Kartaschevka­Prochorovka road, and the division took several tactically important hills on the north edge of its perimeter as well. Those successes were not exploited, however, due to decisions made by Adolf Hitler.

After receiving the news of the Allied invasion of Sicily, as well as reports of impending Soviet attacks on the Mius River and at Izyum, Hitler decided to cancel Operation Citadel. Manstein argued that he should be allowed to finish off the two Soviet tank armies. He had unused reserves, consisting of three experienced panzer divisions of XXIV Panzer Corps, in position for quick commitment. That corps could have been used to attack the Fifth Guards Tank Army in its flank, to break out from the Psel bridgehead or to cross the Psel east of Prochorovka. All of the available Soviet armor in the south was committed and could not be withdrawn without causing a collapse of the Soviet defenses. Manstein correctly realized that he had the opportunity to destroy the Soviet operational and strategic armor in the Prochorovka area.

Hitler could not be persuaded to continue the attack, however. Instead, he dispersed the divisions of the II SS Panzer Corps to deal with the anticipated Soviet diversionary attacks south of the Belgorod­Kharkov sector. On the night of July 17-18, the corps withdrew from its positions around Prochorovka. Thus, the battle for Prochorovka ended, not because of German tank losses (Hausser had over 200 operational tanks on July 17) but because Hitler lacked the will to continue the offensive. The SS panzer divisions were still full of fight; in fact, two of them continued to fight effectively in southern Russia for the rest of the summer.

Leibstandarte was ordered to Italy, but Das Reich and Totenkopf remained in the East. Those two divisions and the 3rd Panzer Division, which replaced Leibstandarte, were transferred to the Sixth Army area, where they conducted a counterattack from July 31 to August 2 that eliminated a strong Soviet bridgehead at the Mius River. Without pause, the three divisions were then transferred to the Bogodukhov sector in early August 1943. Under the command of the III Panzer Corps, they were joined by another unit, the Fifth SS Panzergrenadier Division Wiking. During three weeks of constant combat, the four divisions played a major role in stopping the main Soviet post-Kursk counteroffensive, Operation Rumyantsev. They fought Rotmistrov's Fifth Guards Tank Army, rebuilt to 503 tanks strong, and major portions of the First Tank Army, now at 542 tanks.

By the end of the month, Rotmistrov had less than 100 tanks still running. Katukov had only 120 tanks still in action by the last week of August. While at no time did any of the German divisions have more than 55 tanks in operation, they repeatedly blunted the thrusts of the two Soviet tank armies, which were also reinforced by several rifle corps.

Totenkopf repeatedly cut off and defeated all of the First Tank Army's thrusts toward the Kharkov­Poltava rail line. Das Reich threw back two Soviet tank corps south of Bogodukhov and blunted Rotmistrov's last major attack west of Kharkov, and the III Panzer Corps halted Operation Rumyantsev.

After Kharkov itself fell, however, the German front gradually collapsed. The Soviets regrouped, committed additional strong reserves and renewed their attack toward the strategically important Dnepr River. Army Group South was subsequently forced to abandon much of southern Ukraine in a race for the safety of the Dnepr. Despite the remarkable efforts of the German army and Waffen SS panzer divisions during July and August, the Germans were too weak to hold the Kharkov­Belgorod­Poltava sector after their summer losses.

It is apparent from their operations during the late summer that the SS panzer divisions were not destroyed at Prochorovka. This reassessment of the battle provides food for thought regarding possible German successes if Manstein's panzer reserves had been utilized as he had intended.

To what extent the course of events in The USSR would have been changed is, of course, unknown, but it is interesting to speculate. If Army Group South's panzer reserve had been used to encircle and destroy the Fifth Guards Tank Army and the First Tank Army, the outcome of the war in The USSR might have been significantly different. Although it was beyond the German army's capabilities to force a military end to the war by the summer of 1943, a limited victory in the south could have resulted in a delay of Soviet strategic operations for months or perhaps longer. It is doubtful, however, that this pause would have lasted long enough for the Germans to transfer enough forces to the West to defeat the June 6, 1944, D-Day invasion.

But one fact is beyond any question, regardless of the number of tanks possessed by the Germans or Soviets or what might have been possible. Due to Hausser's panzer corps' failure to take Prochorovka on July 12 and the subsequent misuse of German panzer reserves, the momentum of the Fourth Panzer Army was slowed dramatically. When Hitler abandoned Operation Citadel on July 13, the Germans' last opportunity to influence events on a strategic level in the East was lost.

It is interesting that the information regarding German tank losses at Prochorovka has not been made available before now. Due to the lack of crucial primary-source information--especially the records of the II SS Panzer Corps on the Eastern Front--there had been no evidence to correct the erroneous accounts and impressions given in previous studies of the Eastern Front.

Waffen SS formations' records of their Eastern Front operations were not declassified until 1978­1981. By that time, many of the major works about the Eastern Front had already been published. Later authors accepted the accounts of the battle as given in the earlier books and failed to conduct additional research. As a result, one of the best known of all Eastern Front battles has never been understood properly. Prochorovka was believed to have been a significant German defeat but was actually a stunning reversal for the Soviets because they suffered enormous tank losses.

As Manstein suggested, Prochorovka may truly have been a lost German victory, thanks to decisions made by Hitler. It was fortunate for the Allied cause that the German dictator, a foremost proponent of the value of will, lost his own will to fight in southern Ukraine in July 1943. Had he allowed Manstein to continue the attack on the two Soviet tank armies in the Prochorovka area, Manstein might have achieved a victory even more damaging to the Soviets than the counterattack that had recaptured Kharkov in March 1943.

Michael Wittmann
(April 22, 1914 - August 8, 1944)
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"He was a fighter in every way, he lived and breathed action."
SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Josef "Sepp" Dietrich after Wittmann's death.

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SS-Hauptsturmfuhrer Michael Wittmann was the most successful and famous tank commander of World War II. Wittmann was born on April 22nd of 1914, in Vogelthal near Oberpfalz, in the Hight Palatinat. He was a son of a local farmer - Johann Wittmann.On February 1st of 1934, Wittmann joined Reichsarbeitdienst - RAD (The German Labour Corps) and served for six months, until July.On October 30th of 1934, he enlisted in Germany Army's 19th Infantry Regiment as a Private (for two years). Wittmann left the service on September 30th of 1936, as a Junior Non-Commissioned Officer - Unteroffizier. Shortly after, on April 5th of 1937, Michael Wittmann joined No.1 Sturm of 92nd Standarte of the elite Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler. In late 1937, he received driver training on Sd.Kfz.222 (a four-wheeled light armored car) and then Sd.Kfz.232 (a six-wheeled heavy armored car) and proved to be an excellent driver. Wittmann, then joined the 17th Company which was the Panzer Scout Company of LSSAH. In the summer of 1938, his unit was reduced in status to a Panzer Scout Platoon. In September of 1939, SS-Unterscharführer Michael Wittmann commanded Sd.Kfz.232 of the reconnaissance elements of LSSAH and took part in the Polish Campaign.

In October of 1939, Michael Wittmann joined the 5th Panzerspähkompanie (the depot company of the Leibstandarte) based at Berlin (Lichterfelde), which was an assault gun "academy". In February of 1940, Wittmann was transferred to the newly formed SS-Sturm-Batterie (assault gun battery - Sturmartillerie) of LSSAH, equipped with Sturmgeschutz Ausf A assault guns.The reason for his transfer was that Wittmann held a rank below officer with three years of service and experience on an armored vehicle.At the same time, Wittmann became friends with Hannes Philipsen, Helmut Wendorff, Alfred Günther and other members of that unit. In late 1940, Michael Wittmann started his true panzer combat career in the Balkans (Yugoslavia and Greece). While in Greece, Wittmann was in command of the platoon of Sturmgeschutz III Ausf As (part of LSSAH SS-Sturm-Batterie) and fought there until mid 1941.

On June 11th of 1941, Wittmann along with LSSAH was transferred to the east, in preparations for the upcoming operation "Barbarossa", which started on June 22nd. LSSAH was ordered to advance into southern Russia. On July 12th of 1941, Michael Wittmann received an Iron Cross (Second Class) for destruction of Soviet tanks. Some time later, Wittmann was wounded in combat, but remained with his unit and received the Wound Badge. On September 8th of 1941, he received Iron Cross (First Class) followed after fighting in the Rostov area by the Panzer Assault Badge (for destroying six Soviet tanks in single engagement). Wittmann was also promoted to the rank of SS-Oberscharführer. Until June of 1942, Wittmann fought with his unit in Russia.On June 5th of 1942, because of his outstanding service Wittmann was accepted as a cadet for the officer training in the SS Junkerschule in Bad Tölz (Bavaria).On September 5th of 1942, Wittmann left Bad Tölz school as a Panzer instructor (SS-Panzerausbildungs und Ersatz-Abteilung).


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In Autumn of 1942, 1st Waffen-SS Motorized Division "Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler" was upgraded to the status of a Panzer-Grenadier Division. Also additional 13th Kompanie was equipped with PzKpfw VI Tiger. Training took place at Padeborn in Germany and then at Ploermel in France.In the end of January of 1943, "Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler" was transferred to the Eastern Front. The command of the 13th Kompanie was given to SS-Haupsturmfuhrer Heinz Kling.

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On December 21st of 1942, Wittmann was promoted to the rank of SS-Untersturmführer and on December 24th, he joined the 13th Kompanie of Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler. Michael Wittmann was put in the command of Panzer III Ausf L/M platoon of Tiger company. The platoon was designated to protect the back line of the Tigers from enemy infantry and other obstacles. In the early spring of 1943, Michael Wittmann joined the Tiger company, and left his Panzer III support section. On July 5th of 1943, Wittmann started his combat career on Tiger during the Operation Citadel (Zitadelle). LSSAH was located in the southern sector of the bulge. On the first day of action, Wittmann destroyed two anti-tanks guns and thirteen T-34s, while saving Helmut Wendorff's platoon, which ran into trouble. On July 7th and 8th, Wittmann destroyed two T-34s, two SU-122s and three T-60/70s. On July 12th, Wittmann destroyed eight Soviet tanks, three anti-tank guns and one gun battery. This operation finished on the 17th of July 1943, and included the battle of Kharkov and Kursk along with other engagements. During that time Wittmann's Tiger destroyed 30 Soviet tanks along with 28 guns. On July 29th of 1943, 13th company was used to form schwere SS Panzer Abteilungen 101, which was then attached to LSSAH. In August of 1943, LSSAH was transferred to Italy, for refitting and occupational duties.


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In October of 1943, 1st SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Division "Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler" was reorganized as 1st SS Panzer Division "Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler".

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In sSSPzAbt 101, Wittmann (Tiger #1331) served with other Tiger Aces like: Franz Staudegger (Tiger#1325), Helmut Wendorff (Tiger #1321) and Jürgen Brandt (Tiger #1334). The command of this unit was given to SS-Haupsturmfuhrer Heinz Kling (Tiger #1301). In October of 1943, after the start of Soviet Autumn Offensive, LSSAH was transferred back to the Eastern Front (Kiev area). Also in October, Wittmann changed his Tiger #1331 for the Tiger #S21 and got under his command Jürgen Brandt (Tiger #S24). On October 13th, Wittmann's Tiger destroyed twenty T-34s along with twenty three infantry and anti-tank guns.In December, Wittmann took part in numerous engagements and destroyed a number of Soviet tanks and guns.

On January 13th of 1944, Michael Wittmann received the Knight's Cross for his outstanding service to the Fatherland. "From July of 1943 to the beginning of January 1944 he has destroyed 56 enemy AFVs, including T 34s and super heavy SPs. On 8 and 9 January he and his platoon halted and destroyed breakthrough attempts of a Soviet tank Brigade, and in that battle he destroyed a further ten vehicles. On January 13, nineteen T 34s and three super-heavy SP guns. His total then stood at 88 tanks and SPs." - German radio annoucement, January 13th of 1944. On January 15/16th of 1944, SS-Rottenfuhrer Balthasar (Bobby) Woll received his Knight's Cross. Balthasar Woll was an excellent gunner, who was even able to fire accurately while on the move.

On January 20th, Wittmann was promoted to the rank of SS-Obersturmfuhrer.Two weeks later, on January 30th 1944, Wittmann received following telegram from Adolf Hitlerhimself: "In thankful appreciation of your heroic actions in the battle for the future of our people, I award you as the 380th soldier of the German Wehrmacht, the Oakleaves to the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross. Adolf Hitler.". On February 2nd of 1944, Wittmann received Oak Leafs to his Knights Cross from Führer's hands, in "Führerhauptquartier Wolfsschanze" (Wolfslair - Rastenburg in East PRussia).



Wittmann's Tiger S04 and his crew (left to right):
SS-Untersturmführer Michael Wittmann,
SS-Rottenführer Bobby Woll,
SS-Panzerchütze Werner Irrgang,
SS-Panzerschütze Sepp Rössner and
SS-Sturmmann Eugen Schmidt.

The 88 white rings (kills) were painted for the occasion and the picture was taken by SS-Büschel (Propaganda Kompanie - PK). On the February 28th of 1944, Wittmann's unit, which was under the command ofSS-Hauptsturmführer Heinz Kling, counted five Iron Cross "Knights":SS-Untersturmführer Staudegger, SS-Untersturmführer Wendorf andSS-Hauptsturmführer Kling.SS-Obersturmführer Wittmann was the only one with Oak Leafs to his Knights Cross.During the period from February 29th to March 2nd of 1944, the larger part of the company was transferred to Mons in Belgium. At the time of the transfer, Wittmann received the command of 2nd Kompanie of sSSPzAbt 101 of LSSAH. After leaving Eastern Front, Michael Wittmann stated that the Soviet anti-tank guns were harder and were more prized targets than tanks. On March 1st, Michael Wittmann married Hildegard Burmester and his marriage witness was his gunner - Bobby Woll.


SS-Obersturmführer Michael Wittmann and his Tiger.

At that time, Wittmann became a national hero and was seen everywhere. The propaganda made him into a hero of the entire German nation. In the April of 1944, Wittmann visited the Henschel und Sohn factory at Kassel and spoke to the employees thanking them for their great job on producing Tiger I. During his visit he discovered the production line of Late Type Tiger I Ausf E. In May of 1944, Wittmann re-joined the sSSPzAbt 101 of the LSSAH, which was stationed in the area of Lisieux in Normandy, France.

At the time, Bobby Woll (holder of Iron Cross 1st and 2nd Class and Knight's Cross) received a command of a Tiger and took part in the Normandy battles, where he was wounded (during an air attack) and remained in a hospital until March of 1945. He returned to active service and took part in the final battles on the Western Front. Woll survived the war and became an electrician. He died in 1996.

LSSAH was a part of panzer reserve, which included 12th SS Panzer Division "Hitlerjugend" and the Panzer Lehr Division. At that time the command of sSSPzAbt 101 was given to Heinz von Westernhagen (Tiger #007), while the 1st Kompanie was commanded by Hauptsturmfuhrer Mobius. On the June 6th of 1944 (D-Day), Wittmann got a new late production model Tiger I #205. From 6th to 12th June, sSSPzAbt 101 moved to the invasion front in Normandy. On their way, Wittmann's 2nd Kompanie was reduced to six Tigers by Allied air attacks. Wittmann's company along with the Panzer Lehr Division and the 12th SS Panzer Division "Hitlerjugend" was part of Heeresgruppe under the command of Erwin Rommel. On June 13th, the battle began near Bayeux area. At the time Wittmann's company was near Villiers-Bocage, at the south of Tilly-sur-Seulles (Caen area). On June 13th of 1944, Wittmann's company destroyed entire 4th County of London Yeomanry Regiment travelling on the road No.175 to Villers-Bocage, at the Hill No.213.
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[Von Kleist]

Buenas

Manstein correctly realized that he had the opportunity to destroy the Soviet operational and strategic armor in the Prochorovka area.

He de decir que conocia la tesis que contiene el artículo que has posteado. Pero no la comparto en absoluto. Supongamos que Manstein logra lo que se proponía y llega a Kursk desde el sur. Pero eso no hubiera servido de nada porque:

1. El fracaso de Model en la parte norte del saliente, de hecho invalidaba los objetivos de Ciudadela (destruir a las fuerzas rusas del area de Kursk y eliminar el saliente).

2. La reserva operativa sovietica, el poderoso Frente de la Estepa, estaba prácticamente intacto, mientras que el II PzC SS había sufrido el desgaste de varios dias de accion ininterrumpida.

3. De haber llegado a Kursk, Manstein se habría visto aislado en un saliente poco defendible, y gravemente amenazado por el derrumbe de las defensas alemanas en Orel.

Al menos, ese es mi modesto punto de vista.

Saludos

[Sam JOhnson]

Saludos Von Kleist:
En mi opinion Von Manstein fué el mejor estratega de la SGM (que a pesar de su brillante planeación en Polonia y Francia, no fué tomado en cuenta para Barbarossa y que fué desperdiciado durante los meses mas importantes en Sevastopol y luego tratando de salvar Stalingrado) y si el estaba seguro de poder sacar ventaja en Prokhorovka, estaba mucho mas calíficado que Hitler o nosotros para tomar la decisión.

[Von Kleist]

Buenas

estaba seguro de poder sacar ventaja en Prokhorovka, estaba mucho mas calíficado que Hitler o nosotros para tomar la decisión.

... Asi me dejas con la profundidad de tus argumentos... que quieres que te diga, yo te ofrecido datos que de momento no has rebatido. Pero vamos que no hay que ser Napoleón, ni Manstein, ni Alejandro Magno para comprender que una operación de pinza cuyo eje septentrional primero fracasa y luego se derrumba deja a las unidades del otro flanco peligrosamente expuestas a contraataques...

Saludos

[Sam JOhnson]

Saludos Von Kleist,
Von Manstein solo quería continuar destruyendo otros cientos de tanques en las cargas suicidas de los soviéticos antes de retirarse. Hitler y nosotros evaluamos la situación tratando de conseguir datos, cuando se está en medio de una batalla y después de haber perdido gran parte de tus tanques con las minas, fosas, etc, pero relativamente pocos debido a los tanques enemigos y te encuentras en una buena posición, destruyendo tanques rápidamente desde las colinas como en un campo de tiro, no veo razón para creer que Von Manstein estuviera tan equivocado y Hitler tuviera la razón.
Lo mas irónico es que Hitler habitualmente obligaba a sus generales a continuar peleando cuando era mejor una breve retirada estratégica, causando grandes pérdidas innecesarias.

Si te basas en los números, ubicación y equipo, jamás podras explicar Termópila, Canas, Gaugamela, Bastogne, Curlandia, etc, El buen comandante sabe cuando pelear contra toda posibilidad y cuando retirarse y creo que Von Manstein no era ni imprudente ni incompetente.

[ACB, el Mutie]

Saludos Von Kleist:
En mi opinion Von Manstein [...] y si el estaba seguro de poder sacar ventaja en Prokhorovka, estaba mucho mas calíficado que Hitler o nosotros para tomar la decisión.

Eso es un argumento sinsentido. Cualquiera de nosotros conoce lo que pasó, las tropas casi exactas de cada unidad, tanto amiga como enemiga y conoce los resultados de las batallas. Decir que alguien muy bueno en su trabajo, pero con mucha menos información que nosotros, es más apto para decir si puede ganar o no, es exagerar, en cierto modo, sus cualidades. No estamos hablando de un combate pequeño, sino de una gran batalla que no se decide en un solo combate.

Saludos

[Sam JOhnson]

Repito, Von Manstein no pretendía ganar la batalla sino destruir cientos de tanques más, antes de retirarse y creo que con la experiencia e información de primera mano que tenia, estaba más capacitado que Hitler o nosotros para decidirlo.

Como dije lo increible es que Hitler repetidamente prohibió a Von Paulus, List, Von Rundsted, etc, retirarse aún provisionalmente, cuando estos le informaban que era imprescindible, pero ignoró a Von Manstein cuando este le decía que era conveniente continuar peleando un poco antes de retirarse.

Lo peor que pudo hacer Hitler era forzar la retirada y quitar a Leibstandarte del frente este antes de destruir algunos tanques mas y dejar estos recursos valiosísimos fuera de pelea durante semanas críticas en transito a Italia, tiempo en el que no servían de nada en ninguno de los dos frentes. En Italia solo sirvió para desarmar tropas italianas y despues lo tuvo que regresar a la URSS cuando la situación estaba aún peor

[Von Kleist]

Buenas

Repito, Von Manstein no pretendía ganar la batalla sino destruir cientos de tanques más

Mon Dieu... esto va de mal en peor. Pero en fin, creo que el problema de Manstein era el típico de un comandante de campo con información parcial de lo que sucede en el conjunto de un teatro de operaciones. Efectivamente, el II Cuerpo Panzer SS había inflinjido muchas bajas a las fuerzas enemigas en el sector del Psel. Pero no se puede perder de vista que:

1. Manstein no conocia la magnitud real de las reservas rusas.

2. Manstein no estaba al cargo de la desesperada situacion en Orel.

3. Manstein no conocia que aparte de la operacion de Orel, los rusos preparaban otra contraofensiva en el mismo sector de Jarkov (aunque, desde luego, iba a tardar poco en descubrirlo).

Sr. Johnson, si se empeña en defender lo indefendible puede hacerlo. No soy yo quien vaya a negar la genialidad operativa de Manstein. Pero en el caso de la batalla de Kursk, el genial Erich estaba equivocado en su juicio sobre las posibilidades de éxito de la operación.

Saludos