Fuerza Aérea de Israel

[Malcomn]

Yo tenia entendido que el problema era que le quedaba algo más para acabar de desarrollarlo y urgía tener uno ya.

Saludos.

[Mauricio]

Hola a todos:
Hola Mauricio:
Una pregunta, ¿es el sistema Iron Dome mejor que un láser -que se veía muy promisor- en el rol anti-Katiuska? Es que los kassam son munición bastante barata y pueden ser disparados en salvas, tal vez desde lugares diferentes (y aunque los lanzadores puedan ser neutralizados por la IAF, una vez los cohetes estén en el aire, habrá una potencial catástrofe en tierra; hasta donde había leído, con un sistema láser se podía cambiar de objetivo casi instantáneamente) y con la posibilidad de saturar las defensas. ¿Es el Iron Dome una medida interina hasta que esté a punto el sistema lasérico? Anticipadas gracias y un abrazo.

El láser era muy promisorio, pero quedaban varios asuntos técnicos por resolver. El mayor de ellos que no era posible miniaturizarlo lo suficiente como para montarlo en un chasis transportable. Luego hubo asuntos por resolver con la tecnología misma del láser. El THEL Nautilus utiliza un láser de fluoruro de deuterio, hijo del proyecto MIRACL del US Army en los '80. El láser suele exhibir notoria pérdida de potencia a medida que su haz se propaga, lo que limitaba su verdadero radio de acción a unos 5 Km. Apostar por el láser hubiera sido apostar por un sistema de cobertura mas o menos limitada por la combinación de pobre movilidad y pequeño radio de acción. La parte atractiva era la promesa de costos de intercepción minúsculos en comparación a un misil.

En White Sands no lo hizo nadita mal, pero siempre hubo interrogantes acerca de su verdadera habilidad ante salvas de cohetes. También hubo un número de problemas con el control de calidad en la producción del láser. No fué determinante, pero fué uno de los factores que eventualmente llevaron a que la compañía que lo fabricaba (TRW) fuera absorbida dentro de Northrop Grumman.

[reytuerto]

Hola Mauricio:
En mi ignorancia, yo suponía que el tamaño y la portabilidad del sistema láser, siendo importantes eran secundarios, en la misión anti-katiuska. En realidad no se cual es la distancia de intercepción de los misiles Iron Dome, pero con 5 kms, el láser pintaba bien (nuevamente, en mi ignorancia) para defender poblaciones en el rango de los kassam y grad. No estoy al tanto del costo de cada sistema láser, pero imagino que son lo suficientemente costosos como para evitar poner uno por ciudad, por lo que a la postre, desarrollaron el Iron Dome. Espero que a futuro el sistema laserico se siga desarrollando. un abrazo.

[Mauricio]

Hola Mauricio:
En mi ignorancia, yo suponía que el tamaño y la portabilidad del sistema láser, siendo importantes eran secundarios, en la misión anti-katiuska. En realidad no se cual es la distancia de intercepción de los misiles Iron Dome, pero con 5 kms, el láser pintaba bien (nuevamente, en mi ignorancia) para defender poblaciones en el rango de los kassam y grad. No estoy al tanto del costo de cada sistema láser, pero imagino que son lo suficientemente costosos como para evitar poner uno por ciudad, por lo que a la postre, desarrollaron el Iron Dome. Espero que a futuro el sistema laserico se siga desarrollando. un abrazo.

Diagrama de una estación THEL para darse una idea del tamaño:



Sus componentes:



Y con dos adultos para referencia de tamaño:



Era una cosa bastante sustancial. En general en Israel se opta por defensas móviles. A no ser que sean cosas que no pueden hacerse en otro lugar (tipo las estacione ELINT en el Hermón), siempre prefieren móvil porque es mucho más defendible. Como por ejemplo las baterías Arrow, montadas todas en chasis de camión.

En Israel no lo dicen, pero la realidad es que no pueden defender cada ciudad todo el tiempo. Israel simplemente no se podía permitir un THEL en cada lugar donde es concebible que sea necesario. Y lo mismo con el Iron Dome - van a pasar años ante que estén operacionales en la cantidad mínima para defender cada ciudad a tiro de cohete artillero.

[de guiner]

Interesante lo de la estación THEL, estimado Mauricio.

Un saludo.

[Mauricio]

Bill Sweetman en ARES con respecto al primer escuadrón de F-35 para la HHA.

Israel, Deterrence and the F-35

Posted by Bill Sweetman at 8/16/2010 8:55 AM CDT

Israel's announcement of a forthcoming decision to acquire 20 F-35As, for delivery between 2015 and 2017, happened to come the week after the big Strategic Command symposium on deterrence in Omaha. One of the speakers was Avi Schnurr, executive director of the Israel Missile Defense Association, and what he said is, I think, relevant in understanding what Israel might do with a 20-strong F-35 force.

Schnurr pointed out that Israel's deterrent philosophy is, first of all, based on the principle of "denying benefit" - that is, putting the adversary in a position where he is not confident that his attack will work: hence, the huge US-Israeli investment in ballistic missile defense (BMD).

But, Schnurr adds, it is denying benefit "with a twist. It's not a win/loss calculation. It's the case of an ideologically driven enemy whose aim is to credibly project a vision of victory and intimidate other powers in the region."

As a result, Israel sees the need to ensure that missile attacks visibly fail, and Schurr points out that there are three elements to missile defense: active BMD, passive defense and attack. "The combination of all three is very powerful", he told the Omaha meeting.

Passive defense, by the way, goes beyond shelters: Israel is hardening its infrastructure against electromagnetic pulse and similar threats and developing recovery plans.

Attacking adversary missile systems on the ground, meanwhile, "suppresses the launch rate and makes active defenses more effective." Schnurr says that the IDF learned a lot about counter-missile operations very quickly in the 2006 Lebanon war - and points out that the ideological opponent outlined above does not want to suffer a visible defeat.

While I have taken issue with Lockheed Martin's claims that the JSF does everything better than any other fighter for less money, even its critics and competitors concede that it should do a competent job of doing what its biggest customer wanted: a sort of Super F-117, with the addition of adverse-weather and moving-target sensors, and the situational awareness and self-defense capability to survive in daylight.

Moreover, if your goal was to use a small force of F-35Is as a counter-missile sniper force, there are a lot of things you could do to improve it, with greater or lesser difficulty. If you were willing to trade sortie rates and maintenance times for stealth (as was done on the F-117 and B-2) you could apply more external coatings. If your mission does not require supersonic speed you could even change the engine nozzle. You could also provide outside support in the form of stand-in jamming from UAVs.

It's even conceivable - since Rafael is thinking in that direction - that a customized F-35 could pack its own active missile defense system, and its DAS would be quite useful in targeting something of that kind.

That capability faces an adversary, particularly one trying to deploy nuclear missiles or other weapons of mass destruction, into a defensive posture. The missiles either have to be bunkered and vulnerable to a hard-target weapon attack, or mobile, which makes them hard to find, but also hard to defend and easy to kill. In either case they are susceptible to non-nuclear attack.

If I'm remotely right about this, I would expect that the first batch of F-35Is would, upon delivery, disappear into a black hole of secrecy and never be seen in public.

[Mauricio]

Siguiendo el modelo adoptado con los Grobs con los que se estrenan los candidatos a piloto:

IAF to lease new training aircraft to replace Skyhawks

By YAAKOV KATZ

08/26/2010 23:27

Barak to submit information request for South Korean and Italian trainer aircraft.

Financial concerns and dwindling budgets are requiring the Israeli Air Force to come up with innovative funding mechanisms as it seeks to continue upgrading its fleet of aging aircraft.

Defense Minister Ehud Barak gave his provisional approval last week to purchase 20 F-35 stealth Joint Strike Fighters and the IAF is now in the final stages of submitting an official Request for Information (RFI) for a South Korean and Italian trainer aircraft which it hopes to use to replace its legendary fleet of A-4 Skyhawks.

Known in Israel as the Ayit (Hawk), the Skyhawk first arrived in Israel in 1967 after the Six Day War and was the first fighter jet that the United States agreed to sell Israel.

It served prominently in the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and in the First Lebanon War in 1982.

After that war, the IAF decided to phase out the jet from operational service and began using it as an advanced trainer for cadets in the IAF pilot’s course after completing their initial flight training on Fougas, which have also recently been replaced by the Beechcraft T6 turboprop.

The IAF is looking seriously at two candidates to replace the Skyhawk. The first is Italy’s Alenia Aermacchi M-346 transonic trainer aircraft, in use in Italy and Singapore.

Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi has lobbied Israel heavily on behalf of the plane’s manufacturer and the jet is seen as a leading candidate within diplomatic corridors due to the close ties Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has with his Italian counterpart.

The main contender is the T-50 Golden Eagle made in South Korea in conjunction with Lockheed Martin. The single-engine jet can carry up to two pilots and, with a high-mounted canopy and tandem seating, allows pilots superior visibility. It is considered one of the best trainers in the world. Last year, IAF pilots flew to South Korea to examine the jet.

Closure of the deal has, however, been delayed by budgetary constraints – particularly in light of the pending JSF deal, which is expected to cost the IAF around $2.75 billion for 20 planes that will begin arriving in Israel in 2015.

Therefore, instead of paying for the aircraft, the Defense Ministry has decided to go with a proposal from Elbit Systems and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) which will purchase the trainers and subsequently lease flight hours to the IAF.

[Yorktown]

Una pregunta. Ahora que lo pienso, todo esto del escudo anticohetes lo maneja la IAF o el Ejercito?

Saludos.

[Mauricio]

El Ministerio de la Defensa y las IDF mantienen una organización conjunta (Israel Missile Defense Organization) que se encarga de los asuntos del sistema Homa, con participación de la industria.

http://www.mod.gov.il/pages/homa/index.html

El desarrollo del sistema está a cargo de MAFAT, un órgano dependiente del Ministerio de la Defensa. Los operadores son personal de HHA.

[Mauricio]

Una nota acerca del Escuadrón Agresor de HHA:

Flying Dragons simulate the enemy for Israel Air Force pilots

With aerial dogfights a thing of the past, the Flying Dragon squadron mimics the enemy in order to prepare IAF pilots for combat.

By Anshel Pfeffer



Squadron 115, based far from the major bases of the Israel Air Force, in the Ovda airfield north of Eilat, borrows pilots and jets from other squadrons, doesn't take part in combat operations and gets grounded if a war breaks out. The mission of the "Red Squadron," also known as Flying Dragon, is a different one: to simulate the enemy.

A year ago, as part of a course to mentally prepare pilots for combat, a squadron was selected as the Reds' first victim. One after another, the training monitor told pilots over the radio that they had been "downed" by the enemy and were requested to return to base immediately.

"That evening they called us to ask what they had done wrong, how we got them," said Red Squadron commander Lt. Col. Eyal. "We told them not to call us anymore and to talk to their squadron commander. We only meet up in the air, we told them. You have to draw your own conclusions, just like in war."

Squadron 115, which effectively serves as the operational branch of the IAF training department, runs that department's Advanced Training Center. It was established in its current form five years ago, in a controversial move by the previous IAF commander, Maj. Gen. Eliezer Shkedy. Recognizing that the air force was lacking something crucial in its training, the decision was made to allocate planes and pilots for enemy simulation.

The last time the IAF downed an enemy airplane was in 1986. Generally speaking, the Israel Air Force has not fought an army with air defense and fighting jets since 1982. The last time the IAF fought an intense campaign in which airplanes were downed on a daily basis and pilots were killed or captured, was during the Yom Kippur War of 1973.

At 36, Eyal does not see a great disadvantage in the fact that pilots from his generation have never fought in an air war.

"In the Yom Kippur War, they said at first that someone who hadn't flown in the Six-Day War couldn't fight, and it turned out that the young pilots fought just as well as the veterans," he said. "When I was a young pilot I also flew with pilots who had combat experience, and I can't say they were any better or worse. It's not even clear if the lessons from the old dogfights are still relevant today, when we're using much more precise ammunition."

The Syrian scenario

The Red Squadron pilots are trained to create scenarios as close as possible to situations in which pilots just out of flight school might find themselves in a war. The word "Iran" won't be mentioned in any on-record conversation, and even the abstract "outer-circle missions" term is no longer used, due to censorship and information security rules prohibiting pilots and commanders in the air force from discussing operational plans.

But there's an enemy closer to home about whom it is permissible to talk; as part of the Red Squadron routine, flying suits are marked with Syrian flags and their names are replaced with Arabic ones. They even exchange a few words in Arabic with the control tower as they set off, to get into the mood.

As part of preparation for combat, pilots who are "downed" by the Red Squadron don't return to their base for a routine debriefing. Instead, they are taken on an exhausting all-night march which ends, at best, with a helicopter rescue or, at worst, with simulated captivity - a more sophisticated version of the captivity training undergone by pilots and elite groups.

"We take the squadron through a kind of a failure and crisis process over two days," Eyal says. "Along with the base psychologist, we take pilots through difficult scenarios. Then we rebuild the squadron through success up in the air."

As all IAF airplanes lost in both Lebanon wars were downed by ground fire, the Red Squadron also operates a team of Cobra helicopters and a ground force. When the Reds are training other helicopter squadrons, the Cobras move quickly from place to place, using flares to simulate shoulder missiles used by Hamas and Hezbollah.

[Mauricio]

Contrato firmado, F-35 para HHA:

http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340 ... 19,00.html

[Malcomn]

Buena noticia, ¿de cuantos aviones estariamos hablando?

Saludos.

[Juan David]

Buena noticia, ¿de cuantos aviones estariamos hablando?

Saludos.

Malcomn,

Si lees la nota hasta el final, verás que dice que el precio x unidad es de 96 millones de dólares.

Si dividimos 2750 (monto total) entre 96 (precio unitario) nos daría algo como 28.6 aviones!! mmm

Poniéndole lógica comprarían unos 24 y el resto en simuladores y cositas!

Saludos.

[Mauricio]

Buena noticia, ¿de cuantos aviones estariamos hablando?

Saludos.

Malcomn,

Si lees la nota hasta el final, verás que dice que el precio x unidad es de 96 millones de dólares.

Si dividimos 2750 (monto total) entre 96 (precio unitario) nos daría algo como 28.6 aviones!! mmm

Poniéndole lógica comprarían unos 24 y el resto en simuladores y cositas!

Saludos.

Son 20 aviones.

[Experten]

¿Si les van a permitir modificar los F-35A para que carguen sus propios jammers y misiles?

Esperemos que si, sería fenomenal para clientes de exportación.

Por cierto aqui si tengo una duda importante ¿Tienen planeado Rafael e IAI desarrollar una versión scramjet del misil Derby?