He encontrado este hilo buscando sobre portaaviones en la guerra del Pacífico.
¡Me ha parecido magnifico! Lo escrito y las ilustraciones dan para hacer un libro. Sobre Midway hay mucho material en la web pero, por ejemplo, hay mucho menos sobre el Mar del Coral.
Aquí esta todo muy bien documentado y la redacción es muy amena.
Mis felicitaciones al autro, Sergiopl
El Pacífico: La Guerra de los Portaaviones
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Jose Luis JLF
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sergiopl
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El Pacífico: La Guerra de los Portaaviones
Jose Luis JLF escribió:He encontrado este hilo buscando sobre portaaviones en la guerra del Pacífico.
¡Me ha parecido magnifico! Lo escrito y las ilustraciones dan para hacer un libro. Sobre Midway hay mucho material en la web pero, por ejemplo, hay mucho menos sobre el Mar del Coral.
Aquí esta todo muy bien documentado y la redacción es muy amena.
Mis felicitaciones al autro, Sergiopl
Gracias Jose Luis
Debo decir que sobre el Mar del Coral he encontrado mucha mas información desde que escribí el artículo. Algún día ampliaré esa parte... al paso que voy será sobre 2020 o así
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flanker33
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El Pacífico: La Guerra de los Portaaviones
Hola Sergiopl,
Quería comentarle una cosa, y es que me ha parecido en el relato de la batalla, que la efectividad de las CAP,s, sobre todo la norteamericana, pero también la japonesa no fueron lo que se podía esperar de ellas, y por contra, el fuego antiaereo si fue relativamente más efectivo, pero puede ser una apreciación personal mía.
Saludos.
Quería comentarle una cosa, y es que me ha parecido en el relato de la batalla, que la efectividad de las CAP,s, sobre todo la norteamericana, pero también la japonesa no fueron lo que se podía esperar de ellas, y por contra, el fuego antiaereo si fue relativamente más efectivo, pero puede ser una apreciación personal mía.
Saludos.
"Si usted no tiene libertad de pensamiento, la libertad de expresión no tiene ningún valor" - José Luís Sampedro
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sergiopl
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El Pacífico: La Guerra de los Portaaviones
Hola flanker33:
La CAP norteamericana, debido a problemas con el radar, la relativa escasez de cazas y errores "doctrinales" y humanos (con especial hincapié en las comunicaciones y la coordinación) tuvo un rendimiento muy pobre para lo que se esperaba de ella. El FDO del "Enterprise", Jack Griffin, fue muy criticado por los pilotos de caza estadounidenses tras la batalla, aunque hay que decir que la mayoría de los errores que cometió son comprensibles (teniendo en cuenta la tecnología de la época... y que Griffin, pese a su gran experiencia teórica, participaba en su primera acción de combate). En cambio, la artillería antiaérea de la USN, que ya se había cobrado numerosas víctimas entre los aviadores japoneses en las 3 batallas anteriores, se hizo todavía mas potente con la inclusión de los nuevos cañones Bofors en el "Big E" y buques modernos con un enorme volumen de fuego AA, como el acorazado "South Dakota" y el crucero ligero antiaéreo "San Juan".
Analizando friamente los datos, y teniendo en cuenta un detalle importante como el que el atacante fuera derribado antes de lanzar su bomba o su torpedo, podemos ver que:
- en el ataque coordinado de los bombarderos en picado y los torpederos contra la TF-17 fueron abatidos un total de 24 aparatos: 12 de ellos por la AAA y otros 12 por aviones (11 cayeron a manos de los Wildcat y 1 fue abatido por un Dauntless). El problema es que los cazas no interceptaron a las formaciones enemigas antes de que iniciaran el ataque (varios de los derribos tuvieron lugar después de que los Val y los Kate hubieran soltado sus bombas y torpedos).
- en el primer ataque contra el "Enterprise" (el de los bombarderos en picado) se repitió la historia: los Wildcat interceptaron tarde a los intrusos (debido a su insuficiente velocidad ascensional y su mala posición inicial) y abatieron unicamente a 2 de los Val antes de que estos iniciaran el ataque. De los 10 bombarderos en picado abatidos, parece que sólo 3 lo fueron por los cazas, siendo los restantes víctimas de la AAA.
- en el ataque de los torpederos contra el "Big E" parece que sólo 2 fueron abatidos por la AAA, mientras que los Wildcat dieron cuenta de 4 (2 de ellos después de lanzar sus torpedos) y además consiguieron un "mission kill" sobre otro y también dañaron gravemente al que se estrelló contra el "Smith" (otros 3 fueron alcanzados pero continuaron adelante). La CAP ya estaba desorganizada a esas alturas, pero de un modo u otro al menos consiguió reducir el número de torpederos en un 25% antes de que lanzaran sus armas... hay que decir que en este caso se debió mas a la "performance" de algunos de los pilotos y a la escasez de Ceros de escolta que a otra cosa.
- el tercer y último ataque contra el "Enterprise", el de los Aichi D3A del "Junyo", se saldó con 8 aparatos japoneses abatidos: 5 de ellos fueron víctimas de los Wildcat e incluso de algún Dauntless... pero ninguno fue abatido antes de lanzarse al ataque, pues la CAP ya no era efectiva a esas alturas.
En total, y si mis cuentas son correctas, el balance sería de 24 aviones de ataque abatidos por la AAA y otros 24 por los cazas, aunque de estos 24 la mayoría ya habían llevado a cabo sus pasadas de ataque debido a los problemas a la hora de interceptar al enemigo a una distancia suficiente de los portaaviones y con un número suficiente de cazas.
En cuanto a los japoneses... efectivamente sus cazas tampoco se cubrieron de gloria a la hora de contrarrestar el único ataque serio contra la "Kido Butai" (y menos a la hora de impedir la acción de Strong que dejó fuera de combate al "Zuiho"). Lo cierto es que aunque la organización de la CAP nipona mejoró después del severo correctivo de Midway, la ausencia de radares realmente efectivos y de comunicaciones adecuadas con los cazas hacía realmente complicada una defensa creible. Y la verdad es que los mitificados Ceros siempre tenían problemas cuando se enfrentaban a los SBD Dauntless (a.k.a. "Slow But Deadly"). En ese caso, de 15 atacantes SIN ESCOLTA sólo 2 fueron abatidos (otros 2 debieron de dar media vuelta antes de completar el ataque, gravemente dañados) y hasta 11 llegaron a lanzarse en picado sobre el "Shokaku" ante la oposición de una veintena de cazas enemigos que tuvieron tiempo de sobra para efectuar numerosas pasadas. El problema adicional es que en el caso de los japoneses... la AAA estaba practicamente de adorno. Tendría que mirarlo... pero igual en todas las batallas de 1942 sobran los dedos de las dos manos para contar los SBD y TBD/TBF abatidos por la AAA nipona.
Un saludo.
La CAP norteamericana, debido a problemas con el radar, la relativa escasez de cazas y errores "doctrinales" y humanos (con especial hincapié en las comunicaciones y la coordinación) tuvo un rendimiento muy pobre para lo que se esperaba de ella. El FDO del "Enterprise", Jack Griffin, fue muy criticado por los pilotos de caza estadounidenses tras la batalla, aunque hay que decir que la mayoría de los errores que cometió son comprensibles (teniendo en cuenta la tecnología de la época... y que Griffin, pese a su gran experiencia teórica, participaba en su primera acción de combate). En cambio, la artillería antiaérea de la USN, que ya se había cobrado numerosas víctimas entre los aviadores japoneses en las 3 batallas anteriores, se hizo todavía mas potente con la inclusión de los nuevos cañones Bofors en el "Big E" y buques modernos con un enorme volumen de fuego AA, como el acorazado "South Dakota" y el crucero ligero antiaéreo "San Juan".
Analizando friamente los datos, y teniendo en cuenta un detalle importante como el que el atacante fuera derribado antes de lanzar su bomba o su torpedo, podemos ver que:
- en el ataque coordinado de los bombarderos en picado y los torpederos contra la TF-17 fueron abatidos un total de 24 aparatos: 12 de ellos por la AAA y otros 12 por aviones (11 cayeron a manos de los Wildcat y 1 fue abatido por un Dauntless). El problema es que los cazas no interceptaron a las formaciones enemigas antes de que iniciaran el ataque (varios de los derribos tuvieron lugar después de que los Val y los Kate hubieran soltado sus bombas y torpedos).
- en el primer ataque contra el "Enterprise" (el de los bombarderos en picado) se repitió la historia: los Wildcat interceptaron tarde a los intrusos (debido a su insuficiente velocidad ascensional y su mala posición inicial) y abatieron unicamente a 2 de los Val antes de que estos iniciaran el ataque. De los 10 bombarderos en picado abatidos, parece que sólo 3 lo fueron por los cazas, siendo los restantes víctimas de la AAA.
- en el ataque de los torpederos contra el "Big E" parece que sólo 2 fueron abatidos por la AAA, mientras que los Wildcat dieron cuenta de 4 (2 de ellos después de lanzar sus torpedos) y además consiguieron un "mission kill" sobre otro y también dañaron gravemente al que se estrelló contra el "Smith" (otros 3 fueron alcanzados pero continuaron adelante). La CAP ya estaba desorganizada a esas alturas, pero de un modo u otro al menos consiguió reducir el número de torpederos en un 25% antes de que lanzaran sus armas... hay que decir que en este caso se debió mas a la "performance" de algunos de los pilotos y a la escasez de Ceros de escolta que a otra cosa.
- el tercer y último ataque contra el "Enterprise", el de los Aichi D3A del "Junyo", se saldó con 8 aparatos japoneses abatidos: 5 de ellos fueron víctimas de los Wildcat e incluso de algún Dauntless... pero ninguno fue abatido antes de lanzarse al ataque, pues la CAP ya no era efectiva a esas alturas.
En total, y si mis cuentas son correctas, el balance sería de 24 aviones de ataque abatidos por la AAA y otros 24 por los cazas, aunque de estos 24 la mayoría ya habían llevado a cabo sus pasadas de ataque debido a los problemas a la hora de interceptar al enemigo a una distancia suficiente de los portaaviones y con un número suficiente de cazas.
En cuanto a los japoneses... efectivamente sus cazas tampoco se cubrieron de gloria a la hora de contrarrestar el único ataque serio contra la "Kido Butai" (y menos a la hora de impedir la acción de Strong que dejó fuera de combate al "Zuiho"). Lo cierto es que aunque la organización de la CAP nipona mejoró después del severo correctivo de Midway, la ausencia de radares realmente efectivos y de comunicaciones adecuadas con los cazas hacía realmente complicada una defensa creible. Y la verdad es que los mitificados Ceros siempre tenían problemas cuando se enfrentaban a los SBD Dauntless (a.k.a. "Slow But Deadly"). En ese caso, de 15 atacantes SIN ESCOLTA sólo 2 fueron abatidos (otros 2 debieron de dar media vuelta antes de completar el ataque, gravemente dañados) y hasta 11 llegaron a lanzarse en picado sobre el "Shokaku" ante la oposición de una veintena de cazas enemigos que tuvieron tiempo de sobra para efectuar numerosas pasadas. El problema adicional es que en el caso de los japoneses... la AAA estaba practicamente de adorno. Tendría que mirarlo... pero igual en todas las batallas de 1942 sobran los dedos de las dos manos para contar los SBD y TBD/TBF abatidos por la AAA nipona.
Un saludo.
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sergiopl
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El Pacífico: La Guerra de los Portaaviones
(Procedente de un off-topic en otro hilo )
Sobre el "wargaming" japonés antes de la operación MI (la batalla de Midway):
The capstone to the planning process took place on 1 May on board the battleship Yamato. She was to play host to a series of war games designed to solidify the operational aspects of MI. Here, in a series of map exercises conducted until the 5th, the operational plan was put to the test in front of the command staffs of the various task forces. The forward mess spaces were cleared of their normal furnishings, and a large table surrounded by chairs was put in place. Individual cabins around the ship were used as command posts for the operational staffs involved in the actual operation. At each, the unit’s commander or chief of staff behaved as if he were standing on the bridge of his respective flagship, issuing orders that were relayed by runners to other commands in mimicry of radio communications.
War gaming is an old and respected adjunct to the formulation of military planning, allowing participants to explore issues and make revisions to their plans accordingly. Whatever rules are used, the emphasis during gaming is supposed to be on honestly identifying and correcting errors in operational concepts and preparing contingency plans. Yet from the get-go, the farcical nature of Operation MI’s games was apparent to everyone present. Yamamoto clearly intended this conference not so much as a true exercise, but as a rubber stamp.
During the games, Yamamoto’s chief of staff, Admiral Ugaki, frequently played the role of umpire. In that capacity, he consistently passed down rulings that glossed over the difficulties encountered by the Japanese. In this effort, Ugaki was aided by a lack of preparation for the exercise on the part of the various staff commands. The planning for the operation had proceeded at such a speed in April that proper briefing documents had only lately been distributed to the participants. Thus, the officers now on board Yamato had had very little opportunity to do their homework beforehand. Whether this was a deliberate maneuver on the part of Yamamoto and Ugaki, or simply a reflection of MI being thrown together too quickly, is unknown. The practical effects, however, were identical–the staff officers of the subordinate commands were in an inherently weaker position to criticize the plan’s basic assumptions. As a result, they mostly went along with what they were told.
The attitude of many of the participants, moreover, was that this exercise was little more than a formality. In contrast to the assiduous studies before Pearl Harbor, these games revealed a certain sloppiness. In the words of Nagasawa Ko, who went on to become a rear admiral in the Japanese Naval Self-Defense Forces after the war, the general tenor of the games was one of “This is a necessary drill, but don’t worry, we’ll take care of anything that comes along.” An attitude of bored indifference permeated the various commands, most notably that of First Air Fleet. Nagumo opposed the operation but felt powerless to stop it. At a wedding that May, he remarked to a friend that his superiors “spoke ill” of him already and that if he actively opposed the operation his bravery would be called into question. All things considered, he went on to say, he “would rather go to Midway and die than be branded as a coward.”
What Nagumo thought of the proceedings on board Yamato is not recorded, which is in itself interesting. As “point man” in the operation, he would have been within his rights to ask the sharpest questions of anyone. Yet, he apparently voiced no concerns whatsoever. It must be recalled, though, that Nagumo was in a weak position to object to Yamamoto’s plans in any case. He had been upbraided by his superior for his perceived lack of aggressiveness at Pearl Harbor. And he was clearly out of his element in discussing the complexities of air operations–Genda had to handle these questions for him.
If Nagumo was guilty of being withdrawn, it shortly became clear that Yamamoto and his staff were engaged in being actively disingenuous. The character of the games was established early on when an officer in charge of playing the Red forces (representing the American Navy) submitted a course of action that closely resembled the tactics that would be used by the Americans in the actual battle. Having shown up sooner than anticipated, while the invasion of Midway was in process, Red proceeded to attack Nagumo’s flank. The Japanese carriers were heavily hit, and the invasion was placed in great difficulties. At this juncture, the table judge demurred, asserting that such American tactics were impossible, and reversed the damage to three Japanese carriers. Despite the emotional supplications of the Red player, his plea was overturned and his tactics were recast along lines more in keeping with Yamamoto’s vision as to when and where the foe should show himself.
In a second incident, the Japanese side was playing through the ramifications of an attack by American land-based aircraft against Nagumo’s force. The table judge for the event, Lt. Commander Okumiya Masatake, rolled dice to determine that nine hits had been scored, resulting in both Akagi and Kaga being sunk. Ugaki then personally intervened to revise the number of hits downward to three, leaving Kaga the sole victim of the American attack. Later in the exercise, Kaga was allowed to reappear as a participant in the follow-up operations against Fiji and New Caledonia. Both of these events reinforced the opinion of many of the assembled officers that the operation was fundamentally flawed. However, it was clear that the commander in chief was not prepared to listen to reason on these matters.
Interestingly, near the end of the exercises Yamamoto himself asked what Nagumo would do if an enemy carrier force appeared on his flank while he was engaged in operations against Midway. All eyes turned to Air Officer Genda, whose internal reaction might well have been, “If that happens, we’re in terrible trouble.” But what he uttered instead was a famous Japanese military phrase: “Gaishu Isshoku (One touch of the armored gauntlet!),” meaning roughly “We’ll wipe them out!” Captain Miwa then rose to declare that, because Japanese defensive power was “unbreakable,” the matter was of small concern. Coming from two officers in a Navy whose renunciation of all things defensive bordered on the fanatical, these fanciful answers put a capstone on four days of scripted silliness and underlined the air of unreality that pervaded the operational planning as a whole.
Yamamoto was apparently somewhat put out that First Air Fleet’s staff didn’t have a credible answer to his question. But as another student of the battle has pointed out, he had little grounds to be upset at the failure of a subordinate to supply an original answer in the midst of an exercise that had been so heavily choreographed as to be meaningless. Having done his best to quash all criticism, Yamamoto had thrown honesty and creative thinking out the window as well. Yamamoto did take this opportunity, though, to interject an instruction to Nagumo and his staff that they should reserve at least half of Kid Butai’s attack aircraft in readiness for an antishipping strike should the need arise. However, these orders were verbally transmitted to First Air Fleet; nothing was ever put in writing. At the time, the instructions seemed clear enough. As events would prove, though, their intent would be far from clear-cut a month later.
At the end of the exercise, the situation remained much as before–Yamamoto’s battle plan was unchanged in almost all particulars. The games had served as a monologue. There had been no intellectual discourse, no learning; the entire affair had been a mockery of professional staff work. The net result was that Nagumo would go to battle armed with practically nothing in the way of realistic contingency plans. Whatever difficulties arose would be his to handle, alone.
Fuente: Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway (Parshall y Tully, 2005)
(Algún día terminaré este hilo )
)Sobre el "wargaming" japonés antes de la operación MI (la batalla de Midway):
The capstone to the planning process took place on 1 May on board the battleship Yamato. She was to play host to a series of war games designed to solidify the operational aspects of MI. Here, in a series of map exercises conducted until the 5th, the operational plan was put to the test in front of the command staffs of the various task forces. The forward mess spaces were cleared of their normal furnishings, and a large table surrounded by chairs was put in place. Individual cabins around the ship were used as command posts for the operational staffs involved in the actual operation. At each, the unit’s commander or chief of staff behaved as if he were standing on the bridge of his respective flagship, issuing orders that were relayed by runners to other commands in mimicry of radio communications.
War gaming is an old and respected adjunct to the formulation of military planning, allowing participants to explore issues and make revisions to their plans accordingly. Whatever rules are used, the emphasis during gaming is supposed to be on honestly identifying and correcting errors in operational concepts and preparing contingency plans. Yet from the get-go, the farcical nature of Operation MI’s games was apparent to everyone present. Yamamoto clearly intended this conference not so much as a true exercise, but as a rubber stamp.
During the games, Yamamoto’s chief of staff, Admiral Ugaki, frequently played the role of umpire. In that capacity, he consistently passed down rulings that glossed over the difficulties encountered by the Japanese. In this effort, Ugaki was aided by a lack of preparation for the exercise on the part of the various staff commands. The planning for the operation had proceeded at such a speed in April that proper briefing documents had only lately been distributed to the participants. Thus, the officers now on board Yamato had had very little opportunity to do their homework beforehand. Whether this was a deliberate maneuver on the part of Yamamoto and Ugaki, or simply a reflection of MI being thrown together too quickly, is unknown. The practical effects, however, were identical–the staff officers of the subordinate commands were in an inherently weaker position to criticize the plan’s basic assumptions. As a result, they mostly went along with what they were told.
The attitude of many of the participants, moreover, was that this exercise was little more than a formality. In contrast to the assiduous studies before Pearl Harbor, these games revealed a certain sloppiness. In the words of Nagasawa Ko, who went on to become a rear admiral in the Japanese Naval Self-Defense Forces after the war, the general tenor of the games was one of “This is a necessary drill, but don’t worry, we’ll take care of anything that comes along.” An attitude of bored indifference permeated the various commands, most notably that of First Air Fleet. Nagumo opposed the operation but felt powerless to stop it. At a wedding that May, he remarked to a friend that his superiors “spoke ill” of him already and that if he actively opposed the operation his bravery would be called into question. All things considered, he went on to say, he “would rather go to Midway and die than be branded as a coward.”
What Nagumo thought of the proceedings on board Yamato is not recorded, which is in itself interesting. As “point man” in the operation, he would have been within his rights to ask the sharpest questions of anyone. Yet, he apparently voiced no concerns whatsoever. It must be recalled, though, that Nagumo was in a weak position to object to Yamamoto’s plans in any case. He had been upbraided by his superior for his perceived lack of aggressiveness at Pearl Harbor. And he was clearly out of his element in discussing the complexities of air operations–Genda had to handle these questions for him.
If Nagumo was guilty of being withdrawn, it shortly became clear that Yamamoto and his staff were engaged in being actively disingenuous. The character of the games was established early on when an officer in charge of playing the Red forces (representing the American Navy) submitted a course of action that closely resembled the tactics that would be used by the Americans in the actual battle. Having shown up sooner than anticipated, while the invasion of Midway was in process, Red proceeded to attack Nagumo’s flank. The Japanese carriers were heavily hit, and the invasion was placed in great difficulties. At this juncture, the table judge demurred, asserting that such American tactics were impossible, and reversed the damage to three Japanese carriers. Despite the emotional supplications of the Red player, his plea was overturned and his tactics were recast along lines more in keeping with Yamamoto’s vision as to when and where the foe should show himself.
In a second incident, the Japanese side was playing through the ramifications of an attack by American land-based aircraft against Nagumo’s force. The table judge for the event, Lt. Commander Okumiya Masatake, rolled dice to determine that nine hits had been scored, resulting in both Akagi and Kaga being sunk. Ugaki then personally intervened to revise the number of hits downward to three, leaving Kaga the sole victim of the American attack. Later in the exercise, Kaga was allowed to reappear as a participant in the follow-up operations against Fiji and New Caledonia. Both of these events reinforced the opinion of many of the assembled officers that the operation was fundamentally flawed. However, it was clear that the commander in chief was not prepared to listen to reason on these matters.
Interestingly, near the end of the exercises Yamamoto himself asked what Nagumo would do if an enemy carrier force appeared on his flank while he was engaged in operations against Midway. All eyes turned to Air Officer Genda, whose internal reaction might well have been, “If that happens, we’re in terrible trouble.” But what he uttered instead was a famous Japanese military phrase: “Gaishu Isshoku (One touch of the armored gauntlet!),” meaning roughly “We’ll wipe them out!” Captain Miwa then rose to declare that, because Japanese defensive power was “unbreakable,” the matter was of small concern. Coming from two officers in a Navy whose renunciation of all things defensive bordered on the fanatical, these fanciful answers put a capstone on four days of scripted silliness and underlined the air of unreality that pervaded the operational planning as a whole.
Yamamoto was apparently somewhat put out that First Air Fleet’s staff didn’t have a credible answer to his question. But as another student of the battle has pointed out, he had little grounds to be upset at the failure of a subordinate to supply an original answer in the midst of an exercise that had been so heavily choreographed as to be meaningless. Having done his best to quash all criticism, Yamamoto had thrown honesty and creative thinking out the window as well. Yamamoto did take this opportunity, though, to interject an instruction to Nagumo and his staff that they should reserve at least half of Kid Butai’s attack aircraft in readiness for an antishipping strike should the need arise. However, these orders were verbally transmitted to First Air Fleet; nothing was ever put in writing. At the time, the instructions seemed clear enough. As events would prove, though, their intent would be far from clear-cut a month later.
At the end of the exercise, the situation remained much as before–Yamamoto’s battle plan was unchanged in almost all particulars. The games had served as a monologue. There had been no intellectual discourse, no learning; the entire affair had been a mockery of professional staff work. The net result was that Nagumo would go to battle armed with practically nothing in the way of realistic contingency plans. Whatever difficulties arose would be his to handle, alone.
Fuente: Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway (Parshall y Tully, 2005)
(Algún día terminaré este hilo
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KL Albrecht Achilles
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El Pacífico: La Guerra de los Portaaviones
Hacer del ejercicio una coreografia es un sin sentido, cuando el proposito es precisamente afinar los procedimientos y mejorarlos ante los posibles imprevistos. ¿Porque se cree que sucedio asi, siendo tan evidente que no se sacaria provecho de el?.
Si va como la ucronia...
(que por cierto a la vista de los acontecimientos habria que revisarse 
)Saludos
It matters not how strait the gate. How charged with punishments the scroll.
I am the master of my fate: I am the captain of my soul. - From "Invictus", poem by William Ernest Henley
I am the master of my fate: I am the captain of my soul. - From "Invictus", poem by William Ernest Henley
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sergiopl
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El Pacífico: La Guerra de los Portaaviones
Yamamoto clearly intended this conference not so much as a true exercise, but as a rubber stamp.KL Albrecht Achilles escribió: ↑18 May 2022, 00:26Hacer del ejercicio una coreografia es un sin sentido, cuando el proposito es precisamente afinar los procedimientos y mejorarlos ante los posibles imprevistos. ¿Porque se cree que sucedio asi, siendo tan evidente que no se sacaria provecho de el?.
¿Mentalidad funcionarial? ¿Pasar el trámite y seguir adelante? (no sería la primera vez que pasa eso). Por otra parte, es cierto que el proceso de "wargaming" anterior a Pearl Harbor fue bastante más concienzudo, por lo que tal vez los 6 meses de victorias también tuvieron su peso.
Para esto mejor no poner fecha, pero en el disco duro tengo una carpeta "Batalla del Mar de Filipinas", con las notas que escribí hace... ya ni me acuerdo, así que algún día pasaráSi va como la ucronia...
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KL Albrecht Achilles
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El Pacífico: La Guerra de los Portaaviones
Pues eso, uno ve lo metodico que fueron en Pearl Harbour y sorprende que fuesen tan solicitos al momento de "acomodar" los resultados del ejercicio.sergiopl escribió: ↑18 May 2022, 00:39Yamamoto clearly intended this conference not so much as a true exercise, but as a rubber stamp.
¿Mentalidad funcionarial? ¿Pasar el trámite y seguir adelante? (no sería la primera vez que pasa eso). Por otra parte, es cierto que el proceso de "wargaming" anterior a Pearl Harbor fue bastante más concienzudo, por lo que tal vez los 6 meses de victorias también tuvieron su peso.
Bien puede ser lo que dices, cierta arrogancia alimentada por las victorias tenidas hasta ese momento.
Saludos
It matters not how strait the gate. How charged with punishments the scroll.
I am the master of my fate: I am the captain of my soul. - From "Invictus", poem by William Ernest Henley
I am the master of my fate: I am the captain of my soul. - From "Invictus", poem by William Ernest Henley
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NBQ soldier
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El Pacífico: La Guerra de los Portaaviones
Esa arrogancia empezó a crecer desde la Batalla de Tsushima..
Buen dia
Buen dia
¿Quién está conectado?
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