La Guardia Republicana iraquí, en 2003, con BMP-2, Shilka, ametralladoras pesadas, T72, AAA, SA-7, etc no era precisamente un grupo de desarrapados.
Si, pero tras semanas de bombardeos y ataques incesantes de la coalicion, sin suministros y con soldados mal entrenados si se compara a los americanos. Si estas haciendo referencia a ese AH-64D que fue derribado en una emboscada, decir que una de las hipotesis concluye que el aparato fue derribado por fuego de armas ligeras, ya que estaba intacto. Habra que esperar a que haya alguna investigacion mas detallada, lo cual es un poco dificil porque el helicoptero fue destruido segun los americanos o evacuado segun los iraquies.
Ni siquiera los afganos, con 20 años de experiencia de combate, SA-7, Dashoka, posiciones fortificadas son un enemigo despreciable para los helos de combate.
El problema es que estas misiones se realizan a grandes alturas, donde el AH-64 tiene problemas. Las malas lenguas hablan de que los polacos van a enviar un escuadron de Hinds, helicoptero que ya ha actuado en este teatro. En Kosovo no se desplegaron porque hubiesen sido demasiado vulnerables (segun el Pentagono), y uno de ellos se "estrello" en extrañas circunstancias, algunas fuentes indican que fue derribado por un misil serbio lanzado desde el otro lado de la frontera mientras se estrenaba.
Lo que no tiene ninguna duda es que un sistema Fire & Forget es, incluso solo por su concepción, superior a cualquier sistema semiactivo, y así lo está demostrando la industria en los desarrollos Trigat y Spike.
Yo solo digo que prefiero esperar a que sea probado en combate. Los videos promocionales estan muy bien, pero hay que analizar como reaccionan los sistemas de guiado frente a señuelos, niebla, mal tiempo etc etc.
¿Alguna info sobre esas pruebas en Suecia?
Articulo de Robert Hewson: "AH-64A/D Apache & AH-64D Longbow Apache" by , WORLD AIR POWER JOURNAL, Volume 29 / Summer 1997, 48:109.
The AH-64A Apache - A Swedish perspective
Since 1988 the Swedish army has operated two companies of what it refers to as 'anti-tank' helicopters - 20 MBB BO 105CBs (local designation Hkp 9A) equipped with the Emerson Heli-TOW system. In March 1995 the Chief of the Army requested the Director of Army Aviation to undertake a technical demonstration programme of a dedicated attack helicopter.
In 1996 Sweden was facing a major defence review and the army felt the time was at hand to evaluate its requirement for, and the benefits of, a modern multi-role attack helicopter. A list of potential types was drawn up for evaluation, including the MDH AH-64A Apache, Bell AH-1W Super Cobra, Agusta A 129 Mangusta, Eurocopter Tiger, Atlas/Denel CSH-2 Rooivalk, Mil Mi-28 'Havoc' and KamovKa-50 'Hokum'. The primary purpose of the evaluation was to determine how aircraft would perform in a Swedish environment, so the army insisted that its pilots be trained to fly each type under evaluation, and act as systems operators/gunners. Aircraft had to be available for evaluation in mid-1995, undertake live weapons firings and require a minimum of operating/support costs. The choice was narrowed to the AH-64A and Mi-28.
The Swedes recognised that one was a mature system and the other still in the early stages of development, but were interested in examining the two completely different designphilosophies and doctrines behind the Apache and the 'Havoc'.
Planning for the four-week evaluation began in April/May 1995. Upon arrival in Sweden the aircraft would self-deploy to the Northern Military District to undertake tactical missions and live-firing exercises. This would be followed by air-to-air target firing and tactical missions in the Central and Southern Military Districts. As a result, each aircraft would be exposed to the full range of Swedish geography and climate.
The Swedish Defence MaterialAdministration (FMV) and the United States Army Security Command, with the support of the Swedish Army Aviation Centre and McDonnell Douglas Helicopters, agreed to supply two USAREUR AH-64As, then stationed in Hanau. A Swedish crew was trained by MDH at Mesa to fly the Apache and operate its systems. A team of Swedish tactical advisors travelled to Ft Rucker to undertake detailed mission planning. The two Apaches (86-9029/86-9033) were flown
from Germany by a mixed US/Swedish crew, arriving at the 2nd Army Aviation Battalion in Linkoping on 12 August 1995.
The Apaches were scheduled to undertake a range of tactical scenarios, including operational redeployment between military districts, avoiding enemy fighter aircraft, engagement of enveloping forces, deep strike operations, operations in the Swedish archipelago, engagement of enemy air assault forces, delaying operations against mechanised forces, and supporting attacking armoured forces. Swedish terrain, tactics and military posture mean that standard US operational procedures, such as artillery
and air support, were impossible. The Swedes learned that the Apache had the flexibility to operate throughout the country and could be redeployed over substantial distances while still carrying an effective weapons load. Even without the use of EW systems, the Apaches avoided the JA 37 Viggens of F21 Wing, which were hunting them during their redeployments. In the event, missions were not flown at night, although the Swedes recognise that night operations are preferable, indeed essential, in their Arctic environments (in northern Sweden six months of the year are spent in almost permanent darkness). The autonomous nature of AH-64A operations stretched Sweden's (substantial) C3 network and highlighted the need for an improved
communications fit on the aircraft.
TheApache's radios are not compatible with Swedish radio systems. Two days of maritime operations with navy and marine units in the archipelago proved that the Apache was very vulnerable on the outer coastline and needed theshelter of the inner archipelago to protect it from hostile fire. However,the Marines were impressed by the AH-64A and thought that the Apache could play an important role in supporting (or repelling) amphibious attacks. Furthermore, the Hellfire missile (Rb 17) is already in service as a coastal defence weapon in Sweden and is compatible with the Apache's
own weapons.
During a simulated air drop by an air force Hercules, the Apaches 'shot down' the aircraft using Hellfire. During anti-armour missions the Apache proved to be far superior to Sweden's existing Hkp 9As. Air-to-air trials were conducted against towed targets at the Swedish Anti-Aircraft School, Vaddo.
The targets were 'cold' (with no IR signature, perhaps not the most realistic simulation) and the FLIR and DVO were unable to acquire them within the prevailing safety limits. When the gun did lock-up a target the autotracking system failed and no direct hits were ever made on any target. Live-firing trials were limited to the Apache's rocket system, as
Sweden already has the Hellfire in service (as a coastal defence missile) and is familiar with its performance.
There were also cost and safety factors in this decision. A manual rocket firing was made and the rockets missed the target area by several hundred meters. A total of 99 hours was flown by the two aircraft during the four-week evaluation. During that time, there were periods when one or both AH-64As were unserviceable. The Apaches suffered from software problems in the FCC and badly maintained rocket pods; an APU clutch had to be changed, a TV camera had to be replaced, a laser unit had to be replaced, several bulbs had to be changed, one gun suffered a hardware failure and rotors needed repairing. As a result, five of the planned 20 missions were cancelled due to technical problems. Additional missions were also cancelled to allow ground crews more time to prepare for weapons tests. The Apache's navigation and fire control systems suffered several problems. Co-ordinates in latitudes higher than 65°N could not be entered and, as a result, planned night attack missions were not flown.
A single Mi-28 was supplied by Rosvoorouzhenie to the FMV under a contract signed in August 1995. The evaluation helicopter (Mi-28 prototype 042) was airlifted by II-76 to Lulea on 7 October 1995. Using Mi-24s and Mi-28s in Moscow, the Swedes had trained one test pilot and two service pilots to fly the Mi-28. Swedish personnel ultimately flew as weapons systems operators during the evaluation, and not as command pilots (the Mi-28 does not have dual controls). Since the Russian pilot was not a fluent English speaker, all operational missions were tightly pre-briefed and flown with a translator airborne in
another aircraft. The Mi-28 flew a number of tactical missions that mirrored the Apache programme. The Swedish evaluation found that the sighting system worked well and was
easy to use, even in the hands of an inexperienced crew. The Mi-28 was rated as highly survivable, with good ballistic protection for the crew and with an extensive onboard RWR and ECM system. The MMI (Man Machine Interface/ergonomics) of the Mi-28 was generally good and will be improved. The aircraft handled well, althoughcrews had some reservations about their early production standard aircraft
in this area. Current production Mi-28s are completely lacking in any night fighting
capability. Mil is working to remedy this problem with the much improved Mi-28N, which has beencompared (perhaps over-optimistically) to the AH-64D.
The official Swedish Army Aviation Centre report on the evaluation stated that the Mi-28's weapons accuracy was "good and astonishingly repeatable," particularly taking into
account the range of firing parameters and poor weather conditions. Both 9M1154Shturmand 9M120 Ataka guided missiles were fired against stationary targets (to a maximum range of 4680 m/15,354 ft, with the Mi-28 flying at 200 km/h, 124 mph IAS), with 1-m (3.3-ft) accuracy. Rockets were found to be accurate up to a range of 4000m (13,123ft), with 35 hits registered from 40 firings. Four unexploded rockets were later found and questions were raised about the production quality and safety standards
of Russian ammunition. Gun firings were unsuccessful due to bad boresighting.
The Mi-28 was flown for a total of 30 hours, never failed to undertake a mission, and experienced the minimum of technical snags. On one occasion an engine automatically throttled back. The AH-64A maintained its reputation as an complex and effective aircraft during the Swedish army aviation evaluation. after plume ingestion from a rocket
firing. This was a safety measure which performed as expected, and the aircraft was ready for flight within an hour, to resume firing tests. The aircraft also experienced a failure of the flare dispenser. The Swedish opinion of the Mi-28 was that it was a robust and reliable helicopter well-suited to field conditions. Reservations were expressed about the classification and standards of its electrical system and some design features.
Integration of the required modern avionics would require additional electronic shielding and filtering. Availability of the necessary specifications, airworthiness certification, technical manuals and maintenance documentation was anunknown.
The evaluation of the AH-64A concluded that it was a highly-complex aircraft, requiring a well-trained and co-ordinated crew. Successful missions demanded an intensive level of mission planning. Its onboard systems allowed detection of targets, by day and night,
at ranges meeting all Swedish
El Havoc probado es un prototipo, y no la version N, que es mucho mas avanzada. El AH-64 era una version A.
Saludos.
