Fuerzas Aéreas del Mundo. Noticias e historia. Sus aviones de guerra, helicópteros y misiles. Programas de construcción aérea. Pilotos y paracaidistas.
y porque en la punta del ala deberia funcionar mejor como winglets en vez de los más pequeños AIM-9, reduciendo la resistencia inducida del ala, aunque esto es una conjetura mia...
Por ahi van los tiros. Tanto el F-16 como el 18 deben llevar algo en la punta del plano para que esta se comporte como es debido y cuanto mas grande (dentro de un limite) mejor. Si te fijas incluso volando limpio llevan siempre el LAU en el tip, cosas del bataneo a alta velocidad.
Al llevar los 120 en la punta del plano se supone que a la hora de entrar en combate cerrado has disparado los dos, con lo que las cargas en los dos planos seran iguales afectando lo menos posible a las prestaciones del aparato por disimetrias. El comportamiento sera peor que con dos SW pero en un combate cerrado es bastante habitual disparar solo uno de ellos, con lo que te encontrarias en mitad del combate con un ala comportandose medianamente bien (la que lleva el sw) y la otra peor (la vacia). Es preferible que las dos pierdan el mismo rendimiento (al disparar los 120 antes del combate) aunque esta perdida sea mayor.
y porque en la punta del ala deberia funcionar mejor como winglets en vez de los más pequeños AIM-9, reduciendo la resistencia inducida del ala, aunque esto es una conjetura mia...
Por ahi van los tiros. Tanto el F-16 como el 18 deben llevar algo en la punta del plano para que esta se comporte como es debido y cuanto mas grande (dentro de un limite) mejor. Si te fijas incluso volando limpio llevan siempre el LAU en el tip, cosas del bataneo a alta velocidad.
Al llevar los 120 en la punta del plano se supone que a la hora de entrar en combate cerrado has disparado los dos, con lo que las cargas en los dos planos seran iguales afectando lo menos posible a las prestaciones del aparato por disimetrias. El comportamiento sera peor que con dos SW pero en un combate cerrado es bastante habitual disparar solo uno de ellos, con lo que te encontrarias en mitad del combate con un ala comportandose medianamente bien (la que lleva el sw) y la otra peor (la vacia). Es preferible que las dos pierdan el mismo rendimiento (al disparar los 120 antes del combate) aunque esta perdida sea mayor.
No se si me explico pero es muy tarde....
Un saludo.
sip si lo haces, suena tambien válido, otra razon por usar los 120 en los tips
"El que no es tolerante con la intolerancia, es un intolerante"
Los MiG-23ML y seguramente los MLD tiene 6 puntos para portar armas: 2 bajo las alas y 4 en el fuselaje aunque en estos solo puede llevar misiles pequenos (R-60)
Corrijanme si equivoco pero creso que la version MLD puede llevar R-27 Alamo y R-73 Archer.
Ademas las tan comentadas victorias cubanas se lograron con R-60, cierto es que se encrentarion a cazas que no tenian capacidad BVR.
Corrijanme si equivoco pero creso que la version MLD puede llevar R-27 Alamo y R-73 Archer.
Solo R-73 Archer, el R-27 Alamo no es usado por los MiG-23MLD Izdeliye 23-18. La integración del R-73 se logra mediante tres cajas negras en el sistema de control de fuego, aunque no se incorpora con el sistema de mira de casco Schlemm como en el MiG-29 y Su-27.
Hola Pit
Había una versión nueva del MiG 23 (33-)8 si no me equivocco), se le habían integrado misiles r77 y r73, además de una amplia panoplia aire tierra. Nosabés en que quedó?, tengo entendido que los sirios querían modernizar o estaban modernizando sus MiGs 23
El MiG-23-98 era una versión modernizada del MiG-23 que incorporaría elementos modernos similares a la modernización MiG-21-93 (adoptada por la India) incluyendo el radar NIIP Phazotron "Moskit-23" o una modificación del Sapfir-23MLA-2 o versión del Sapfir-23 de turno para adoptar el uso del RVV-AE "R-77" también conocido como AA-12 Adder.
En realidad no quedo mas que en anuncios y propuestas porque nadie lo eligió. Libia mandó hace un año unos MiG-23 a Voronino para cumplir sus periodos de overhaul y reparación capital. Creo que Siria hiso lo mismo (ellos tienen MiG-23MLD de exportación con algunas modificaciones locales). Pero solo Angola se anoto en el autobus de modificar sus MiG-23ML, con una empresa ucraniana sin embargo, de lo que no se sabe mucho, solo que incluirá el radar "Topaz" probablemente el mismo usado en los MiG-29S lo que le permitiría usar el RVV-AE...aunque vamos a ver que pasa!.
Gracias Pit
La verdad es que el 23-98 siempre me pareció una opción interesante. Vi algunas fotos en la web de MiG 23 con r 77, no sabés si llegó a volar algun prototipo de MiG 23-98?
Saludos
JPJ escribió:Gracias Pit La verdad es que el 23-98 siempre me pareció una opción interesante. Vi algunas fotos en la web de MiG 23 con r 77, no sabés si llegó a volar algun prototipo de MiG 23-98? Saludos
Hola JPJ!
Hasta donde se, no, nunca el MiG-23-98 pasó a la etapa de pruebas y dejó de ser una mera propuesta, ahora como curiosidad, los MiG-23 participaron en el programa de pruebas del R-77 y en 1986 uno de ellos en Ajtubinsk por error derribó un avión de pasajeros civil!
Durante los años 60 surgió la necesidad de un sustituto del MiG-21, y Mikoyan-Gurevich inició las tareas de diseño del MiG-23. Las autoridades estaban decididas a que el aumento de tamaño y de peso del caza no impusieran una carrera de despegue más larga. Tras una serie de pruebas, se confirmó que la configuración del Modelo 23-1 1 de geometría alar variable era la más eficaz, y se ordenó su producción con la denominación MiG-23S, con un potente motor R-27F2M-300 de 98,1 kN. Inicialmente, fue instalado un radar «Jay Bird» RP-22 similar al del MiG-21S, dentro de un característico radomo corto, y se retiró la capacidad transvisual.
Asi mismo, el avión fue dotado de un IRST TP-23. Entre mediados de 1969 y finales de 1970 se construyeron cincuenta aparatos, que fueron utilizados para realizar pruebas operativas antes de reconvertir la producción al MiG-23M, denominado «Flogger-B» por la OTAN.
Éste incorporaba el radar de efecto doppler Sapfir-23 ("High Lark"), un nuevo sistema de control de tiro y un piloto automático. El MiG-23M podía disparar el misil semiactivo R-23 (AA-7 «Apex»). Se instaló un nuevo motor Soyuz (Tumanskii) R-29-300 de 122,63 kN de empuje (con una tobera más corta), y los empenajes horizontales del avión fueron colocados más hacia atrás, proporcionando una fisionomía muy diferente.
Se añadió un cuarto depósito de combustible en el fuselaje trasero, así como un nuevo ala Tipo 1, con un borde de ataque alargado y un marcado «diente de perro». Las aletas del borde de ataque fueron suprimidas (ala Tipo 2), y más tarde incorporadas de nuevo en el ala Tipo 3, en 1973,
Los MiG-23M fueron entregados a la Aviación Frontal como sustitutos del MiG-21, para ser utilizados principalmente en cometidos tácticos y de superioridad aérea, aunque con una importante capacidad auxiliar de ataque terrestre.
Otros fueron destinados al lA-PVO, ampliando el número de MiG-21, Su-9, Su-li y Su-15 en el cometido de defensa aérea.
Se fabricaron dos versiones inferiores del MiG-23M para la exportación, la segunda de ellas con la denominación «Flogger E». El MiG 23MS era una versión sustancialmente inferior con el radar tipo «Jay Bird» del MiG-21 alojado en un radomo corto, sin capacidad transvisual.
El MiG-23MF conservó el radar de control de tiro «High Lark», capacidad para misiles AA-7 «Apex» y la denominación MiG-23M, y fue entregado a los aliados del Pacto de Varsovia, y posteriormente a Siria, Angola, Iraq,
MiG-23ML/P/MLD «Flogger-G/K»
El MiG-23ML «Flogger-G» (con la denominación 23-12 de la OKB) ha experimentado mejoras relacionadas con su gobierno, especialmente a elevados ángulos de ataque, una mejor capacidad de maniobra y límites de g más grandes. Tiene una estructura más ligera, pues no lleva el cuarto depósito de combustible del fuselaje ni el carenado de unión del estabilizador vertical. Asimismo, dispone de mayor potencia al llevar instalado el nuevo motor Soyuz (Tumanskii) R-35-300.
Un avión muy parecido, el MiG-23P (23-14) era utilizado por el PVO y posee un nuevo ordenador digital que le permite ser guiado
completamente hacia su blanco desde tierra, y que capacita al piloto para activar la poscombustión y lanzar el armamento.
El MiG-23ML fue también utilizado como base para el MiG-23MLD (23-18), denominado «Flogger-K» por la OTAN. La nueva versión, al parecer producida por conversión de células de MiG-23ML, incorpora generadores de torbellinos en el tubo pitot y entalladuras en as extensiones de las raíces alares. Asimismo, incorpora un nuevo sistema 1FF y un simulador de disparo de misiles que permite un entrenamiento económico. Entre otras modificaciones están los montantes orientables situados debajo de las secciones alares exteriores, que son movibles para poder alinearse con el flujo de aire, incluso cuando el ala está en flecha máxima.
El radar del MiG-23ML representa una importante mejora sobre el del MiG-23MF, con un alcance de 90 km en lugar de 60 y mejores capacidades de búsqueda hacia abajo y de perturbación. La «imagen» del radar aparece en el presentador frontal de datos.
MiG-23UB «Flogger-C»
Las características de gobierno del MiG-23 eran muy diferentes de las del resto de aviones del arsenal soviético, y por este motivo, en mayo de 1968, se autorizó el desarrollo de una versión de entrenamiento biplaza, seis meses después de dar vía libre a la construcción del monoplaza.
El prototipo del MiG-23UB (23-511. o «Flogger-C, realizó su primer vuelo en mayo de 1969. Siempre se había contemplado que el MiG-23UB sería utilizado para transformación de pilotos y entrenamiento de tiro, y que dispondría de una limitada capacidad de combate. Por este motivo, se instaló una barquilla de dirección e iluminación para el misil AA-7 "Apex", dentro de un carenado cónico situado en la raíz alar de estribor. Los aviones de serie llevan todos el ala Nº 3 (compatible con los depósitos exteriores de combustible situados debajo del ala en soportes no orientables) y las dos cabinas en tándem están cubiertas por cúpulas independientes de apertura hacia arriba. El instructor dispone de un periscopio retráctil que le proporciona una mejor visión hacia delante en la aproximación.
Los MiG-23UB están equipados con un limitador de ángulo de ataque, o con un sistema de alerta del mismo, junto con una dotación completa de aviónica que incluye un sofisticado sistema que permite al instructor simular emergencias y amenazas para el alumno. Todos los usuarios de MiG-23 y MiG-27 utilizan también el MiG-23UB, y el modelo, que fue retirado de producción en 1978, presta servicio en numerosas unidades de MiG-29 y Su-27.
MiG-23B/BK/BM/BN «Flogger-F/H»
En 1969, Mikoyan comenzó el proyecto para la producción en serie de un avión de ataque sencillo y barato. Sin embargo, en lugar de diseñar un avión nuevo, las restricciones económicas obligaron a Mikoyan a utilizar un derivado del MiG-23S, cuya capacidad supersónica en períodos cortos se consideraba una útil ventala. Mikoyan le asignó una nueva denominación (Modelo 321, pero la Fuerza Aérea conservó la denominación MiG-23.
El MiG-23 original había sido desarrollado como caza táctico polivalente y, con su robusta estructura, su sólido tren, su potente motor y su ala de geometría variable, poseía la capacidad de operar desde pistas semipreparadas. Este avión era idóneo para ser convertido o adaptado al cometido de cazabombardeo.
El MiG-23B (32-24) básico poseia la estructura del MiG-23S, pero con un nuevo morro descendente más pronunciado que proporcionaba al piloto una mejor visión hacia delante y hacia abajo, así como una planta motriz Lyulka AL-21 F-300 alojada en un fuselaje posterior más corto. Al igual que el MiG-23M, la nueva variante de ataque terrestre fue equipada con el ala N. 2 y posteriormente con la N. 3. Se dotó al avión de un nuevo sistema de navegación y ataque PrNK Sokol 23S. Se instalaron blindajes en los costados del fuselale delantero, para protección del piloto, así como depósitos con un sistema contraincendios de inyección de gas inerte. Estaba equipado con un iluminador de misiles y una cámara de TV dentro de carenados ojivales en los guantes de las raíces alares.
Antes de que la producción se encaminara hacia una variante mejorada se construyeron alrededor de 24 MiG-23B.
El MiG-23BN (32-23) incorporaba un sistema mejorado de navegación y ataque PrNK Sokol 23N y estaba propulsado por una versión algo menos potente del Soyuz (Tumanskii ) R-298-300. Estaba previsto que el MiG-23BN fuera la primera versión de ataque, pero sufrió retrasos debido a problemas económicos y de instalación de equipos. Incorporaba carenados ojivales en el borde de ataque, sobre los guantes alares fijos, que normalmente se asocian con el ASM AS-7 »Kerry». El MiG-23B y el MiG-23BN comparten la denorrnación de la OTAN de "Flogger-F".
El rendimiento de estos dos aviones resultó decepcionante y muchos de ellos fueron posteriormente reconvertidos a MiG-23BK (32-26) o MiG-23BM (23-25), o bien exportados.
Enseguida surgió la necesidad de disponer de una aviónica mejorada, por lo que fueron desarrollados dos nuevos cazabombarderos. ambos con la denominación de «Flogger-H». Esta denominación fue asignada porque llevaban nuevos carenados de RWR sobre las «esquinas» inferiores del fuselaje, justo delante del compartimiento del aterrizador de proa. Los MiG-23 de ataque cubanos eran »Flogger-F» sin carenados RWR sobre las toberas, mientras que los « Flogger-H alemanes y checoslovacos sí los llevaban.
La primera de las nuevas variantes fue la MiG-23BK, que iba equipada con el mismo sistema de navegación y ataque y el telémetro láser del MiG-27K. El MiG-23BM era similar, pero con el mismo sistema de navegación y ataque PrNK Sokol 23M que el MiG-27D. Para mayor confusión, la denominación de MiG-23BN ha sido adoptada al parecer como designación general de las fuerzas armadas, aplicándose a veces a aviones denominados BM o BK por la OKB.
Numerosos «Flogger-H. de exportación son habitualmente citados como MiG-23BN, y quizá fueron construidos como tales, pero realmente están adaptados al estándar MiG23BK. Entre estos aviones se encuentran los MiG-23BK de Alemania Oriental, cuya documentación los describía como MiG-24BN. Los » Flogger-H » de Bulgaria, Checoslovaquia, India e Iraq tienen el mismo aspecto, aunque muchos de ellos llevan sondas fijas de repostaje en vuelo, encima del morro.
MiG-27D1J/J2/K/L/M «Flogger-D/J»
La denominación MiG-27 se aplicó en un principio a numerosos diseños realizados por la OKB de Mikoyan para dar respuesta a la necesidad por fin satisfecha por el Su-25. Al finalizar la guerra de Vietnam, surgió la necesidad de disponer de aviones subsónicos capaces de proporcionar apoyo cercano convencional e interdicción. Se ordenó directamente la producción del MiG-27 original y del similar MiG-27K "Flogger-D", y el prototipo realizó su primer vuelo en 1972.
Los primeros aparatos pronto entraron en servicio en el Grupo de Fuerzas Soviéticas en Alemania. El MiG-27 inicial muy pronto fue sustituido por el MiG-27K, equipado con sistema de navegación y ataque PrNK-23K, y un telémetro láser Fone instalado detrás de una pequeña ventana en el morro. El MiG-27K tenía capacidad para efectuar bombardeo nocturno o sin visibilidad con un alto grado de precisión. Equipos RWR y ECM muy automatizados, y un nuevo sistema de gestión de cargas proporciona al piloto una mayor flexibilidad a la hora de seleccionar y utilizar el armamento.
Existen numerosas subvariantes del avión denominado por la OTAN «Flogger-J». A todos ellos se les han quitado los carenados ojivales de los guantes alares, y llevan extensiones de las raíces alares. Estas fueron añadidas para poder instalar las antenas RWR del hemisferio
delantero, pero también poseen el beneficioso efecto de mejorar el gobierno con elevados ángulos de ataque. Todos los «Flogger-J» están equipados con un nuevo telémetro láser Klen en lugar de la unidad Fone del MiG-27K.
Existe cierta confusión :P en relación con las denominaciones soviéticas del avión. El primer «Flogger-J» fue el MiG-27M de nueva construcción, que posee un reflector de perturbación mayor en el morro. Algunos aviones parecidos llevaban la denominación de la Fuerza Aérea soviética de MiG-27D. Esta variante incorpora el sistema de navegación RSBN-6S, asociado con el cometido de ataque nuclear. Los dos tubos pitot están instalados en la parte alta del morro, y proporcionan las mejores prestaciones de reconocimiento de los MiG-27D/MiG-27K" Flogger-J" y MiG-27K "Flogger-J2".
Esta última variante fue producida como avión de nueva construcción, por conversión de los MiG-27, MiG-27D y quizá MiG-27M. Lleva un pronunciado carenado debajo del morro, una gran ventana rectangular para el sistema FLIR, y una ventana superior para el nuevo designador láser, perteneciente a la familia de los Kaira. Los dos pitot están montados en la parte inferior del morro y el radomo ha sido ampliado.
La Unión Soviética exportó sus aviones más eficaces sólo a un puñado de paises de confianza del Pacto de Varsovia y a unos pocos clientes, por lo que, en términos generales, el MiG-27 no estaba disponible para clientes extranjeros. La única excepción hasta el momento es la India, que construye el MiG-27 con licencia, y que utiliza una versión denominada MIG-27M, a la cual Mikoyan asigna la denominación MiG-27L. El avión posee el mismo contorno de morro del MiG-27M/D, sólo lleva una ventana en el carenado debajo de éste, y comparte la misma denominación »Flogger-J» de la OTAN.
Los MiG-27 soviéticos entraron en combate por vez primera en Afganistán, donde un regimiento de MiG-27D fue desplegado a Shindand para llevar a cabo operaciones de ataque contra posiciones de la guerrilla mujahidin( al parecer al menos dos fueron derribados por F-16 paquistanies)
GRITA DEVASTACION Y SUELTA A LOS PERROS DE LA GUERRA.
Julio César,Shakespeare
Muy interesante el mensaje, el texto viene de algún libro?
Los soviéticos utilizaron el Su-22 y MiG-27 en Afganistan. Según pude leer el Su-22 era mas popular por su dureza y facilidad de mantenimiento, a pesar de que el MiG-27 tiene una electronica mas avanzada.
Actuación de los MiG-27 en la guerra en Afghanistan:
Afghan debut MiG-27
Fighter-bombers MiG-27 were some of the most mass aircraft of the Soviet Air Force; however, for the elongation almost one-and-a-half decades service not with one with them was brought to accept participation in the real war shooting. Even in the years of Afghan soldiers to quite last .[mesjatsev] did not arise the question about their sending into the composition of the VVS 40th Army and therefore combat examination for them became those more not expected.
To this there were their reasons. The Tasks of IBA in VVS 40 Army were properly carried out by Su-17, the first of which (so called “Su-17 without the letter”) were moved into Afghanistan already with the introduction of the troops. The afterward not too impressive debut (in essence, because of the small radius of action and limited combat load) them rapidly replaced Su-17M3, that became present “working horse”. In this case send even for the urgent reformation into the airs regiment of fighter-bombers (APIB) of the Fighter regiments of the PVO of southern regions, by which in the Afghan war the main role was assigned. Thus, 136 APIB from Chirchik and 156 from Mari' had time to complete on several of “flying iies” into Afghanistan, and in autumn 1987 them replaced Su-17M4 from Kalinin.
The machines, called “by martlets”, used the glory of the reliable and unpretentious aircraft, which were being located that it is called, at its place. Besides this, the basing from year to year of one and the same type aircraft simplified maintenance, supply and planning of the combat missions, is so that objectively the question about the passage to another type of fighter-bomber did not arise.
To the autumn of 1988 arrived in time the period of sequential replacement (on the prevailing practice, regiments IBA they changed each other after the year of work in October- November). But “available” regiments from SAVA even without that, hardly after returning from Afghanistan, continually they were torn away from their bases, continuing combat work “after the creek” from the border airfields. Other regiments, which had time to master combat employment under the conditions of mountain-wilderness locality, in all VVS there was not such a one much. At the same time, IBA it had available one additional type of fighter-bomber - MiG-27, by which the toward the end 80th were completed more than 20 air regiments.
Arose natural proposal - to direct toward the replacement MiG-27, in favor what were several reasons, basic from which was the possibility in the remained months of war to test aircraft under the real combat conditions. Simultaneously, by the simplest and most reliable method was resolved the question, to which was devoted not one military- scientific research - what of two machines, created on one and the same requirements with the comparable characteristics, armament and BREO is more effective.
Occurred the known jealousy of the crew of “twenty sevenths” units to those smelled to powder and deserved the war decorations to associates, who flew on MiG-21, MiG-23, Su-17 and Su-25. However, if pilots themselves technology, with small exception, related to the fulfillment of the international duty as to the proposal “voluntarily- forced” and adhered to principle “to the service do not assert yourself, the service do not reject”, then command had other views. In the final analysis subjective factor played not last role, including that that in the chapter VVS 40 Army by this time was located Major General D. S. Romanjuk, which arrived from Transbaykal, where he commanded a division of IBA who itself flew on MiG-27.
To 1988 IBA of southern regions as all VVS, it underwent a number of conversions. Almost immediately after the beginning of Afghan war in the aviation began the radical organizational reforms, began with which it placed the order of MO SSSR - Ministry of Defense of the USSR from 5 January of 1980, the intended to bring together “hearth some banners” VVS and ground forces with the purpose of a increase in their interaction. As a result, the forces of front aviation were reorganized in VVS of the military districts, into which entered the air defense aviation. Now they were subordinated to the command of regions, that also led to the creation strictly of the VVS 40 Army. Furthermore, the order of MO SSSR from 21.08.84 created high commands of the directions, in which there were their administrations VVS, and the impact forces of bombardment aviation collected into the associations subordinate to Centralized authority - air forces of operational designation (VA VGK IT) and strategic designation (VA VGK SN). Created GK of southern direction, with the staff in Baku, treated TurkVO and SAVO, and also activity 40 Army in Afghanistan.
This structure proved to be excessively complex, decentralized and distant from the army one-man management, what, after all, gave reverse to the planned undertaking effect - reduction in the potential of the available in the presence forces. Neighborhood organization was extremely unpopular among airmen themselves, who fell under the beginning to “krasnopogonnomu” command. Distant from the aviation specific character - volumetric works on complex technology and the maintenance of flying training, at the lower level it frequently substituted it “intensified study of regulations” and by favorite marching drill.
In summer 1988 the fault of this system was acknowledged by Defense Council, which restored the association of forces FA into the air forces, which were being subordinated to the GK VVS. By this time TurkVO and SAVO merged into one region, which inherited designation SAVO; however, transferred staff to Tashkent. Accordingly, air units became part VVS SAVO (with exception some transmitted under the beginning VPK and subordinated to the staff of southern direction). With the withdrawal from the circumferential subordination they obtained status of “VVS in the territory OF SAVO”. Completely the wave of changes drooped already after the end of the Afghan war, when on 28 February of 1989 was restored 73 Air force Army with the staff in Tashkent.
To 1988 in the region there were five regiments IBA the consisting of two air divisions. Three of them (136, 156 and 217 APIB), passed Afghanistan, were completed with Su-17 of different modifications, and two (129 and 134) lethal factors on MiG-27. It is remarkable, that the same relationship “two to three” corresponded to total quantities of these machines in our VVS, which had about 800 MiG-23BN/MiG-27 and somewhat more than 1200 Su-17.
129 and 134 APIB on MiG-27 to the autumn of 1988 entered in 24 ADIB. Division also completed the multistage reorganization: before it was mixed (SAD), being “composite soljanku” from almost all forms of front aviation included IAP, APIB and BAP. After “unloading” and reassignment of the part of air regiment, the division preserved 129 APIB, which was being based in Taldy-Korgan (in the common parlance the available “Taldykom”) and it was replenished by 134 APIB from Zhangiz-tobe , where soon moved the staff of connection itself.
Parts sufficiently for long was satisfied by old technology - the rearmament “rear” regions traditionally was accomplished in the second turn, which changed only with the aggravation of situation on the southern boundaries of the USSR. 129 APIB up to 1975 flew on MiG-17, which they replaced by MiG-21PFM, but as long ago as 1979 it obtained MiG-27. However, in the neighbors of the matter they proceeded not better - entered the war shooting in Afghanistan in the number of the first, 136 APIB began to war also on MiG-21PFM. Soon position was operationally corrected and, in accordance with strategy of strengthening southern direction, the shelves began to re-arm to the new technology, in parallel reducing them to the powerful connections with the support to the impact possibilities (before in the regions they predominated fighter-interceptors).
Process continued not without the confusion: in some parts with the transfer in IBA and BA in two or three years it was changed on several aircraft types. Much time occupied retraining for each and reaching combat readiness was involved. Thus, the same 136 APIB, already in spring 1980 reseeding MiG-21PFM on MiG-21SM, without the delay in year replaced them on by Su-17M3. Adjacent, 156 IAP, which entered into composition of 17 OA PVO, replaced specific character more radically, perejdja in summer of 1981 into the composition of 34 ADIB and after obtaining instead of interceptors Su-15 fighter-bombers Su-17M3.
To the autumn of 1988 both regiments of 24 ADIB had MiG-27 of the last models: 129 was equipped with MiG-27M and MiG-27D; moreover the latter were finished from the previous regimental MiG-27 1982-1984 yr. of release. In spite of difference in the names, MiG-27D were analogous to the MiG-27M machines: the aircraft of the first series (izd.32-25) were led to the level “M” on the aircraft factory in Irkutsk. They obtained the elongated nose with new PRNK-23M, laser aiming system “Klen-PM” instead of “Fon”, which served only for measuring the distance, and also the developed leading edge extension of wing, which improved the behavior of aircraft at the high angles of attack, and the baffles generators on the keel, which increased the rudder-effectiveness derivative, which was equipped with the pair of hydraulic shock absorbers. In the content of equipment RSBN-6S SHORT-RANGE NAVIGATION RADIO SYSTEM - was substituted by A-321 “Klystron”, was established RSDN, new radio altimeters A-031, reserve attitude and heading reference system, and changed the cabin equipment, most important difference in which was tele-monitor for the missile guidance with TV seeker. After modernization MiG-27D, received designation izd.32-29, could bear the extended composition of armament, including the guided missiles X-25, X-27PS, X-29L and X-29T
Outwardly MiG-27D it was differed from “original” MiG-27M in terms of the fine details (in particular, on the keel it was absent radome additional KB of radio station R-864, which was proved to be unreliable in the operation); however, bore the characteristic “birthmark” in the painting. Irkutsk aircraft factory at this time let out a series MiG-23UB and for the concealment of the precise number of passed the modernization combat MiG-27 in the aft-of-cabin section by light-gray paint was brought the garish image of the second cab, intended to liken aircraft “to dual-control aircraft”. Simultaneously was created impression, which plant produces only MiG-23UB. It is unknown, similar masking of the characteristic predatory profile of fighter-bomber did lead someone into error; however, perceptible “second cab” it served competent eye as accurate sign MiG-27D.
To the autumn of 129 APIB was replenished also 16 MiG-27M and D from the Belorussian the mill, where the transmitted into attack aviation regiment mastered Su-25. 134 APIB in Zhangiztobe (for the brevity of that called “Zhangizom”) on the north of Kazakhstan, besides MiG-27M had one squadron of “Kairas” - MiG-27K (izd 32-26) - the most perfect machines of this type, called on the designation of aiming complex “Kaira”. This laser-television system, combined with the PrNK-23K, ensured the application of new types of controlled weapon, including the corrected bombs, whose guidance was accomplished even with the fulfillment by the aircraft of the folded configurations of maneuver.
Order about the direction “for fulfilling the special target” entered from GSH VVS; however, not for whom it was by secret, that its role played “the patronage” of Major General Timchenko, recent commanding OF VVS SAVO (it it replaced returning himself from DRA Major General Shkanakin), which came forward with the initiative to verify in the combat situation those locating in its subordination MiG-27. Its role played the approximation of final conclusion 40 Army, which would deprive the command of the very possibility of this “examination”
With the formation of group were said the comradely attitudes of commander with “taldykskimi” commanders, first of all with the squadron commander -2 by Lieutenant Colonel Doroshenko, who insisted on his participation on the mission. The as a result directed to Afghanistan two squadrons of the 134 APIB supplemented the complete regimental composition the squadron 129 APIB, which he, naturally, commanded Doroshenko. In “taldykskuju composite”, as this subdivision was called, selected the most experienced pilots only of 1st and 2nd class, after leaving “young” to be collected the experience of house; this approach practiced also in other units. Moreover, to upon arrival at a place rated pilots they were obtained and the most dangerous tasks - impassive statistics testified that VVS 40 Army at the beginning of April of 1988 lost 190 airmen of those borne 1st classes, 41 - 2nd, 54 and - 3rd- 1!
For the first time in the Afghan campaign in DRA was bound the regiment IBA of complete composition. Thus far they usually bypassed by two squadrons, and sometimes also one, which was partly caused by the unwillingness to send to the war hardly the feathered young people, which only yesterday finished school and which replaced student pursuits to the the lejtenantskie. To the big enough degree the existed practice was dictated by the need for preserving in the system on the base at least the part of forces, truth in this case regiment from standby alert nevertheless was removed and the remained crew was occupied by planned studies.
First of all strengthening group IBA was explained by the changed situation - the as a result begun withdrawal of forces to 15 August was left Kandahar, where were based almost a third of the VVS 40 Army. True, units of them was moved into Shindand, but by no means decreased volumes of tasks, taking into account changes in the dislocation, required the completion of the aviation group.
Preparation for the future mission began previously. According to the specific routine the pilots mastered the special features of combat employment in the mountain-wilderness locality, improved tactical flight preparation under the day and nighttime conditions initially for the mastery of program it was proposed the center of the preparation of crew in Chirchik; however, the presence in Kazakhstan of the mountain range of Kzyl-Agash made it possible to conduct course on the spot. A increase in the craftsmanship included battle maneuvering with the combat load at average and high altitudes, actions in the special cases, fulfillment of takeoff and landing with the maximum takeoff weight according to the shortened diagrams in volume of 16-18 flights. Tactical flight preparation was devoted to the special features of air navigation during the weak navigation guarantee, in the conditions of high mountain region and dustiness of the airspace, finalizing of the methods of overcoming PVO, suppression and destruction of fire means, cover and mutual backing under the effects in the composition of group, and also the procedure of flights by different tasks - reconnaissance, aim designation, cover and support of the troops. Special support in the combat employment was done during finalizing of the attacks of ground targets with the use of bombs, FFAR and gun, inflicting impacts by day and at night with the illumination SAB. Bombing was carried out exclusively from the dive, up to the perpendicular. Completed preparation by the combat putting together of pairs, it was sectional and entire composition of the squadrons (by it it is understood teamwork and tactical arrangement - “feeling of comradeship” and the mutual understanding of pilots).
In spite of the presence in 134 APIB of MiG-27K, that possessed the greatest possibilities and most respected by pilots, command made the decision not to include them in the composition of group. Afghan experience unambiguously showed that under the complex mountain conditions, distant from the calculated “maloperesechennoj” locality, in the high-speed machine does not succeed in using entire potential of onboard equipment. Electronics and aiming systems proved to be useless with the target search in chaos of cliffs, stones and brushwood of zelenki. Quite often purposes generally cannot be isolated from the height without the prompt of ground-based or helicopter spotter. But to take small size target of the strike (it it could be structure in the village, weapon emplacement, ambush after duvalom) to the self-accompaniment and aim designation while transient contact and maneuvering not under the force was even “Kaira” - to the most perfect system, which was being located then in the the frontal aviation. Reason consisted in th lower boundary of safe from “the Stingers” echelon raised to 5000 m, which set serious limitations on the use of a onboard aiming laser-television complex. As a result, pinpoint targets in the locality occurred beyond the limits of the range of detection of the guidance equipment established on the aircraft, since the optimum altitude range of the application of KAB-500, UR X-25 and X-29 lay within the limits of 500-4000 m. moreover of rocket it should have been released at the speeds of 800-1000 km/h from the shallow dive, when to independently examine target of strike and to ensure guidance because of the transiency of rapprochement was already practically impossible. The expensive controlled ammunition under these conditions remained the weapon of the attack aircraft, which acted in the close contact with forward air controllers, and on the fighter-bombers PrNK with the laser and television channels guidance remained ballast. Moreover they were subjected to frequent failures, which affected also the work of interconnected circuits. Another reason was the fact that on MiG-27K, that bore massive “Kaira” there are no armor plates of cab, in any way unsuperfluous in the combat situation.
Up to moment of sending “to the war” MiG-27D and M they passed the standard “Afghan” complex of modifications. It included the adjustment of starting system for increasing its reliability in hot discharged air, a certain increase in the limitation of the temperature of gases behind the turbine (usually “cut off” with the reserve for the savings of the service life of engine and permitted to a increase only in the combat situation), and also installation on the center section of cassettes with IR decoys VP-50-60 with the necessary electric armature. Armchair KM -1 was finished for the arrangement “of combat” NAZ-7B, for which excess metal was selected from its frame. PrNK-23M passed tuning “under the mountain”, as a result by which the aiming problem, which considered the set of introductory (height, temperature and air pressure, angle of dive, range to target, ballistics of ammunition the rest) was solved taking into account exceeding and incline of locality instead of the customary plains- hilly relief. In sorted out NAZ instead of the useless fishing rods and the lifeboat were plotted the pair of flasks with the water, hand grenades, automaton AKS-74U and spare stores to it.
To October the group of 24 ADIB, which composed the valuable air regiment, in composition of which there were three squadrons (on 12 combat MiG-27 in each and four “dual-control aircraft” MiG-23UB) it was ready to departure. Commanded 134 APIB, as they named a group in the documents, Lieutenant Colonel V. S Markel, who become subsequently Hero of Russia. Squadrons commanded the Lieutenant Colonels V. Akashev, A. Blinov and V. Doroshenko. Way to the war the squadron of last beginning, after making 500-km “hook” in the opposite direction: On 20 October its MiG-27 they departed to the north, after being directed in Zhangiztobe, where collection and obtaining of task in the staff of division was in prospect for the group. Through several days together with the regiment they again proved to be house - along the way in DRA in Taldy-Korgan was executed the first intermediate landing (on this case of pilots it already awaited canteen).
By the following points of steel airfields Chimkent and then Mari', where they gave out required camouflage to crew, including winter jackets and “the sliders”, useful by the approached winter. Acquaintance with future TVD on “the information about the locality” made it possible to learn, that “during the year here it is possible to isolate only two seasons - cold (middle of November - the beginning of March) and hot (beginning of March - middle of November), moreover passage from one season to another is accomplished very rapidly”. In the sharply continental climate dry warm autumn was changed by unstable and dank weather with the night frost to -15°. Similar was issued the last military winter of 1988-1989 for the limited contingent of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan…
They were in Mari'-1, among entire other things, boundary formalities were settled and the necessary documents were designed. The latter was at that time to the known degree the tedious procedure, which included filling of declarations with a meticulous question in the graph “purpose of your trip”, delivery “dark-blue” (official) foreign passports and passage of custom-house. The time, spent on the overflights, it was recorded into the flying books as not obtained to each on the course of the combat training of exercise beginning from “the flights along a route” to “the flights in the clouds”, since the volumes of studies by that flown away to war no one removed.
Finally, on 29 October after 40- minute overflight group overcame the last, shortest, the leg of route and landed in Shindand, whose airfield from the very beginning war served as base IBA. Besides two squadrons Su-17M4 changed 274 APIB, here was found the brought-out from Kandahar assault squadron Su-25 from the composition 378 OShAP, component MiG-23MLD from 120 IAP, and also 302 OVE, equipped with mixture Mi-8 and Mi-24. Specifically, they met by the first of novices, patrolling the environments of airfield and covering their landing. However, the total number of Shindand group of the Soviet troops composed 8600 men, while entire population of city it did not exceed 5 thousand besides the Soviet aviation units and the subdivisions, in Shindand was based and Afghan 355 Mixed Air Regiment equipped with An-26, Mi-8, Mi-25 and Su-7.
On the kept balance practice, 274 APIB was detained for the aid of introduction into the system of the novices, each of which after the study of region and preparation of the maps several times flew on the range, getting accustomed to the locality. Twice carried out flights by joint composition Su-17M4 and MiG-27; however, it was impossible to export the pilots 134 APIB on “the dual-control aircraft” for the practical acquaintance with the most frequently meeting purposes and the orientators by the, and also standard tactical methods, with which the transfer of experience occurred literally from hand to hand and it was most valuable. The pilots “MiG” did not have admittance to the flights on Su-17UM, and the pilots of “Su” did not have a experience of piloting MiG-23UB. The change of materiel made it necessary to also move into Shindand the necessary for MiG-27 ground-support equipment. Something (together with the technical personnel) they were delivered by Il-76 and An-12, and machines TECh and bulky equipment conveyed by echelon to Kushka, and from there - under its own power in the composition of transport auto-transport groups.
For the aid of neighbor- Afghans it did not be necessary by this time to design. Those continued to fly on Su-7BMK, being occupied by its tasks also of joint departures never it was undertaken, although objective obstacles, it is at first glance, it was not - all Afghan pilots knew the Russian language, but the means of connection and control were Soviet production. Different relation to the combat work was the true reason for cooling relations. Generally it could seem from the side that “the associates” participate in the different wars. While the groups of Soviet aircraft and helicopters constantly departed for inflicting impacts according to the forces of opposition, the caravans and the bases of the mujahadeen, Afghan pilots carried out one-two departures in the week by single Su-7 or by pair, without risking to approach “being snapped” purposes, but in the case of their work near the Soviet parts into air raised MiG-23, “looked” after the allies
The deteriorated relations were manifested even at the everyday level accustomed to rest in their actions on power 40 army, government servicemen since the beginning of the removal of Soviet troops in that opened of steel to call our “traitors”, fired on the stands and tossed up for taxiings of any kind the splitting and cutting rubbish, polosovavshij pneumatic tires in some pilots it increased the tendency to finish “its war” by the simplest method in 1988-1989 abroad were, as a result of which driven away 11 aircraft and helicopters, and in Shindand itself flights more greatly resembled “breaking completely” of the machines, by restoration of which Afghans themselves did not trouble, because of what already on the approach of the environment of base they struck with a quantity of broken and ransacked frames Su-7
Neighbor- fighters rendered noticeable assistance in the mastery of the regions of work, in three months of work had time to visit all “angles” of the zone of responsibility on “the dual-control aircraft” they transported novices along the standard routes, after indicating rotary points, characteristic signs and orientators, the direction of the approaches and dangerous places, the appearances above which without the matter was to be avoided besides the special features of the navigational matter, veterans they prompted the component of battle maneuvering, target search and tactics, others of which they were located on the face, and that they exceeded the scope of manuals, relating no longer to the technology of combat employment and organization of flights, but to the flying skill
Taking into account the finesses, determined by local coloring, the departures to the impact predominantly were planned in the early morning or evening hours (midday heat and population and dushmen they waited out in the shadow of Duvalov, “zelenki” and of caves, and therefore the search for enemy it was doomed to the failure) the caravans, which were being hidden by day in the villages and the shelters, they were touched into the way only toward the evening, with the search one ought to have given considerable attention to the shaded slopes, in the night flights first of all it was necessary to follow its own attitude and surrounding relief - collision with the mountains was more dangerous than any antiaircraft fire general rule during the construction of combat approach was the attack from the nose dive, preferable and on the accuracy, and on the safety - aircraft was located above by purpose the minimum of time and, after driving away, “by float” jumped out beyond the limits of the possible zone of reach of AD (to observe the specified lower boundary 5000 m it was possible not always both because of different exceeding of locality and of specific features of pilots and combat ardor)
However, besides the acquaintance with TVD, during the first days for personnel it was necessary to study the equipment of stands and habitable town for the protection from the possible firings in principle, the environments of Shindand were considered as the relatively quiet - with the local mujahadeen was possible to agree according to the principle “we you we do not touch, you - us”, but since the beginning of the withdrawal of forces in the province were increased in frequency the diversions of the not had time to navoevatsja “irreconcilable”, that threatened to the finally outgoing Soviet parts “bloody bath” during August the forces of opposition on the north here took that left by the Soviet troops at Kunduz, moreover for government parts was possible to hold only prepared to the defense airfield Geratskij mullah Akbar it declared “Shuravi they harmed us nine years, but now we charge to their Allah” and only Most High he knew, what more in this call - humbleness or threat without relying on Most High, force “Khezbe Of alla” (parties of Allah) local commander Dovrana was selected to Shindand and it organized artillery attack to rocket projectiles firing it arrived exactly to the time of landing of aircraft, but the used by dushmen projectiles of increased by primitive means to 20-25 km distance because of the large scattering vomited in the environments the air bases
In three days in the stony earth on the stands and in the habitable zone unearthed the shelters and weapon emplacements, but nevertheless danger remained - on the open “clearing” of airfield even without the direct entries the splinters without difficulty flew away up to the great distances, and those favored by dushmen igniting (phosphoric) projectiles could be put out perhaps that by the available in the abundance sand of the wall of modules” edged with the steel panels, collected from the strips of airport paving K 1D, left in Shindand exactly for the preparation for the basing of intensive aviagruppirovki floorings they were intended for the flight service of aircraft with a takeoff weight of 12 tons; however, the specially carried out flight tests made it possible to establish that these articles have the increased safety factor and they are capable of maintaining 18-ton machines in the final analysis to fly them it was not necessary, they limited only to use K-1D for expanding the stands, but remainder went as the diverse construction material - from the posts for the barbed wire to the pedestrian paths and the revetment of structures as the protection were used also the boxes from under the ammunition, well-packed by sand and stones of wall they protected to the height of human increase, although those, who slept on the second tier of cots, felt themselves is very comfortably to fortunately, verify in practice the effectiveness of all these measures it was not necessary - in entire retention time of regiment the airfield was fired only two time, and that breaks lay with the spread far they talked, that they were addressed to neighbor- Afghans, who continued the exchange of impacts with “their” enemies
The nature of environments contributed to safety of base - the stony desert with the rare bushes of prickle, deprived of the shelters toward the end of autumn became deserted many settlements, whose inhabitants departed with the herds to the mountain pastures, and the roaming bands also avoided the uninhabited places, where they could not obtain shelter and support evidence of this was the fact that the majority of battle damages aircraft and helicopters obtained not during the takeoff and the landing, that were being considered as the most risky regimes, but with the work in other regions, last loss in the Shindand zone occurred two ago, when search and rescue Mi-8 "October 1986 was biased by sniper shot from “the auger” in 180 km from the base and, after the evacuation of crew, it was destroyed from air
“To worsen indices”, all the more finally, did not want since MiG-27 n 3. of 4 tons it exceeded MiG-23 by the takeoff weight and it noticeably was inferior in “taxed force” (its engine R-29B-300 it developed on the afterburner of 11500 kG against 13000 kG of the R-35-300), then the climb “by spark plug” with located on a height 1150 m of airfield it was impossible throughout the mass MiG-27 it also exceeded “martlets”, lagging in this case vtja-govooruzhennosti, but therefore it was perceptibly more heavily on the takeoff Therefore the latter technique 134 APIB they changed now, after deriving throttle on “full afterburner”, after detachment pilots they slightly pushed the control stick forward, accelerating aircraft on almost horizontal area to the neighbor drive and, after the landing gear retracting and flaps, the collected speed machine steeply departed upward on by the angle of 30°-40° on the hill with interval of 2-4 it flogged it was produced the shooting of the traps, which by train burnt out behind before the gain of safe altitude the collection of group it occurred at the height of 7000-8000 m, after which along the placed into PrNK-23M route MiG-27 dispatch to the purpose
Landing was also carried out rapidly, “by stake downward” already along the road home group went with a decrease, passing by reverse landing pattern along VPP and extending the intervals between the aircraft to 40 seconds abeam of BPRM- CLOSE-IN HOMING BEACON- from the height of 1800m MiG-27 one after others was carried out the steep descending turn, leaving to the strip engine revolutions they held on “to idling”, trying not to accelerate machine more than 550 km/h in proportion to the approach of the velocity they dissipated to 260-270 km/h, in this case the flaps automatically descended from 15° to 50°, but if necessary the pilot of fighter-bomber pulled “gazke”
The zone of the responsibility of pilots Shindand included, besides the adjacent provinces Herat and Jalalabad, also the southern regions, where the spurs of the Hindu Kush passed to monotonous uplands and desert, which was being alternated by dry riverbeds, by ravines, by hilly banks, by the pilings up of cliffs and boulders in hundreds of kilometers was situated the used unkind glory mountainous area Lur-Koch, who was remaining himself - in spite of repeated “cleanings” and airstrikes - by base of local bands to the West from it it was stale “zelenka” of Anardary (latter to bomb continually they forbade from kabul - they indicated that in the local gardens and the groves they are located the landownership of capital to znati) after the desert, at the Iranian boundary as constant as purposes they served the bases, located on Rabati-Dzhali and lakes Saba-ri and Khamdun, from where into the depth the countries moved caravans with the weapon and the ammunition
The situation in the environs of Kandahar with the best will in the world difficult it was to estimate optimistic; however, the blocked center of province continued to be controlled by the government troops the conclusion of parts 40 army and the impossibility of use Kandahar koof the airfield (now it assumed only transport and medical service aircraft) seriously complicated the work of aviation city and airfield, divided 20 km (to the withdrawal of our they were distinguished “Afghan” and “Soviet” Kandahar) surrounded the significant forces of the mujahadeen, which solidly saddled roads and cut off it from the center of the country “perfumes” freely they were moved in the surrounding green zone, continually firing city from the mortars and the reactive installations the control of province and fight with the forces of opposition for the local GO of the army corps of General B Oljumi they were the difficult matter - in the region it acted near [polutysjachi] of bands and in order to avoid skirmishes, the staff of housing went to the payment of money to enemy, and it sometimes shared with it by foodstuffs and ammunition
The dominant role in the opposition in Kandahar was removed the aviation, for which this task remained first priority before the purpose in Kandahar they regularly processed the based here squadrons MiG-23, Su-17 and Su-25, now in order to suffice of lying nearer anything [Shindanda], it was necessary to overcome 350-400 km the departures into this region they occupied to 75% of overall volume of the work of the squadrons at Shindand (both MiG-27 and Su-25 and risen to their fighter cover) of the purposes, discovered by reconnaissance around the blocked city, every day they appeared in the schedule 134 APIB, because of what PTB-800 under the fuselage generally never removed although according to “clean” navigational calculation flying range MiG-27M with the complete servicing only of internal tanks it was 1750 km, but the radius action with 1000 kg of bombs - 800 km, in the real situation it was necessary to take into consideration the additional fuel consumption taking into account the special procedure of takeoff, the time, necessary to the collection of group and, most importantly, the target search, which was conducted exceptionally independently
The independent combat work of the group 134 APIB approached e of November, when the latter Su-17M4 left home however, by the inertia and in view of habit to the permanent “dryings” in many documents of staff in kabul the accepted relay race regiment to the end itself continued to call by the previous of 274-m1 meanwhile work it went without the interruptions and output, with the rare “ring-offs” on the weather accomplishment of mission and organization of flights it regulated by field manual; however, not without th corrections e prompted by practice. In particular, for the effectiveness, the operation instruction of staff VVS from kabul, entered already from the evening on the telephone. In it were designated a target and places of work next day, usually from the calculation three departures to the pilot. Last figure was determined by the endurance of crew - with the large load the people already worked “on the wear”, losing form. On the evening formulation of the problems the commander and the chief of staff of regiment gathered pilots, giving to them indications, routes and assigning the composition of groups. Target area (characteristic of the targets of strike, their coordinate, characteristic orientators, AIR DEFENSE of enemy, forbidden zones (where they were placed its and Afghan parts, and also peaceful villages) simultaneously was studied and they were prepared map.
In the morning from the staff by telegram came the confirmation of combat mission, which finally asserted the matched with the staff of part detail of forces, combat crew, flight altitude, height of conclusion from the attack, which was being determined by the expected opposition AIR DEFENSE, and precise time of impact. The drawn aircraft were determined by the schedule chart of regiment, which considered it stored up resource, their readiness and the reserve of forces. For the operational reaction with the appearance of sudden tasks (“work on call”) or to delay with the introductory “on top”, the regiment commander had the right to independently appoint the detail of forces and to plan departures next day. In the case of the substitution left the covey, strengthening of impact or urgent tasks, in the regiment was separated on-duty component. Moreover, by the special feature of duty 134 APIB was armament MiG-27 only bombs, although house was provided for the destructive version with the rockets R-60 on APU-60- I under the fuselage, with which the aircraft departed to the interception and were guided to the target upon commands from the earth (this duty they bore those remaining in Taldy-Korgan and Zhangiztobe MiG-27). In Shindande the rockets R-60 with IR GSN were not hung up even with the departures into the near-boundary regions, where the risk of encounter with the Pakistani fighters was not excluded - the tasks of tracking AIR DEFENSE of base, ensured the located with a number “present” destroyers MiG-23MLD.
In the flying change to the flights usually were derived 16 MiG-27. For the change were as a rule, carried out three or four departures by squadron, and to the pilot were fallen two or three departures. Battle formation on the route was built by the column of pairs with visual contact between them and by the sharp bearing of aircraft in the pair, which provided a good survey and which did not prevent maneuver. However, the fully automated flight along a route and attack with the use of PrNK-23M, that ensured the passage of route with the rotary and purposeful points to realize made it possible neither special features of locality nor nature of purposes. Bomb release “in the automaton” gave area covering, during scattering from a height reached at best 300-500 m, and therefore this form of actions remained the empty expenditure of resource and ammunition. Pinpoint targets - separate buildings, fortress, stand and the fortified positions of the mujahadeen, the to say nothing of roaming forces and caravans - should have been found in the necessary square visual. Therefore automation was used only during 20- 30- minute flight along a route, until the navigation complex PrNK-23M and SAU-23B1 order aircraft.
On the route for the fuel economy the wing always left in the position of 16°, maintaining the speed of 800 km/h and the flight echelon 10.000-10.500 m of true altitude. With the approach to the assigned region the group was opened to the vapors, which began search. To each pair was assigned its purpose - them there was so much, which with the interest was sufficient on all, but separation made it possible to avoid confusion and not to interfere with each other. In view of the distance of objects, for the indications of FAC from the earth and the helicopters to hope it did not be necessary. As orientators served the characteristic bends of river or road, ditches, squares pour on, gardens and the noticeable from a distance mirrors of irrigating pond- Houses. On the maps and the plane-tables were indicated also the perceptible “candles” of minarets, the ruins and the decrepit, but well noticeable from the height fragments of ancient walls, usually separate and which served as fiducial points of the counting (moreover in the morning hours they they gave clear shadows). For purpose itself it most frequently was necessary to find in the settlements and “zelenke”, where the mujahadeen stopped at leisure, there were located the storages of all forms of that entered from abroad of supply items, surrounded by the, as a rule, fortified positions.
After detecting purpose, that leads was introduced its MiG-27 into the dive, leading angle to 40-45 ", optimum for the rate of descent - more gently sloping it involved attack time, with the steep - aircraft it was accelerated and it lost altitude too rapidly, so that after seconds, without having had time to plainly take aim, it should have been derived from the attack. It, having slightly remained, followed slave, that was being taken aim individually. Aircraft gradually was accelerated to 1000 km/h and velocity head was perceived by the trembling of the entire loaded by bombs machine. In the dive MiG-27 it went with the small slip, which made it possible to more precisely put sighting mark. During the aiming was used laser range-finder “Klen-PM”, whose data were considered by calculator with the extension of stamp. After attaining the imposition of stamp on the purpose, pilot removed slip by the smooth motions of pedals, he " calmed” machine on the bank and the hunting and without the delay the bombs were dropped. Conclusion with the steep climb here followed. The latter was carried out not only from the fears of the antiaircraft fire - prohibition to be lowered below 5000 m acted strictly, but the heavy hand of the commander OF VVS 40 Army was known. 134 APIB pilots, “who dived” are lower than the stipulated “ceiling”, repeatedly were obtained penalties and them on day- other they as a warning grounded for “the crude violation of flying discipline”. In the flying circles walked popular history about how one of such aces General threatened “to expel from the war” and to send into the union, on what the disturber answered: “Do not frighten me by the native land!”.
By the operation instruction, on the letter of regulations, was specified “assigned degree of the defeat of objects” according to the type “A”, “in” and “”, that indicated respectively destruction, and incapacitation is not less than to sutkipovrezh-denie “to the period of battle”, that determined a quantity and the type of the ammunition, required for the accomplishment of various objectives. In practice equipment of aircraft more greatly depended on presence and preparedness of ammunition. The Shindand storage of ammunition supply differ significantly in terms of the fixed supply and delivery from near Kushka, where echelons were unloaded and ammunition were delivered by machines to the airfield. On the base of bomb they sorted for types, as far as possible immediately they freed from the packing and with obtaining of their task it remained to only razvezti on the aircraft the fixed system and in the recent months of war it worked without interruption; however, in the course it began to go entire contract, without a special difference between types and stamps of ammunition.
Along the planned purposes “was rolled” the assigned tonnage, good with the formulation of the problems of the characteristic of purposes they sounded monotonous: “the fortress, occupied with rebels,… [duval], where stopped band,… the building of Islamic committee…” At the same time, 134-[j] [APIB] did not obtain tasks for the direct aviation support, where played special role accuracy and effectiveness of impact, required concrete weapon of destruction. Occurred another occasion - “erasure” of warehouse reserves in proportion to the approached end of war, whose date was known to each. The production of reserves occurred so intensively, that before the withdrawal it was necessary to in haste supplement storages, embedding on them the inquired by kabul three-month reserve of ammunition, the share of the air facilities of defeat in which it was 823 tons of bombs and rockets.
The usual version of equipment MiG-27 consisted of two “five hundred meter distances” either of four bombs with a mass of 250 or 100 kgf each, placed on the front subfuselage and underwing units. They were most frequently used BY [FAB]-250 and [FAB]-500 of different types and models, [OFAB]-250-270 and -100-120. Last, however, pilots carried to the discharge “humane” ammunition because of the insufficient damaging effect, especially with the high-altitude bombing, when low accuracy should have been compensated by power or with a quantity of ammunition of the application of a high caliber it required and the nature of the purposes, larger partly protected and difficult vulnerable - to pull down clay [duval] or thick adobe wall “of hundredth” they could far from always even at the open place their damaging effect (splinters and blast effect) on the kinetic energy 1,7-2 times (depending on varied conditions) was inferior [FAB]-250, whereas to say nothing of powerful “half-ton trucks” with the impact on the easy structures the latter generally possessed 2,5-3 times higher efficiency
In the course dispatch also incendiary bombs ZAB -100-175 with the thermite cartridges and ZAB -250-200, filled with viscous adhesive mixture although to burn in the mountains and the villages it was especially to something, and the begun winter made WITH ZAB by even less effective, fiery impacts gave large psychological effect as a rule, such “presents” they could cover sufficiently considerable area, and flown away with wide fan even the small burning drops, were caused heavy burns correction for the type of purpose it was done, when the single-valued task of the defeat of kinetic energy stood - for this they tried to use [RBK]-250 and [RBK]-500, entire swept up living by the squall of breaks in radius of hundreds of the meters
To the aircraft continually brought [ODAB]-500 and -500[P]; however, relation to the capricious ammunition was ambiguous Eyewitness- landing force members they told about the impressive results of their action - the swept structures, burnt out [propleshinakh] in the brushwood “of [zelenki]” and been charred corpses with the knocked out eyes to rescue from the volumetric explosion helped neither natural terrain nor entrenchments nor shelter moreover, in locked [obemakh] of structures contained [ODAB] it occurred under the favorable conditions (absence of wind and low humidity), giving maximum explosive and thermal shock at the same time, reliability [ODAB] (especially in winter) is left much to be desired the damaging qualities of the volumetric explosion, which burnt everything in hundreds of cubometers by the highest temperature and by pressure, it was reached only at the specific concentration of fuel- air mixture moreover, the in spite of impressive caliber, bombs contained a relatively small quantity of liquid VV - 93 kgf of liquefied oxide of ethylene in [ODAB]-500 and 145 kgf of piperylene in [ODAB]-500[P] the creation of the aerosol cloud of optimum saturation and its timely undermining had to ensure those locating in the bomb first the cartridges of the explosive, and then detonating action their undermining it was produced by the fuses through the clearly assigned time intervals the obtained effect, however, it depended on wind, temperature, humidity and atmospheric pressure, and also the observance of the regime of bombing and it was not always reached even under the polygon conditions in the Afghan situation by unfavorable they were immediately all factors, because of what frequently did not occur not only the undermining, but also simple combustion without the detonation construction [ODAB]-500[P] and [PM], besides the passage on another type VV, included whole system of the cartridges of the explosive charge, which forms the cloud of necessary concentration, and the special leader- predictor on the three-meter stock, which undermined the charge above the earth's surface the complication of construction did not solve all problems, although the reliability of ammunition noticeably increased, nevertheless [ODAB] operated not always, especially with the offensive of winter dampness and low temperatures, at which the droplets of mixture did not want to be set on fire
They related not fearlessly on the airfield to [ODAB] - passed rumor, which their contained is poisonous, yes even the squelched filling required caution in the rotation of, while usual demolition bomb without ceremony they were discarded to the earth and they rolled on the concrete runway load MiG-27 in the group it could be most different - machine part bore [FAB] and [OFAB], others - [RBK], [ODAB] or [BetAB]
With the redeployment with themselves took the blocks [UB]-32-57 and B -8, but they remained without the matter to the use of powerful BUNKS S -24 of those called in Afghanistan “by nails”, to in certain cases preferable, prevented the same limitation on the flight altitude launching with 5000 m it could not be aiming, [tk] their maximum lethal range was 4000 meters about such “pencils” as S- shch and S -8, and it did not be necessary to speak - their sighting range was altogether only 1800-2000 m for the same reason “ballast” it remained powerful 30- of mm the six-barrel gun [GSH]- ' -30, which possessed rate of fire into 5000 it [vyst]/min and by powerful 390- gram projectile nevertheless, complete fire unit to it (260 cartridges) was always located aboard
Servicing aircraft was conducted according to combat requirements 2-1 of part [NIAS] to the military time this permission was introduced only from June 1986 g before main staff VVS Afghan conflict with the war it did not make level and work they conducted in the usual order, although with the corrections, caused by repeatedly increased labor expense the utilized in the union preliminary preparation was abolished and was substituted by the current preflight and post-flight, and also by purposeful inspections with the inspection “necessary” systems, instead of that accepted earlier “entire contract” it was permitted to let out aircraft in the flight with the malfunctions and the failures, if they did not affect safety and they made it possible to accomplish task even if it approached the period of routine maintenance, MiG-27 continued service - there was permitted the prolongation of resource to 50 hours with the normal operation the machine
In spite of different kind similar “relaxations”, total volume of labor expenses by the technical operation it grew in comparison with “the union” by 92%, and a basic fraction of time occupied equipment and the suspension of ammunition, the expenditure of forces for which increased 24 to the aid to gunsmiths they came all - from the technicians of aircraft and the mechanics to the unoccupied pilots the preparation was conducted by groups of three-five men one it revealed “zincs” with the cartridges OF IR- traps, struggled them on the aircraft and filled cassettes [VP]-50-60 another [rastarirovala] of bomb, bringing down bandages and extracting them from the wooden packing (bombs were prepared always with the reserve to one-two departures from the calculation, that excess hundred demolition bombs it will not mix) rest on the trailers and the carts they reached bombs to the aircraft, where them assumed the prepared calculations with the technician- gunsmith in chapter, who set the locks of holders, who checked control circuits and who led suspension after this specialists from the group [AV] with the cart of the prepared fuses they bypassed stand, twisting them into the bombs and removing the checks (to equip bombs to in good time and store them it was dangerously and strictly it was forbidden)
The limit of time, especially with the preparation for the repeated departure, made necessary the simultaneous inspection of aircraft, servicing, charging by air and by nitrogen, checking systems and the suspension of armament just in case in this case they followed so that no one there was in the cab, electric power supply to the control circuit of weapon was not given and [sootvet] the [stvujushchij] switch it was established on “the nonexplosion” - in this case the fuse was not set even with the torn away linchpin and the random stalling of bomb from the lock after suspension and the equipment of bombs no one, besides pilot, was not resolved to occupy the place in the cab or to include equipment ready to takeoff of aircraft (cases of the shooting on the earth and of the shooting OF THE IR- traps, which threatened to burn stand, they were far from single - sufficient it was to open the blocking on the chassis and not to turn attention to the position “necessary” toggle switch)
In the required order were filled up with compressed nitrogen the cylinders of the system of inert gas, which ensured MiG-27 fuel-tank pressurization for reduction in the fire hazard with the shooting through
Fragment of the flight map- two-kilometer scale map of province headlights. Scale 1:200.000 is, i.e., in 1 cm of 2 km visible the drawn course, circle - region of search and purpose in the center (to the right to [s].61). Reserves of aircraft bombs on the storage of ammunition supply. In the foreground thick-walled [FAB]-500[TS], which gave with the break the mass of heavy splinters (to the left). In the expectation of the command the of group technique of armament they rest on [bombosklade] Of [shindanda], sitting on [ODAB]-500[P]. are in the background visible WITH [RBK]-500 (below).
Departures in the environs of Kandahar alternated with the impacts on [Lurkokhu], [Girishku] and suburbs of Herat, that were being delivered both in response to the attacks of the mujahadeen and for their averting the demand of command to secure removal of land troops, caused the need “preventive” bombardment of roadside zones and potentially convenient for the organization ambushes of places, and also the ways of the output of bands to the communications airplane attacks unambiguously as a rule gave to understand to enemy that the firing of column will immediately entail air strike on this place and adjacent villages, which gave shelter to the forces “of irreconcilable”
As a whole the effectiveness of high-altitude bomb throwing could not be high together with the difficulties of search and recognition of purposes basic reasons they remained the absence of united procedure and dependence on the personal habits of pilot, the significant scattering of bombs, at best composed not how many ten meters, or mountains themselves with their unstable weather conditions (fluctuation of temperatures, frequent winds, jet streams, the ascending and downflows) influence of which yielded to calculation neither sight nor pilot even in the better time, when limitations on the height were not such strict, they were included by objective control into the discharge of successful (besides the direct entries), the breaks, which were being lain down not further than 50 m of the boundary of purpose. Dissatisfied by the existing position, Colonel the Alexander Of [rutskoj], until August 1988 g been by the deputy of the commander OF VVS 40- 1 army for front aviation, [unichtozhajushche] characterized the imposed on pilots style of work “why generally then to fly, to burn kerosene, to discard with hundreds of tons the in a 24 hour period expensive ammunition, if the result of impacts is zero ". ”
It was necessary to search for other methods of using the aviation to third of departures 134- GO [APIB] it was carried out for mining of locality besides the basic task - the forging of enemy and obstacle for his movements - mining partly compensated the limited nature of action, indeed that remaining of hundred aircraft VVS 40- 1 of army could not ensure a constant supremacy above the extensive zones of responsibility, that is more than twenty-four hour. Discarded for the mining [FAB] and [OFAB], which were being exploded first here, first there in the course several days, they made it possible to extend the period “of presence” and gave the effect of pressure on the enemy if we usual attack possible was wait out, after being covered from the aircraft, then the concealed bomb- mines and the unexpected explosions in the literal sense of word undermined the desire to leave of refuge usual procedures they did not make it possible to estimate the effectiveness of this bombing - it did not give immediate defeat, but the special recommendations of psychologists with th fatalism e characteristic of Moslems spoke into its benefit, the concealed inevitable threat suppresses more than the explicit danger
At the same time, “sowing” by the recommended itself barrage aerial mines, by which filled [RBK] and [KMGU], which covered large areas with the high density (for each several square meters it was fallen along the mine), it required discharge from the small heights with the spread of load from the given ones on the conditions of safety 5000 m of mine it carried by wind, spread became excessive and cottons of the small mines, which operated during the selfdestruction during three days, did not produce proper impression only method they remained the bombardment every day with the demolition bombs, which suppressed enemy by the shaken the earth powerful breaks the moreover flown away splinters “of five hundred meter distances” and the fragments of stones preserved lethal force at a distance 600-700 m
Besides the planned impacts, MiG-27 they were assigned to conducting of reconnaissance-and-strike actions (RUD) - to independent search and destruction, wider known as “free hunting” by larger part they were carried out for the search for caravans and separate machines along the paths and the roads, because of what RUD sometimes it was deciphered as “prospecting of the sections of the road” especially it was revived the motion of [dushmanskogo] transport at night, when they felt themselves more confidently under the cover of the darkness of [karavanshchiki], but the government troops preferred not to leave garrisons and gates this it partly simplified task on pilots the light of the headlights of machines from the height of 3500-5000 m it was possible to observe at the removal 40-60 km, but to deliver impact - immediately, since their columns waited out night time under the protection of urban walls and block signal posts
In the day time the search was conducted by pairs, and for the growth of efforts it was possible to draw MiG-27 on-duty component, constantly found in the readiness №1 being prepared for the departure for “the hunting”, pilots studied the region of search on photo-plane-tables and large-scale maps, with the aid of the intelligence data determining the most probable paths of motion of enemy, noting the position of its posts and the passage of columns on the roads on the maps 1 scale maps was brought azimuthally -[koor]-[dinatnuju] grid RSBN $$RTRSBN - SHORT-RANGE NAVIGATION RADIO SYSTEM, the flight course, zone of frequency control and near-boundary 10 of km zone after the increased in frequency skirmishes with the the Pakistani BY F -16a, to its position with respect to “the ribbon” was necessary to pay special attention battle formation in the pair with the search they held in the system “bearing” with the angle of 20-25° and a distance of 400-600 m with exceeding of slave on 100-150 m Primary attention in the route was given to the survey of roads, paths, river valleys and passes
The conclusion of the forces of the Special Force and the helicopter squadrons, which played main role in the hunting for the caravans, fairly untied to the mujahadeen of hand now, together with the horses and the camels, increasingly more frequent it was possible to see the columns of jeeps and trucks of the increased passability only in October 1988 g reconnaissance 40- 1 army fixed the passage of boundary more than 100 by caravans with the weapon and the ammunition as the answer ever larger role in the work of front aviation and 134- GO [APIB] of steel to occupy night departures besides the fight with the caravans, this made action by twenty-four hour, and purposes they became camp and the stands, which gave out themselves by the light of bonfires on the night departures assigned only pilots 1- of GO of class, trained to bombing through th purposes e illuminated from air and the carried out not less than 10 check and training flights at night
To the night flights was derived to ten MiG-27 the search order by single aircraft, predominantly in the flat terrain and the foothills, only on the clear lunar nights were assigned squares for “the hunting” in the mountains, when apexes distinctly were examined and ridges [pri] this during the preparation separately was noted the position of mountain peaks on the azimuth and the distance from the lighthouse RSBN $$RTRSBN - SHORT-RANGE NAVIGATION RADIO SYSTEM duration of flight it comprised not more than 1 hour of 20 min, but in air simultaneously were found two MiG-27, that were being been sent for the different sides after the completion of search and turning home rose the following and, thus, RUD conducted without the interruption to the aircraft they were hung up on two [SAB]-100 and from two to four [OFAB]-100-120 or [OFAB]-250-270
Night work produced a increase in the load on the pilots - besides the tiredness with the instrument flying and the orienting, harassed the stressed search in the darkness and “torn” daily rhythm of the alternating day and night departures so, already on 10 November for captain into [Pravdivtsu] it was necessary in the tightened change of six times to rise in the sky - after two day departures it four additional times departed [nochju]1 on two or three night departure were standard, also, a the subsequent day, and later for it it was necessary even on 31 December to meet v. air - after taking off on the eve of midnight, pilot landed already the secondly to the hour of the night of the following day
Night attack was carried out employing the following procedure after detecting purpose, pilot left to its beam at the removal 10-15 km, refining place and direction of motion simultaneously it was produced the demand OF KP and, in the case of obtaining “good” to the attack, pilot delivered impact “on the move” or discarded [SAB], which burnt not less than seven minutes of this time was completely sufficient for evaluating of situation and organization of attack next day usually was carried out the checking of results, photographing in the case of success on the spot visually or remained ruins, corpses of horses and camels or broken machines, then, with the possibility, [vertoletchiki] took away the surviving trophies
In one of such departures even on the eve of in the daytime one of the pilots focused attention on small, but very convenient for the stand pine grove in [Anardare] region passing above the region at night, it noted below flame and, after managing without the illumination (as he then said, from the fear that “the perfumes” will hear the rumble of aircraft and will extin
Tengo bastante material para hacer eso que te interesa, si me das hasta el fin cosa de leer y razonar bien algunas cosas, puedo ayudarte sin mayores problemas.
Si te interesa información sobre la actuación de otros aviones Soviéticos en Afghanistan, dimelo y ponemos un thread donde colgar algunos articulos que tengo.
No tiene pantalla de radar, la información sale en el hud como en los mig-29, su-27.
Justo debajo del hud se vé una fila horizontal de luces donde se reflejan las ordenes del control de tierra, girar, distancia al objetivo, encender postcombustion, disparar, maniobra evasiva.
Debajo está el selector del modo de radar, al igual que el mig-29 el tener que seleccionar manualmente el modo adecuado para cada geometria del blanco lo hace dependiente del control de tierra (no tiene un modo de rastreo en el que se vean todos los tipos de blancos como en un avion occidental, hay que seleccionar entre blancos a gran altura,supresion de contramedidas, blancos que se acercan a baja altura, que se alejan a baja altura, el irst...).
A la izquierda del todo se ve un aparato circular co una especie de avioncito dibujado rodeado de luces, es el RWR SPO-10, bastante malo, no sirve de mucho.
La efectividad en LD/SD de su radar es bastante discutible (en acig.org la niegan) por ejemplo en una emboscada tendida contra F-16 pakistanies en la guerra de afganistan parece ser que fueron incapaces de adquirir el blanco. Tambien se dice que el primer AA-7, el R-23, era totalmente inutil, el R-24 mejor pero la brusquedad de sus actuadores provoca que pierdan la guia con facilidad.
Los mig-27 k y m si disponen una pantalla para sensores y el RWR SPO-15 es mucho mas eficaz.
denominación MiG-27L. El avión posee el mismo contorno de morro del MiG-27M/D, sólo lleva una ventana en el carenado debajo de éste, y comparte la misma denominación »Flogger-J» de la OTAN.
