Armada de Israel

[pagano]

El problema de tal colaboración sería en cuanto a la financiación, porque la guita proviniente del tío Sam es todavía muy necesario para Israel (p.e. el 75% del Hetz está financiado por EEUU?
¿Cómo se ve desde ahí el asunto? porque desde luego, ni Ucrania ni Israel están para muy altos gastos

[pagano]

Se desata el asunto político por el ataque al INS Hanit
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite? ... e/ShowFull
Respecto al post anterior, viene a colación porque Siniora ha sido invitado para una reunión con el PM Ehud Olmert

[shomer]

... ni Ucrania ni Israel están para muy altos gastos

No se trata de adquisición de armas de uno u otro lado, sino de programas de colaboración tecnológicos! ... Ucrania tiene mucho que ofrecer en experiencia acumulada en fabricacion de misiles, por ejemplo!

Salu2

[pagano]

Pero es que no solo te gastas muchísimo dinero en la compra de un material, ya que en I+D te gastas una suma muchísimo superior (ponemos por ejemplo el caso del Hetz).

[shomer]

... El problema de tal colaboración sería en cuanto a la financiación, porque la guita proviniente del tío Sam es todavía muy necesario para Israel (p.e. el 75% del Hetz está financiado por EEUU?
...

Las industrias de ambos países se benefician, Israel comparte su Know-How con las grandes empresas norteamericanas y ambas partes consiguen a cambio financiación y subsidios del gobierno norteamericano en proyectos de interés común!

Salu2

[pagano]

En efecto.
En la noticia que puse sobre la unidad Espada Defensiva de la base de Palmachim (unidad de misiles Hetz), en la noticia fuente (revista Fuerzas Militares del Mundo), se hace mención en la entrevista al jefe de la unidad la casi continua presencia de militares y técnicos norteamericanos para ver la evolución del sistema.

[reytuerto]

Estimados foristas:

Hola Shomer! El hecho que reseñas "...Se cumplen en estas fechas, 39 años del hundimiento del Destructor K-40 INS Eilat alcanzado por cuatro misiles Styx ..." es tan importante como Hampton Roads el siglo antepasado. Saludos.

[shomer]

Estimados foristas:

Hola Shomer! El hecho que reseñas "...Se cumplen en estas fechas, 39 años del hundimiento del Destructor K-40 INS Eilat alcanzado por cuatro misiles Styx ..." es tan importante como Hampton Roads el siglo antepasado. Saludos.

Shalom ReyT! ... Vale decir, que al igual que los caídos en el Monitor o en el Virginia, los marinos del Eilat jamas supieron que ese dia marcaron un antes y un después en la historia de los combates navales!

Salu2

[José Luis Ch.]

Y cuando se cumplen años del combate de Latakia?

Ahí los israelies se las cobraron a los sirios y egipcios con los Gabriel...

[Dienekes]

Pues fue el 6 de octubre, entre las 23:35 y las 00:00 horas. Antes se había hundido un dragaminas y una lancha lanzatorpedos, que servían de señuelo y avanzadilla. Fue la primera batalla naval de misiles (pues el ataque al Eilat no fue una batalla).

[shomer]

... Fue la primera batalla naval de misiles ...

Y la primera en hacer uso extensivo de la guerra electrónica como tecnica efectiva de evasión de misiles!

The Battle of Latakia

The Battle of Latakia was a small but revolutionary naval battle of the Yom Kippur War, fought on October 7, 1973, between Israel and Syria. It was the first naval battle in the history to see missile combat and the use of electronic warfare deception.

At the outset of hostilities, the Israeli navy set out to destroy the naval capabilities of the Syrians, who were equipped with modern Soviet made equipment.

Fought off the Syrian port city of Latakia, the Israelis employed the tactic of letting the enemy fire missiles at maximum range, while using chaff and jamming techniques (ECM) to defend against them. Once the Syrians ran out of missiles, the Israelis closed in and fought at optimum missile range.



Several Syrian gunships were sunk, and the Syrian navy returned to port and did not fight again for the rest of the war.

Few naval battles change the course of maritime warfare. Of those that do, a very select group ever become recognised as doing just that. Perhaps these engagements change the balance of world power, as was the case with Trafalgar. Or maybe these milestones bear witness to the introduction of a totally new concept in the conduct of naval warfare; as was the case at Midway.

The battle of Latakia did two things: it proved to the world that the Israeli Navy was up to par with its bretheren in the Air Force and Armored Corps, and it was the first naval battle in the history to see actual missile combat conducted and electronic warfare deception measures taken. The battle of Latakia demonstrated to the world the power of the fast attack craft and the effectiveness of missile evasion techniques. The small skirmish off of the Syrian coast during the first moves of the Yom Kippur War was a sign of things to come in naval warfare and changed the way that navies saw themselves in their ever-deadlier environment.

During the first day of hostilities, the Israeli Navy was dispatched to lure the Syrian missile boats out of port and engage them. A number of things made this order difficult:

The Israeli anti-ship missile, the Gabriel, had yet to be used in anger. Its performance against a real-life hostile target was as of yet unknown.
The Gabriel had only half of the effective range of the missiles the Syrians were using, the Soviet SS-N-2 Styx; a missile which had already sunk an Israeli destroyer six years earlier.
The Israeli defenses against the Styx consisted of electronic counter measures which had never been used in any real-life engagement. If they failed, the Israeli boats would be easy prey for the radar-homing Styx missile.
These challenges notwithstanding, an Israeli task force, operating in two parallel columns of three ships out at sea and two more closer to the shore, swung right towards the Syrian port of Latakia. On their radar screens, a surface contact appeared due north of their position. Unsure of its intent, the Israelis fired a battery of 76mm shells over its bow, to which it responded with desultory 40mm fire. Contact had been made.

Michael Barkai, the officer in charge of the operation, ordered the Hanit out of the three ship column to engage the Syrian torpedo boat, now positively identified. The Syrian was easily sent down to the bottom, picked off at extreme range by the Hanit's 76/62 gun. Not knowing whether the lone PT boat had reported their position, the Israelis hurried for the shore and braced for the coming showdown.

As the Israelis headed towards the shore, another radar contact was picked up, this time twenty five kilometers northeast of their position. One of the Israeli boats fired a snap shot Gabriel, but because the target was running for the shore and drew itself out of range, the missile dove ineffectually into the sea. But the chase still continued, and once in range the Reshef, in the starboard column, fired a Gabriel at eighteen kilometers range which struck the 560-ton Syrian Minesweeper dead on. But the Israelis knew that the real challenge was the Styx, not some vulnerable hulk of a vessel. The Israelis continued their dash towards Latakia.

Three contacts appeared on the radar screens as the Israelis neared the coast. They were Syrian missile boats, one Osa and two Komars, which had come to meet the interlopers. As the Israelis approached, the Syrians fired their missiles at a range from which the Israelis could do nothing. Once the missiles drew closer, however, the Israelis began firing their chaff rockets and used the jamming systems on board their ships to send out false radar signals to the incoming missile in an attempt to confuse its on-board computers. All of this technology was Israeli-developed and produced, and this was the first time it had ever been used in actual combat.

As the Styx missiles drew closer, it was apparent that all of the electronic defenses had worked - the missiles either flew harmlessly overhead or dove into the water. The Israelis pressed on with their apporach, confident in themselves and in their boats. The tactics that the Israelis had invested so much in were sound: approach stealthily, and let your opponent fire his missiles at maximum range as you close; as the enemy missiles near your position engage your deception countermeasures and hope for the best.

Only one Syrian boat still had missiles left - the Osa. It turned to face the Israeli flotilla as the two Komars made their mad dashes towards the protection of Latakia. But it would be to no avail. The Israelis closed at full speed, and let loose a devastating salvo of Gabriel missiles and managed to defeat two more Styx missiles with their chaff and jammers. The 150kg warhead on the Gabriel was more than enough to destroy the missile boats, and they sank quickly. After Latakia, the Syrian navy would be bottled up in its home ports. Acorner in naval warfare had been turned.

The Israeli navy, previously a fifth-rate mess of floating hand-me-downs, had proven itself at a time when even the vaunted Air Force and Armored Corps could not. The Israeli innovations in the use of chaff and radar jammers set a precedent in the way ships defend themselves still to this day. Indeed, even the Arab navies now employ the same techniques that the Israelis found so useful off of Latakia. The Israeli-designed Gabriel worked flawlessly. It was able to pick up small targets and, although its range was limited, it was able to earn a name for itself in the war rooms of nations everywhere; today it is employed by Taiwan, Sinagpore, SouthAfrica, and many others. Due to actions like the one off of the Syrian coast on October 7, 1973, the Israelis have made a name for themselves in the field of missile boat warfare and have proven themselves capable of not only joining the elite of military trendsetters but also of leading that prestigious group.

Aqui, un link interesante: http://www.btinternet.com/~david.Manley ... mpaign.pdf

Salu2

[shomer]

Imagen de satélite de dos de los Gal en las instalaciones de HDW en Kiel:





Hasta donde tengo entendido, o se los vende, o se los devuelve al servicio! ... Salu2

[shomer]

Vídeo emitido por Al Jazeera mostrando el lanzamiento de los dos misiles disparados contra la INS Hanit!

Aquí: http://players.mediazone.co.il/media...082/players/3/

Salu2

[shomer]

Algunos detalles de la investigación sobre el incidente con la INS Hanit!

A panel of Navy officials that probed Hizbullah's radar-guided missile strike on the Hanit, one of the Navy's most sophisticated missile ships, reported on Tuesday that the attack - and the deaths of fours sailors - should have been thwarted.

Imagenes de la Hanit ya reparada!


The IDF's report on the incident, which was completed on Sunday and submitted to Chief of General Staff Lt.-Gen. Dan Halutz Tuesday afternoon, read: "As far as the intelligence picture is concerned, it was found that despite the lack of pinpoint information about the weapon in the hands of Hizbullah, there was information in the Navy in the past that could have lead to some type of an assessment that the enemy possesses shore-to-ship missiles."

The investigative committee, led by Brig.-Gen. (res.) Nir Maor, found major flaws in the transfer of vital information from Military Intelligence to Naval Intelligence and to the commanders of the missile ships that patrolled off the coast of Beirut during the summer's war.

Navy officials told the committee that they did not know Hizbullah was in possession of advanced anti-ship radar-guided missiles. Military Intelligence said the information was given to the Navy in 2003.

According to the report, one Navy official, acting on a "gut feeling," raised the possibility that Hizbullah possessed Iranian missiles the morning of the attack, but was told by senior officers on the ship that such a threat was "imaginary and groundless."

In addition to the intelligence failures, the committee found a senior naval officer had deactivated the Barak missile defense system on the ship an hour before the attack without notifying the captain. The Barak system was capable of intercepting and destroying the missile.

The ship's command was caught so off-guard, that it did not know exactly what had happened until several hours after the missile strike, the committee found.

Navy Chief Maj.-Gen. David Ben Bashat said the report was a cause for concern and that inadequacies revealed by the committee were already being addressed. But Bashat insisted that the Navy's general assessment that there was not a missile threat accounted for the actions of the ship's commanders.

Bashat said instruments on two other ships patrolling the waters off Beiruit had identified the incoming missile, but had determined the object was Israeli air force jets returning from sorties over Lebanon.
Therefore, he concluded, the missile strike could not have been prevented, even if all the Hanit's instruments had been functioning at the time.

The report did not include recommendations for administrative action against any officers on the ship or in the Navy's upper echelons.

Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah commented on the attack in real-time on the second day of the war, warning Israel, "You wanted an all-out war, and that is what you will get. You don't know who you are dealing with," in a phone interview with a Lebanese television station.

Minutes later, television footage showed the missile being launched, and then striking the ship as Nasrallah remained on the phone. He coolly said, "A ship which was firing at the Shi'ite quarter of Beirut is on fire and is going to sink."

Four sailors were killed in the attack when the Iranian C-802 radar-guided missile struck near a helicopter pad on the Sa'ar 5-class missile ship. A fire broke out and the ship was significantly damaged, but was able to return to an Israeli port under its own power.

The missile was made in China, underwent upgrades in Iran, and from there was delivered to Hizbullah, military officials said.

The committee had presented initial findings to Halutz on October 16 from its investigation into the July 14 missile attack on the Hanit. At the time, Navy sources said Halutz was not satisfied with the findings and asked that additional work be done.

Salu2

[león]

Saludos,
Disculpen mi ignorancia, pero después de haber leído todo este tema y el del Tzahal deduzco que Israel no posee ninguna fuerza de infantería de marina.

Estimo entonces que Israel no contempla en su doctrina militar ninguna acción anfibia de cierta envergadura (la verdad es que el propio Israel es ya una "cabeza de playa" en sí mismo en Oriente próximo) Me atrevo a pensar que así la IDF sólo está capacitada para incursiones anfibias tipo "comando", y que éstas las realizará alguna unidad especial de la HHY o el Tzahal.
¿Estoy muy equivocado? De ser así, ¿qué unidad tiene encomendada esta misión?