Armada de Estados Unidos

[eco_tango]

Javier, hay una cosa que me llama la atención. Has dicho, y más de una vez, que obteniais cadencias de fuego, con la MK42, de 25 dpm. Sin embargo, la cadencia máxima de ese montaje era de 35 dpm, corrigeme si me equivoco.

Lo comento porque hace algún tiempo tuve ocasión de hablar sobre este tema con un CN de la Armada Española, ya retirado, y que a bordo de las F70 tuvo ocasión de trabajar tanto con el cañon como con el sistema de misiles. Me comento que uno de los trucos para asegurarse el funcionamiento de la MK42 es precisamente el bajar el cadencia de tiro. ¿Coincides con esa opinión?.

Saludos

[eco_tango]

Por cierto, ya que hablamos de Ticos... interesante lectura sobre su modernización, junto con la de los Burke.

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS22595.pdf

¿40 años, como se preveia originalmente, o 35 años de vida para los Ticos?. Me da la impresión de que la contestación a esta pregunta estará directamente relacionada con la llegada de los CGX a tiempo o no.

Saludos

[Javier Arroyo]

Javier, hay una cosa que me llama la atención. Has dicho, y más de una vez, que obteniais cadencias de fuego, con la MK42, de 25 dpm. Sin embargo, la cadencia máxima de ese montaje era de 35 dpm, corrigeme si me equivoco.

Lo comento porque hace algún tiempo tuve ocasión de hablar sobre este tema con un CN de la Armada Española, ya retirado, y que a bordo de las F70 tuvo ocasión de trabajar tanto con el cañon como con el sistema de misiles. Me comento que uno de los trucos para asegurarse el funcionamiento de la MK42 es precisamente el bajar el cadencia de tiro. ¿Coincides con esa opinión?.

Saludos

La cadencia de fuego inicial del Mk42 era de 40 dpm (no de 35dpm), y fue reducida por razones de seguridad ("safety").

[eco_tango]

Javier:

La cadencia de fuego inicial del Mk42 era de 40 dpm (no de 35dpm), y fue reducida por razones de seguridad ("safety").

Ok, 40, la memoria me traiciono. ¿Razones de seguridad es equivalente a decir que el montaje se averiaba?

Saludos

[Javier Arroyo]

Javier:

La cadencia de fuego inicial del Mk42 era de 40 dpm (no de 35dpm), y fue reducida por razones de seguridad ("safety").

Ok, 40, la memoria me traiciono. ¿Razones de seguridad es equivalente a decir que el montaje se averiaba?

Saludos

De vez en cuando, mejor definicion es seguridad personal y del material. Es como una religion en el USN.

Mira a este video:

USS JOHN STENNIS "SAFETY" PROGRAM:

http://youtube.com/watch?v=dLelatv9lmY


Esta para mearse los pantalones (pero hay que entender Ingles) !!!


Y dos mas para disfrutar, HOOOAH!!!

http://youtube.com/watch?v=eQvqlBmtu0c& ... ed&search=

http://youtube.com/watch?v=ULhBbnpWYcY& ... ed&search=

[eco_tango]

Bueno... está claro que si tenía algunda duda sobre el significado del término "Safety" el video que has recomendado me la ha quitado...

Saludos

[eco_tango]

Y hablando de las inmortales FF-1052, unos muy interasantes diagramas de las mismas:

http://ussbadger-1071.org/menus/images/ ... rofile.jpg

http://ussbadger-1071.org/menus/images/LowerDecks.jpg

fijarse en el tamaño de los sollados... igualito, igualito que los estandar de habitabilidad de hoy en dia.

Saludos

[pepe-FAE]

kalma

De hecho si no me equivoco se tiene previsto actualizar de mod2 a mod4,como tantas otras cosas cuando haya dineros.Oí que no se les va a colocar el mantelete furtivo,sino que los cambios afectarían a la parte mecánica y caña,pero sólo rumores,si nos meten la nueva torre mas furtivizada mejor

El pasar de un modelo a otro no es tan sencillo como cambiar algunas piezas y la caña. Supone cambiar medio montaje, habría de cambiarse todo lo que va sobre cubierta.

Con el mod 4 habríamos ganado un tercio mas de alcance usando las nuevas cargas, aunque se dice que estas cargas someten a gran desgaste a la caña.


Javier Arroyo

La Mk42 Mod 10DP solo se me estropeo una vez (teniamos un tremendo Subteniente encargado y cañoneros de 1a). Esa vez se quedo con una bala dentro del barril. Despues de media hora tratando diferentes cosas, todas segun el manual, pusimos un "clearing charge" y logramos mandar la bala a unos 30m de la nave y al fondo del mar al frente del poligono de tiro de la isla de Vieques (Puerto Rico).

Clearing charge=carga corta es lo que indica el manual el que hay que usar; siempre y cuando el cañón pueda abrir fuego, para aclarar (despejar) la caña cuando se produce un fallo de fuego, por fallo del estopin o avería.


javier arroyo

En fuego de apoyo a superficie las dos sufren del mismo problema. Como son un cañon naval (naval rifle) la bala tiene una trayectoria recta y de alta velocidad, al contrario de un obus de artilleria (howitzer) que lanza la bala en una trayectoria alta, parabolica, y de menor velocidad. Eso significa que el cañon naval solo puede atacar a blancos que ve directamente, al contrario del howitzer que puede darle tortazos a una posicion escondida detras de una montaña.

El Mk42 con el calculador adecuado, usando carga reducida y proyectil normal (no RAP) si era capaz de efectuar fuego en segundo sector.


eco tango

Me comento que uno de los trucos para asegurarse el funcionamiento de la MK42 es precisamente el bajar el cadencia de tiro. ¿Coincides con esa opinión?.

La cadencia de fuego es fija, a todo lo que da.
El problema del MK42 es o era la complejidad unido a la velocidad de su sistema de carga.

eco tango

¿Razones de seguridad es equivalente a decir que el montaje se averiaba?

Esta va enlazada con la anterior, la velocidad en este caso estaba directamente relacionada con la presión de su sistema hidráulico y a esa presión parece ser que las tuberías reventaban.

[Javier Arroyo]

Y hablando de las inmortales FF-1052, unos muy interasantes diagramas de las mismas:

http://ussbadger-1071.org/menus/images/ ... rofile.jpg

http://ussbadger-1071.org/menus/images/LowerDecks.jpg

fijarse en el tamaño de los sollados... igualito, igualito que los estandar de habitabilidad de hoy en dia.

Saludos

Huy como cambiaron! Muchisimas gracias por mandarlos!!

Esos diagramas si que son viejos.
Unos ejemplos:

En el Main Deck, no se ve el cuarto de la electronica del CIWS, el cuarto libre que se usaba para carga extra o se le prestaba a la Guarda Costera cuando estaban a bordo, el pasillo desde el Wardroom hacia la popa no estaba bloqueado por nada y seguia hasta el cuarto de electronica. A proposito, ese pasillo era estrecho, no como el gran boulevard que existe en las FFG que empieza entre los hangares y va hacia la popa. El espacio justo antes del "Supply Off Stateroom" es un almacen de armas ligeras de fuego (cal .45, M-14, escopetas) que en todas las naves del USN siempre esta en la zona de los oficiales. El XO tenia su propia ducha y WC, y los otros camarotes compartian una ducha y un WC. Todos los "Mooring" rooms que se ven en el dibujo.....no existian para "mooring" y el mas grande era el almacen de 20mm para el CIWS, etc., etc.

En el 2nd Deck toda la zona desde la proa hasta el dormitorio de los CPO fue modificada en los astilleros. Lo que llaman "Filter Cleaning Room" era el XBT Room (Expendable Bathythermograph). La lavanderia era mucho mas chica, no habia nada de "1st Class Lounge", el "Career Counselor Office" no se encontraba en el 2nd Deck sino que estaba en el O1 Level entre el CIC y un WC que llamabamos el "secret shitter" (cagador secreto). El cuarto de control de maquina era mas chico (la extension que se ve a estribor en el dibujo estorbaria la zona donde estan los evaporadores de agua). El "Windlass Room" & "Boatswain Storeroom ("Bosun's Locker") en la popa es una zona conjunta sin divisiones. Todo del IDVS en la proa, y todos los espacios alrederor, era donde estaba el equipaje para el TACTASS y el gimnasio etc. etc.

En el 3rd Deck el "compresor room" lo habian movido a AUX1, y el almacen de armas (donde poniamos las ametralladoras medianas, los lanzagranadas, y los STINGERS) era mucho mas grande.

En el O1 Level, para el que le interesa, el "officer's stateroom" (camarote de oficiales) 01-89-02 era el mio. En esa zona habian 3 camarotes estrechos para 6 oficiales--2 oficiales por camarote. Ese area se conocia en las 1052 como "The Junior Officer Jungle". Lo horrible de la Jungla es que teniamos a la cubierta del O2 Level como nuestro techo y en el tropico o el Golfo Persa hacia un calor de putas durante el dia, mientras que en el Atlantico Norte o cuando le dimos la vuelta al Cabo de Hornos nos helamos los cujons. Pero podiamos armarla, fumar, tener buenas partidas de poker, y hacer idioteces sin molestar a nadie debido al ruido de los ventiladores.

Debajo del Puente de Mando y justo encima del almacen de ASROC/HARPOON, hay dos camarotes, el del Capitan a estribor, y uno de 4 "Junior Officers" a babor que se le conocia como el "Ghetto"! Lo malo del Ghetto es que no se podia subir el volumen de la musica, hacer gamberradas, o tener peleas de lucha libre, porque el Capitan estaba justo al lado. Pero lo mejor del Ghetto es que tenian su propia ducha y WC, y la ducha no tenia el boton que racionaba el agua, es decir que el agua corria a gusto ("Hollywood Shower").

[Javier Arroyo]

javier arroyo

En fuego de apoyo a superficie las dos sufren del mismo problema. Como son un cañon naval (naval rifle) la bala tiene una trayectoria recta y de alta velocidad, al contrario de un obus de artilleria (howitzer) que lanza la bala en una trayectoria alta, parabolica, y de menor velocidad. Eso significa que el cañon naval solo puede atacar a blancos que ve directamente, al contrario del howitzer que puede darle tortazos a una posicion escondida detras de una montaña.

El Mk42 con el calculador adecuado, usando carga reducida y proyectil normal (no RAP) si era capaz de efectuar fuego en segundo sector.

[quote]

Contra una lomita si. Contra una montaña no.

[AMRAAM]

Aqui os dejo un articulo de la "todopoderosa"navy(o a lo mejor no,a mencion de algunas cosas que se dicen ),que esta sacado del foro militar en ingles.."militaryphotos.com",y que aparece hoy en el.La verdad,es que no se mencionan fuentes para la noticia,pero en cuaquier caso de ser ciertas algunas de las informaciones que aparecen en ella ,acercan a la NAVY a una categoria no tan "galactica" y si mas "terreste",demostrando que nadie es invulnerable.Pues lo dicho ahi va:
http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?t=109078

[Kalma_(FIN)]

No me funciona el enlace.

[AMRAAM]

Cierto KALMA,a mi tampoco me funciona,n se por que.. .Bueno pues copiare el articulo completo aqui..

In 1981, The NATO exercise Ocean Venture ended with much embarrassment for the U.S. Navy, and more specifically, its enormously expensive aircraft carrier battle groups.
During the exercise, a Canadian submarine slipped quietly through a carrier's destroyer screen, and conducted a devastating simulated torpedo attack on the ship. The submarine was never detected, and when the exercise umpire, a U.S. Navy officer, pronounced the carrier dead, his official report was promptly stamped classified to minimize the potential fallout. Unfortunately, a Canadian submariner leaked the story to a local newspaper, and indicated that this successful Canadian attack on an American supercarrier was by no means an isolated incident. This news caused quite a stir in Congress, and the U.S. Navy had a lot of explaining to do. Why indeed had a small, 1960s-vintage diesel submarine of the under-funded Canadian Navy been able to defeat one of America s most powerful and expensive warships, and with such apparent ease?
There are several possible answers. Firstly, Canadian submariners are extremely well trained and professional. Secondly, at that time, the Oberon submarines used by the Canadian Navy were probably the quietest in the world. A third possible reason, not so commonly stated, and with all due respect, is that the mighty U.S. Navy is simply overrated. It is my humble contention that the U.S. Navy is not all it's cracked up to be, and that is the focus of the present article.
Diesel Subs Feast on U.S. Carriers
While Canadian submarines have routinely taken on U.S. Navy carriers, other small navies have enjoyed similar victories. The Royal Netherlands Navy, with its small force of extremely quiet diesel submarines, has made the U.S. Navy eat the proverbial slice of humble pie on more than one occasion. In 1989, naval analyst Norman Polmar wrote in Naval Forces that during NATO s exercise Northern Star, the Dutch submarine Zwaardvis was the only orange (enemy) submarine to successfully stalk and sink a blue (allied) aircraft carrier Ten years later there were reports that the Dutch submarine Walrus had been even more successful in the exercise JTFEX/TMDI99.
During this exercise the Walrus penetrates the U.S. screen and sinks many ships, including the U.S. aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt CVN-71. The submarine launches two attacks and manages to sneak away. To celebrate the sinking the crew designed a special T-shirt. Fittingly, the T-shirt depicted the USS Theodore Roosevelt impaled on the tusks of a walrus. It was also reported that the Walrus also sank many of the Roosevelt's escorts, including the nuclear submarine USS Boise, a cruiser, several destroyers and frigates, plus the command ship USS Mount Whitney. The Walrus herself survived the exercise with no damage.
Not to be outdone by the Canadians and Dutch, the Australian submarine force has also scored many goals against U.S. Navy carriers and nuclear submarines. On September 24 2003, the Australian newspaper The Age disclosed that Australia's Collins class diesel submarines had taught the U.S. Navy a few lessons during multinational exercises. By the end of the exercises, Australian submarines had destroyed two U.S. Navy nuclear attack submarines and an aircraft carrier. According to the article: The Americans were wide-eyed, Commodore Deeks (Commander of the RAN Submarine Group) said. They realized that another navy knows how to operate submarines
They went away very impressed.
Not surprisingly, NATO and allied submariners are extremely confident in their ability to sink American carriers. In his book The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine, Andrew Cockburn wryly noted that European submariners on NATO exercises were far more concerned about colliding with noisy American nuclear submarines (running fast and therefore, blind) than about being attacked by American ships.
The Russians mug the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk
These examples provide ample evidence of the vulnerability of U.S. Navy carrier battle groups to attacks from diesel submarines, but of course there are other ways to sink a carrier, as the Russian Air Force knows well. In October 2000, the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Kitty Hawk was mugged by Russian SU-24 and Su-27 aircraft, which were not detected until they were virtually on top of the carrier. The Russian aircraft buzzed the carrier s flight deck and caught the ship completely unprepared. To add insult to injury, the Russians took very detailed photos of the Kitty Hawk s flight deck, and very courteously, provided the pictures to the American CO via e-mail. In the December 7, 2000 edition of WorldNetDaily, Jon E. Dougherty said that the Russian photographs made it clear that there was panic aboard the Kitty Hawk. As one U.S. sailor quipped, The entire crew watched overhead as the Russians made a mockery of our feeble attempt of intercepting them.
Russia's air force is now only a faint shadow of what it once was, but even now, they can demonstrate that they can, if necessary, do significant damage to the U.S. Navy. It's little wonder then that a Russian newspaper gloated that If these had been planes on a war mission, the aircraft carrier would definitely have been sunk. Perhaps they are right. But it s not just the Russians, Canadians, Dutch and Australians who think the U.S. Navy s carrier battle groups are over-rated, expensive and extremely vulnerable. Admiral Hyman Rickover himself didn t think much of the American carrier-centered Navy, either. When asked in 1982 about how long the American carriers would survive in an actual war, he curtly replied that they would be finished in approximately 48 hours.
This isn't Top Gun
As we ve seen, U.S. carriers are remarkably vulnerable to attacks by submarines and aircraft, but what about the much-vaunted American naval aviators? How would the U.S.N. pilots fare in a dogfight with a well-trained enemy? The evidence is not encouraging. Canadian pilots routinely outperform U.S.N. aircrews in exercises, and have done so for many years. During the days of RCN carrier aviation it was well known that H.M.C.S. Bonaventure could put more planes in the air than much larger U.S.N. carriers. In the early 1980s it was revealed that the average pilot in the Canadian Air Force flew about 300 hours a year, whereas his U.S. Navy counterpart flew only about 160 hours annually. Even in this day of advanced flight simulators, there is still no substitute for the real thing (flying).
U.S. Naval aviators pride themselves as being supposedly far better than any Air Force pilots, but one merely has to look at the Canadian, Israeli and Chilean air forces to cast doubt on that assumption. The Israeli Air Force has bested the pride of the U.S. Navy, and they have done so even with less capable aircraft. A joint U.S.N.-I.A.F. air combat exercise in 2000 underlines and highlights the thesis that the U.S. Navy is overrated. On September 14, 2000, The Jerusalem Post announced that the Israelis soundly dispatched the air wing from the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt (which, incidentally, was the same carrier the Dutch destroyed in 1999). Israeli F-16s squared off against American F-14s and F-18s, both of which are said to be more capable than the F-16. The final results were astonishing. The Israelis shot down a whopping 220 U.S. aircraft while losing only 20 themselves. The 10:1 kill ratio was so embarrassing that the results were not officially published to save the reputations of the U.S. Navy pilots.
Chile is certainly not a great military power, but its air force is well trained, and they too have given the U.S. Navy reason for pause. In the late 1980s, it was reported that Chilean Air Force pilots, flying the relatively unsophisticated but nimble F-5, had trounced an American carrier air group in air combat exercises. Like the Israelis, the kill ratio was 10:1 in favor of the Chileans. As usual, this incident did not receive much press coverage in the United States.
Lack of Training
Despite its vastly superior numbers, resources and weapons, the U.S. Navy, the world s only true heavyweight navy, continually fails to vanquish welterweight and lightweight naval powers. This would indicate that training, not big, expensive ships, is the key to naval power. It is training, or lack thereof, that truly undermines the performance of the U.S. Navy. For example, even though the U.S. Navy maintains the most capable submarine fleet in the world (because the Russian fleet is mostly tied up at dockside), their submariners do not currently receive escape training. The Canadian submarine force is tiny, and yet it has the most advanced submarine escape training facility in the world.
The U.S. Navy boasts that its Blue Angels flight team is the world s best, but with their preference for high speed maneuvering over aerobatic artistry, combined with the team's grossly inflated number of maintenance technicians, one has to wonder. The Blue Angels perform with only six F-18 jets, whereas the Canadian Snowbirds fly nine Tutors, which are much older. The Canadian team flies more airplanes, but has a much smaller maintenance team. The Blue Angels have approximately 100 technicians, but the Snowbirds have only about ten.
American technicians are very specialized, and as a result they need lots of them to do the same job that just one Canadian technician can do. This does not sound like an efficient or cost-effective arrangement, to say the least. Through his many best-selling books and movies, author Tom Clancy has created a crisp, sharp, spit-polished, efficient, and patriotic image for the U.S. Navy. Some think he should be a paid Public Relations consultant or recruiter for the U.S. submarine force. It may come as a shock to some of his readers, however, that the American sailors in his books are too good to be true, and that even some American submariners admit their training is not very good. Several recent books have effectively stripped off much of the shiny Hollywood polish on the American submarine force, most notably Petty Officer Andrew Karam s account of life on the USS Plunger, Rig Ship for Ultra Quiet (2002), and Douglas C. Waller s Big Red (2001). Both authors (Karam served on the submarine USS Plunger) said that there is a lot of hype regarding U.S. submarine training, but the reality is much less impressive. As for the legendary assertion that all U.S. submariners are experts on every system in their boats, one sailor told Waller that was All bunk. Waller explained that The (submariner s) qualification only made you familiar with the rest of the boat. It didn t mean you could actually run other parts. If (the sailor) and the other missile techs suddenly died, those nukes in the back wouldn't have a clue how to fire these rockets. Petty Officer Karam, an Engineering Laboratory Technician, concurred, and acknowledged that he could only work on other systems in a pinch . He continued The Plunger, and, for that matter, any nuke boat, was sufficiently complex that one person simply could not learn everything to that level of detail in the 14 months we were given to qualify. Not if they were doing their own jobs, too.
British allies, of course, have long ridiculed American submariners for spending too much time and effort learning about nuclear reactors. Surprisingly, Waller wrote that some U.S. Navy officers quietly agree. The Drill Coordinator on the USS Nebraska, Lieutenant Brent Kinman, told Waller that American submariners talk too much about the reactor, like mechanics, and not enough about how to fight the ship effectively: That was the problem with today s submariners, Kinman thought. They were technicians rather than warriors. The average lieutenant riding these boats considered himself a nuclear engineer first and a submarine officer second. It almost feels like we re out there just driving the reactor around This overemphasis on engineering might explain why diesel submarines are so often triumphant against U.S.N. nuclear submarines during exercises.
Conclusion
The U.S. Navy is the largest navy in the world, and on paper, certainly the most powerful. Of that there is no doubt. With the Russian Navy all but gone, the American navy remains the dominant sea power in the world. Yet, as we have seen here, this heavyweight navy often has great difficulty handling the little guys. Indeed, if the U.S. Navy were a boxer, one might say that his dominance is due mostly to his sheer size because he punches well below his massive weight. In this era of asymmetrical warfare, of David versus Goliath conflicts, perhaps it is time for America to rethink its naval strategy, lose some weight, and as sports announcers say, focus more on the fundamentals.
For all the money America spends on its huge navy, it really needs to be much better.
The Author
Roger Thompson is Professor of Military Studies at Knightsbridge University and a Fellow of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. His book Brown Shoes, Black Shoes, and Felt Slippers: Parochialism and the Evolution of the Post-War U.S. Navy was published in 1995

p.s. Canada kicks ass !

[HardWood]

De hecho supuse que se podria usar tambien el Rap aunque no tengo experiencia con el puesto que jamas he visto uno , pero garantizo que con el 5"/56 en segunda rama , por lo menos en una baleares , una para
Javier Arroyo que modelo de calculador no permitia dispara en segunda rama , por que es algo bastante comun en artilleria naval ...

Saludos

[Javier Arroyo]

De hecho supuse que se podria usar tambien el Rap aunque no tengo experiencia con el puesto que jamas he visto uno , pero garantizo que con el 5"/56 en segunda rama , por lo menos en una baleares , una para
Javier Arroyo que modelo de calculador no permitia dispara en segunda rama , por que es algo bastante comun en artilleria naval ...

Saludos

Pero yo nunca vi ningun Mk42 usar RAP.