http://www.japanfocus.org/-tsuyoshi-has ... ticle.html
el autor, profesor de historia en la universidad de California, ha ganado premios, pero también ha sido rebatido en algunos de sus argumentos:
http://www.americanthinker.com/articles ... nucle.html
A mi personalmente me parece interesante estos pasajes del primer articulo:
Suzuki explained: “If we miss today, the Soviet Union would take not only Manchuria, Korea, [and] Karafuto [Sakhalin Island], but also Hokkaido. This would destroy the foundation of Japan. We must end the war when we can deal with the United States.”
What motivated Hirohito was neither a pious wish to bring peace to humanity nor a sincere desire to save the people and the nation from destruction, as his imperial rescript stated and as the myth of the emperor’s “sacred decision” would have us believe. More than anything else, it was a sense of personal survival and deep responsibility to maintain the imperial house, which had lasted in unbroken lineage since the legendary Jinmu emperor. For that purpose, Hirohiro was quick to jettison the pseudo-religious concept of the kokutai, and even the emperor’s prerogatives as embodied in the Meiji Constitution. What mattered to him was the preservation of the imperial house, and to that end, he was willing to entrust his fate to the will of the Japanese people. Hirohito’s transformation from a living god (arahitogami) to a human emperor (ningen tenno), which is seen as having occurred during the American occupation, actually took place during the final “sacred decision” at the imperial conference. With astonishing swiftness, the members of the imperial house closed ranks and defended Hirohito’s decision. To attain this objective, Hirohito was prepared to part with the military and the ultranationalists, who were major obstacles.
Son factores de los que no se suelen tener en cuenta a la hora de hablar de la decisión de rendirse del emperador japonés. Y no digo que sean los únicos, pero si importantes. Todo eso unido a las bombas atómicas, para mí, hizo que finalmente Japón se rindiera.There was another factor in the political calculations of the Japanese ruling elite: fear of popular unrest. On August 12, Navy Minister Yonai Mitsumasa told Takagi Sokichi: “They may not be the appropriate words, but the atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war are in a way a godsend, since we don’t have to decide to stop the war because of the domestic situation. The reason why I have advocated the end of war is not that I was afraid of the enemy’s attack, nor was it because of the atomic bombs or the Soviet entry into the war. It was more than anything else because I was afraid of domestic conditions. Therefore, we were fortunate to [be able to] end the war without pushing the domestic situation to the fore.”[70] Yonai’s fear was widely shared by the ruling elite. Konoe’s advocacy of peace, which he had submitted to Hirohito in February 1945, was motivated by his fear of a communist revolution. Whether or not such a revolution was actually likely or even possible, the fear among the ruling elite of such popular unrest sweeping away the entire emperor system was quite real. On August 13, 14, and 15, Kido met Machimura Kingo, chief of the Metropolitan Police, to hear reports of possible political and social turmoil at home.
Sobre el uso táctico de las armas atómicas, en los cuarenta no había ninguna doctrina cobre su empleo táctico, y se desconocían en gran medida el efecto de la radiación sobre los soldados. Como ya comenté antes, se propuso usar un buen número de armas atómicas en las cabezas de playa durante Olympic, que inmediatamente iban a ser ocupadas por soldados norteamericanos. En Europa, no descarto que una vez se produjese un alto de alguna de las puntas de lanza soviéticas, y ya en agosto como mínimo, se lanzara alguna bomba sobre las unidades de vanguardia soviéticas para destruir sus unidades más poderosas, con los efectos que podemos imaginar.
La proporción de aviones soviéticos-aliados es de 1.7/1 o 1.4/1, y es cierto que no es muy grande, pero en una campaña corta (unos meses, ¿3-6?) donde los efectos de la aviación estratégica se dejarían notar menos, y la campaña sería mayormente táctica, donde la superioridad soviética en número de aviones era mayor, supongo una ligera ventaja para la aviación comunista durante las primeras fases (número y sorpresa) para luego ir pasando a una paridad y finalmente a un ventaja aérea aliada.
Respecto a las posibles salidas para finalizar el conflicto, ¿ves entonces a Stalin, si no ha recibido un tiro en la cabeza como dices, cosa no tan fácil, rindiéndose incondicionalmente y siendo juzgado por crímenes de guerra antes de inmolar a su pueblo y su ejército en su propia defensa y en la de su régimen?
Saludos.
