Lo era, sin duda, pero estaba mucho más justificado de lo que puede parecer en una primera aproximación a la situacion estratégica de 1941.
Atacar a la URSS en 1941 era arriesgado, Hitler sabía que si Alemania se quedaba atascada en una guerra en 2 frentes, se metería en graves problemas. Hasta donde se, Hitler mismo escribió en "Mi Lucha" que era una tontería pelear una guerra en dos frentes. después de la campaña de Francia estuvo considerando desde finales de Junio de 1940 primero ofrecer la paz a los británicos siendo rechazado y después a partir de Julio de ese año contemplo las posibilidades de o continuar la guerra contra Inglaterra intentando una invasión de las islas británicas o cuando esto se vio como poco viable continuar la guerra en el Atlántico y Mediterráneo (estrategia periférica)... la otra opción era la invasión a la URSS y no la tomo a la ligera.
Carta de Hitler a Mussolini el 21 de Junio de 1941.
http://www.historiasiglo20.org/TEXT/hitlerduceURSS.htm
Duce:
"Por consiguiente, después de exprimirme constantemente el cerebro, he llegado a la decisión de cortar el nudo antes de que se apriete demasiado. Creo, Duce, que con esto brindo probablemente los mejores posibles a nuestra dirección conjunta de la guerra en el año en curso"(...)."Os escribo esta carta en unos momentos en que meses enteros de ansiosas deliberaciones y una continuada y enervante espera terminan merced a la decisión que más me ha costado adoptar en mi vida Después de examinar el último mapa sobre la situación de Rusia y después de sopesar otros muchos informes, creo que no puedo adoptar la responsabilidad de seguir esperando y, por encima de todo, creo que no existe otro medio de evitar este peligro (...), a menos que continúe esperando, lo que de todos modos terminaría por conducir al desastre, si no este año, el próximo a lo sumó."
Si tomo la decisión correcta o no, ya es otro asunto pero yo creo que se lo pensó bastante.
Probablemente no estaba del todo cuerdo a partir de finales de enero de 1945 cuando él se daba cuenta como terminaría todo con los nazis colgados y Alemania destruida. Pero calificarlo de loco, me parece un error, el tipo me parece muy listo pero hay que entender que Hitler y compañía (Goebbels, Himmler, Rosenberg, etc) creían en lo que decían, es decir, verdaderamente creían en la ideología nazi y sus teorías raciales.En cuanto lo primero, te doy la razon, en cuanto a lo segundo, me parece que tildar a Hitler de "loco" es muy simplista. La verdad es que Hitler actuó muchas veces con un juicio distorsianado por sus ideas raciales, pero si lees "Hitler y sus generales" verás que los razonamientos que mantenía frente a los altos mandos del OKW no eran ni mucho menos los de un loco.
Su racismo les impidió aprovechar a los científicos judíos que tuvieron que huir de Alemania o a los cientos de miles de judíos que sencillamente eran ciudadanos leales, su racismo les impidió tratar con dignidad a las minorías no rusas de la URSS o los llevó a menospreciar a los norteamericanos. Una de las razones importantes por las que los nazis perdieron la guerra me parece es que precisamente perdieron porque eran nazis.
Sobre la conveniencia de atacar a la URSS en 1941, algunos comentarios.
La inteligencia militar de los alemanes fue uno de los puntos más débiles de Alemania durante la guerra. Que la Abwherhaya estado bajo el mando del Almirante Canaris que muchas veces abiertamente trató de beneficiar en especial a los ingleses y que era un opositor al régimen de Hitler no ayudaba precisamente.
Pero los aparatos de inteligencia de Inglaterra y Estados Unidos cayeron en los mismos errores de subestimar al Ejército Rojo y la capacidad de movilización de la URSS.
La siguiente información la tomo del artículo.
Russia Will Assuredly Be Defeated’:
Anglo-American Government
Assessments of Soviet War Potential
before Operation Barbarossa
Martin Kahn
"According to a large array of sources most British and American Government
officials regarded the USSR as more or less doomed when Germany and her
allies attacked on 22 June 1941. Soviet resistance was expected to a last
only for a few months or even only a few weeks according to some. These
perceptions were not only harbored by low and middle level Government
officials, but apparently also officials at the very top. According to some,
Churchill was notable for his reluctance to totally write off Soviet chances in
the event of a German attack. But Churchill’s private secretary recorded in
his diary for 21 June that: ‘The P.M. [Prime Minister] says a German attack
on Russia is certain and Russia will assuredly be defeated"
"In general the military efficiency of the Red Army (and the Navy) was
seen as being far below the standards of Western European Powers. The
efforts made by the Red Army in Poland and Finland did not help to improve
its reputation. Some of the most recurrent arguments for military
weakness were inadequate and poor leadership, political interference (the
dual command of the Commissar system), untrained soldiers lacking in initiative,
and an inferior organization in general. Many of these problems were
of course attributed to the purges of 1937–38, but then mostly as an aggravating
factor."
"In a War Office (WO) report produced during the end of the Russo-
Finnish War the Red Army’s defensive values were stressed again, but the
WO did not believe that the Red Army could stand up to an attack by a
first class power for very long. The last sentence in the report was almost
something of a prophecy: the Red Army would be ‘particularly vulnerable
to the effects of surprise, owing to the rigidity of its doctrines and to its
inherent inability to provide against the unexpected.’ A few weeks before
the COS concluded: ‘The more commitments Russia undertakes the quicker
she is likely to collapse."
"Despite the re-evaluations after the Russo-Finnish War, the highest intelligence
agencies still held Soviet military capabilities in low esteem, shortly
before the German attack. On 14 June 1941 the British Joint Intelligence Sub-
Committee (JIC) reported that the Armed Forces were large; with 3.5 million
men, 18,000 tanks, and nearly 6,500 aircraft, but their value for war was
still considered to be low and its equipment obsolete.24 Some progress was
noticed though, and there was no doubt that steps had been taken to rectify
many of the defects revealed in the Russo-Finnish War. The morale of
the Red Army was considered to be high, but the JIC doubted that it would
last in the face of German mechanized warfare and the German Air Force.
Despite its size, the Red Army was not believed to be able to offer substantial
resistance in open warfare, to an army so highly mechanized or ably led as
the German."
La opinión de los norteamericvanos era más positiva que la de los ingleses.
"On 19 June the Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Colonel C. H. Mason,
submitted a memorandum to the US Chief of Staff in which he stated that Red
Army strength in Europe amounted to 2.75 million men, a figure that could
quickly be raised to 3.25 million. The Air Force was estimated to 4,250 aircraft
in Europe, some ‘fairly modern,’ others outdated. The soldiers were
considered to have courage, their discipline and training was seen as ‘fair.’
The tank troops were judged as rather modern, with many good tanks. He
believed that the weakest element in the Red Army was its officers of higher
and middle rank, and that the Russo-Finnish War had confirmed ‘this historic
Russian deficiency.’ The inefficiency of the railways and communication was
described as a ‘major factor’ in the Red Army’s assumed inability to launch
successful offensive and defensive operations."
"In a comparative assessment of military strength, taking into account
the size, equipment, training standards, and leadership of the Soviet and
German armies, Mason predicted that Germany could ‘rapidly’ defeat the
USSR, ‘overthrow the Stalin regime, and seize [the USSR’s] western provinces.’
He also believed that the total destruction of the army was a possibility in
1941, which would open up Siberia to the Germans, all the way to Lake
Baikal. Mason concluded that a German attack on the USSR was a ‘sound
military operation, if launched prior to July 1 [. . .] with reasonable chances
of a full success prior to winter’s setting in’."
"The assumed inability
of industry and transport to support the armed forces at the front was the
worst problem, since this would have assured defeat in the long run against a
determined and economically viable enemy like Germany, almost regardless
of how well the Red Army was doing in the field."
Obviamente estos análisis resultaron equivocados y subestimaron el potencial de la URSS, de forma similar a como lo hicieron los alemanes y es que una de las ventajas de la paranoia de Stalin es que era muy difícil recolectar información sobre los soviéticos.
"They certainly underestimated the number
of available tanks and aircraft. Most Anglo-American estimates during
1939–41 put the number of Soviet aircraft at somewhere between 4,000 and
12,000. Some US estimates were as high as 10,000 even in 1939, while the
British estimates from that time were between 4,000 and 5,000 aircraft. It is
hard to compare these estimates with reality since sometimes it was stated
whether the figures referred to first line strength and sometimes not. There
were also considerable divergences between estimates in time and between
different observers.43 Since the total Air Force strength was 20,978 aircraft on
the 22 June 1941, all estimates, even the higher ones, were clear underestimates.
Of the 19,533 Red Army planes 3,934 were used at school and training
facilities. On the other hand, only 16,502 (of the grand total) were serviceable
at that date and 13,211 were combat ready. But even the last figure is
higher than the highest Anglo-American estimate of the whole period.44
It seems that the US estimates regarding aircraft in general were closer
to the truth than the British. American estimates of tank strength were very
scarce during the period, but the British produced some. Even though most
estimates were considerably lower (never more than 12,000), the highest
one, from June 1941, put total strength at 18,000. It is hard to say how many
of these tanks were considered battle-worthy, but actual Soviet tank strength
in June 1941 was 22,600 (14,200 in the field forces)"
Tendría que buscar la fuente, pero el agregado militar de la embajada alemana en Moscú llegó a comentar sobre la dificultad de tener agentes de inteligencia en la URSS, que un agente alemán tenía tantas posibilidades de pasar desapercibido en Moscú como un beduino con turbante.
