Es bueno saber donde están sus prioridades... no es que tampoco vistos sus antecedentes sea una gran sorpresa...Ismael escribió:Este hombre tiene que dejar el twitter, pero ya
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PD: Nordstrom es algo así como "El Corte Inglés" de los EEUU; ha dejado de vender la marca de la hija de Trump porque no vendía lo suficiente, y papá sale al quite.
troop2020 escribió:Saludos a todos .... El 9 circuito 3 - 0 mantuvo la suspension del ban a migrantes de 7 paises musulmanes , la corte argumento que la administracion no prueba que haya ningun peligro de esos paises y que ningun atentado terrorista previo a sido cometido por nacionales de esos paises entre otros argumentos ...
El problema de la decision de la corte es que ignora el principal argumento de la administracion , este es que el POTUS tiene la autoridad para implementar un ban en aliens entrando a US si es por nuestra seguridad o por otras razones , el que la corte en su argumento ignore este echo le esta dando una municion extra al pato para acusar a la corte de una decision politica ...
En cualquier caso el 9 circuito en sus argumentos ignora la parte mas importante , el claro mandato del POTUS para implementar un ban si lo considera necesario , el que el 9 circuito ignore esto le a traido criticas hasta de liberals de toda la vida que comparan esto a un caso de free speech donde la corte ignore the First Amendment en sus argumentos , algo mas que la corte a echo es que le da derecho a un ciudadano de otro pais sin nacionalidad de USA a reclamar sobre una ley de USA , algo sin precedente que a sido criticado por todo el mundo porque habre la puerta a futuras reclamaciones en casos de todo tipo ...
The Government contends that the district court lacked
authority to enjoin enforcement of the Executive Order
because the President has “unreviewable authority to
suspend the admission of any class of aliens.” The
Government does not merely argue that courts owe
substantial deference to the immigration and national
security policy determinations of the political branches—an
uncontroversial principle that is well-grounded in our
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Cardenas v. United States, 826 F.3d
1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2016) (recognizing that “the power to
expel or exclude aliens [is] a fundamental sovereign attribute
exercised by the Government’s political departments largely
immune from judicial control” (quoting Fiallo v. Bell,
430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977))); see also Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33-34 (2010)
(explaining that courts should defer to the political branches
with respect to national security and foreign relations).
Instead, the Government has taken the position that the
President’s decisions about immigration policy, particularly
when motivated by national security concerns, are
unreviewable, even if those actions potentially contravene
constitutional rights and protections. The Government
indeed asserts that it violates separation of powers for the
judiciary to entertain a constitutional challenge to executive
actions such as this one.
There is no precedent to support this claimed
unreviewability, which runs contrary to the fundamental
structure of our constitutional democracy. See Boumediene
v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008) (rejecting the idea that,
even by congressional statute, Congress and the Executive
could eliminate federal court habeas jurisdiction over enemy
combatants, because the “political branches” lack “the
power to switch the Constitution on or off at will”). Within
our system, it is the role of the judiciary to interpret the law,
a duty that will sometimes require the “[r]esolution of
litigation challenging the constitutional authority of one of
the three branches.” Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton,
566 U.S. 189, 196 (2012) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 943 (1983)). We are called upon to perform that duty
in this case.
Although our jurisprudence has long counseled
deference to the political branches on matters of immigration
and national security, neither the Supreme Court nor our
court has ever held that courts lack the authority to review
executive action in those arenas for compliance with the
Constitution. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly and explicitly rejected the notion that the political
branches have unreviewable authority over immigration or
are not subject to the Constitution when policymaking in that
context. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001)
(emphasizing that the power of the political branches over
immigration “is subject to important constitutional
limitations”); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 940-41 (rejecting the
argument that Congress has “unreviewable authority over
the regulation of aliens,” and affirming that courts can
review “whether Congress has chosen a constitutionally
permissible means of implementing that power”). 6 Our
court has likewise made clear that “[a]lthough alienage
classifications are closely connected to matters of foreign
policy and national security,” courts “can and do review
foreign policy arguments that are offered to justify
legislative or executive action when constitutional rights are
at stake.” American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v.
Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1056 (9th Cir. 1995).
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), does not
compel a different conclusion. The Government cites
Mandel for the proposition that “‘when the Executive
exercises’ immigration authority ‘on the basis of a facially
legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will [not] look
behind the exercise of that discretion.’” The Government
omits portions of the quoted language to imply that this
standard governs judicial review of all executive exercises
of immigration authority. In fact, the Mandel standard
applies to lawsuits challenging an executive branch official’s
decision to issue or deny an individual visa based on the
application of a congressionally enumerated standard to the
particular facts presented by that visa application. The
present case, by contrast, is not about the application of a
specifically enumerated congressional policy to the
particular facts presented in an individual visa application.
Rather, the States are challenging the President’s
promulgation of sweeping immigration policy. Such
exercises of policymaking authority at the highest levels of
the political branches are plainly not subject to the Mandel
standard; as cases like Zadvydas and Chadha make clear,
courts can and do review constitutional challenges to the
substance and implementation of immigration policy. See
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695; Chadha, 462 U.S. at 940-41.
This is no less true when the challenged immigration
action implicates national security concerns. See Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 19 (1942) (stating that courts have a duty,
“in time of war as well as in time of peace, to preserve
unimpaired the constitutional safeguards of civil liberty”);
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 120-21 (1866) (“The
Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and
people, equally in war and in peace . . . under all
circumstances.”). We are mindful that deference to the
political branches is particularly appropriate with respect to
national security and foreign affairs, given the relative
institutional capacity, informational access, and expertise of
the courts. See Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 3334.
Nonetheless, “courts are not powerless to review the
political branches’ actions” with respect to matters of
national security. Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532,
559 n.17 (9th Cir. 2005). To the contrary, while counseling
deference to the national security determinations of the
political branches, the Supreme Court has made clear that
the Government’s “authority and expertise in [such] matters
do not automatically trump the Court’s own obligation to
secure the protection that the Constitution grants to
individuals,” even in times of war. Humanitarian Law
Project, 561 U.S. at 34 (quoting id. at 61 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting)); see also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258,
264 (1967) (“‘[N]ational defense’ cannot be deemed an end
in itself, justifying any exercise of legislative power
designed to promote such a goal. . . . It would indeed be
ironic if, in the name of national defense, we would sanction
the subversion of one of those liberties . . . which makes the
defense of the Nation worthwhile.”); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S.
1, 17 (1965) (“[S]imply because a statute deals with foreign
relations [does not mean that] it can grant the Executive
totally unrestricted freedom of choice.”).
Indeed, federal courts routinely review the
constitutionality of—and even invalidate—actions taken by
the executive to promote national security, and have done so
even in times of conflict. See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S.
723 (striking down a federal statute purporting to deprive
federal courts of jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by
non-citizens being held as “enemy combatants” after being
captured in Afghanistan or elsewhere and accused of
authorizing, planning, committing, or aiding the terrorist
attacks perpetrated on September 11, 2001); Aptheker v.
Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (holding unconstitutional
a statute denying passports to American members of the
Communist Party despite national security concerns); Ex
parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944) (holding unconstitutional
the detention of a law-abiding and loyal American of
Japanese ancestry during World War II and affirming federal
court jurisdiction over habeas petitions by such individuals).
As a plurality of the Supreme Court cautioned in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), “Whatever power the United
States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its
exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in
times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all
three branches when individual liberties are at stake.” Id. at
536 (plurality opinion).
In short, although courts owe considerable deference to
the President’s policy determinations with respect to
immigration and national security, it is beyond question that
the federal judiciary retains the authority to adjudicate
constitutional challenges to executive action.
antfreire escribió:(QUOTE)"ha dejado de vender la marca de la hija de Trump porque no vendía lo suficiente, y papá sale al quite."
Que extrano que decidieron que no vendia lo suficiente solo despues que su padre gano las elecciones. A mi me parece que la izquierda liberal (que esta en todas partes) no acaba de asimilar que perdieron unas elecciones que nadie pensaba que las perderian y no saben que hacer para herir a sus vencedores.
(QUOTE) Y por que no pueden ellos hacer lo que les salga de sus narices tambien? Sera que de las unicas narices que sale algo es de las narices izquierdistas?Gaspacher escribió:Izquierda, centro, o mediopensionistas, están en su derecho de hacer lo que les salga de las narices...
más preocupante es que todo un presidente y una asesora presidencial utilicen su cargo para ayudar a la niña de papa...
Es rigurosamente falso que la corte menciona esto y rigurosamente cierto que ignora olimpicamente el statute que le da la autoridad al president de impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate ...Es rigurosamente falso que el 9 circuito no "ignore" el mandato al presidente para implementar política migratoria o prohibiciones sobre la misma "si lo considera necesario". De hecho, examina y discute la cuestión con detalle y descarta la posición del gobierno por su absoluta falta de fundamento. Copio a continuación el fundamento jurídico que expone la decisión para que no pueda caber ninguna duda.
He copiado la mención expresa del Tribunal y aún así lo niegas.troop2020 escribió:Saludos a todos ...Es rigurosamente falso que el 9 circuito no "ignore" el mandato al presidente para implementar política migratoria o prohibiciones sobre la misma "si lo considera necesario". De hecho, examina y discute la cuestión con detalle y descarta la posición del gobierno por su absoluta falta de fundamento. Copio a continuación el fundamento jurídico que expone la decisión para que no pueda caber ninguna duda.
Es rigurosamente falso que la corte menciona esto y rigurosamente cierto que ignora olimpicamente el statute que le da la autoridad al president de impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate ...
Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate”
La corte toma por los pelos varios casos y ignora el derecho del president aprobado por el congreso de imponer un ban si lo considera necesario para proteger a los US ...
the Government has taken the position that the
President’s decisions about immigration policy, particularly
when motivated by national security concerns, are
unreviewable, even if those actions potentially contravene
constitutional rights and protections. The Government
indeed asserts that it violates separation of powers for the
judiciary to entertain a constitutional challenge to executive
actions such as this one.
There is no precedent to support this claimed
unreviewability, which runs contrary to the fundamental
structure of our constitutional democracy.
Por supuesto que lo ha analizado y ha citado y señalado los precedentes que confirman su criterio (no son "casos tomados por lo pelos", son precedentes que deciden sobre la cuestión que se debate.De echo no han analizado nada porque si lo hubieran echo no hubieran metido la pata hasta no poder mas ...
Nada dificil de comprender los estados habren la puerta a otras reclamaciones al admitir una reclamacion que es sobre un asunto que afecta ciudadanos de otros paises no de USA ....[/quote][/quote][quotePor último, respecto a lo de "dar derecho a un ciudadano de otro pais sin nacionalidad de USA a reclamar sobre una ley de USA , algo sin precedente que a sido criticado por todo el mundo" resulta complicado de entender, ya que no hay ningún ciudadano de otro país personado en este procedimiento. La solicitud de paralización proviene de la fiscalía de diversos estados de los Estados Unidos, no de "ciudadanos de otro país"
]
La verdad es impresionante la mencion del tribunal ignora olimpicamente lo mas importante la autoridad del president dada por el congreso que no se la toma el solo de imponer un ban si lo estima necesario , se la saltan a parrilla y tu dices que no ...He copiado la mención expresa del Tribunal y aún así lo niegas.
Impresionante.
Por lo demás, la decisión no ignora la normativa que da autoridad al presidente, aunque no la examina en detalle ya que eso formará parte del estudio del fondo del asunto que no debe realizarse en este momento.
Los estados admiten reclamar por individuos que no son ciudadanos de USA habriendo la puerta a otras reclamaciones en el futuro , cuando esclavizemos o matemos extranjeros en las esquinas entonces sera pertinente lo que dices pero como no lo hacemos no tiene caso ...Los Estados no "admiten"una reclamación, los Estados realizan una reclamación. Por lo demás ¿Los extranjeros que viven en las Estados Unidos no están protegidos por sus leyes? ¿SE les puede matar o esclavizar? Interesante punto de vista.
Despite the district court’s and our own repeated invitations
to explain the urgent need for the Executive Order to be
placed immediately into effect, the Government submitted
no evidence to rebut the States’ argument that the district
court’s order merely returned the nation temporarily to the
position it has occupied for many previous years.
The Government has pointed to no evidence that any
alien from any of the countries named in the Order has
perpetrated a terrorist attack in the United States. 7 Rather
than present evidence to explain the need for the Executive
Order, the Government has taken the position that we must
not review its decision at all. 8 We disagree, as explained
above.
To the extent that the Government claims that it has
suffered an institutional injury by erosion of the separation
of powers, that injury is not “irreparable.” It may yet pursue
and vindicate its interests in the full course of this litigation.
See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 767-68 (5th
Cir. 2015) (“t is the resolution of the case on the merits,
not whether the injunction is stayed pending appeal, that will
affect those principles.”).
7 Although the Government points to the fact that Congress and the
Executive identified the seven countries named in the Executive Order
as countries of concern in 2015 and 2016, the Government has not
offered any evidence or even an explanation of how the national security
concerns that justified those designations, which triggered visa
requirements, can be extrapolated to justify an urgent need for the
Executive Order to be immediately reinstated.
8 In addition, the Government asserts that, “nlike the President,
courts do not have access to classified information about the threat posed
by terrorist organizations operating in particular nations, the efforts of
those organizations to infiltrate the United States, or gaps in the vetting
process.” But the Government may provide a court with classified
information. Courts regularly receive classified information under seal
and maintain its confidentiality. Regulations and rules have long been
in place for that. 28 C.F.R. § 17.17(c) (describing Department of Justice
procedures to protect classified materials in civil cases); 28 C.F.R.
§ 17.46(c) (“Members of Congress, Justices of the United States
Supreme Court, and Judges of the United States Courts of Appeal and
District Courts do not require a determination of their eligibility for
access to classified information . . . .”); W.D. Wash. Civ. L.R. 5(g)
(providing procedures governing filings under seal).
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