Cada ves que replicas, Albertopus, tu inconsciente de refutar por refutar, de renegar por renegar, solo denota tu inseguridad por seguir dando pie a tus argumentos, eso si, salvo tu buena jocosidad que hay que reconocer, te sirve solo de cara al auditorio. Además, solo le has estado dando vueltas al asunto para no seguir aceptando lo evidente, tus muchas vueltas y revueltas en nada cambian lo que te eh dicho.
No es de extrañar, ya has dejado patente tu escasa capacidad de análisis, al anunciarnos que los hechos de Irak obedecen a una “Excepción”. Naturalmente es una opinión de cosecha propia, tal análisis sesudo evidentemente no pinta ni cose nada en el tema. Sin embargo (siempre hay peros, caramba) hay cosas a las cuales intentas pasar por objetivas además de replicar sin tener la menor idea de lo que dices.
Nos dices:
Albertopus escribió:... es decir, es un país en el que los únicos que amenazan y coartan la libertad de los ciudadanos son unos imbéciles empeñados en ir al paraíso a consta de sus semejantes. En este punto, la ocupación extranjera no tiene nada que reprocharse y, de hecho, ha sido gracias a las tropas extranjeras que han podido celebrarse elecciones. El gobierno iraquí en solitario no hubiera podido llevar a cabo esa tarea. Por cierto, el mismo gobierno iraquí que sigue demostrando que es incapaz de asegurar un mínimo de estabilidad en el país. La lumbrera que ordenó retirar las barreras de cemento que protegían los edificios y barrios de Baghdad se ha cubierto de gloria estos días.
“Naturalmente”, ignoras/obvias que en Irak ante de 2003 no existía tal nivel de violencia y como tu mismo dices, “ese gordo de Sadr solo mira sus intereses sin importarles los demás”, todo por una cuota de poder, claro, lo que obvias y de nuevo en forma natural, es que ese gordo feo y apestoso de Sadr antes no tenia esa cuota de poder, y que la resistencia fiera que lidero en contra de ocupantes, condiciono para que este tipo, ahora tenga su cuota de poder, en efecto, su actitud antes de la ocupación era puesto a raya por el régimen de Sadam al asesinar a uno de sus parientes, entre otras cosas:
http://buscador.emol.com/noticias/Moqtada+Al-Sadrhttp://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2004/04/0 ... 24813.htmlEl tipo es acusado de ejecuciones sectarias contra los Sunies, luego, claro, de obtener su cuota de poder y aun antes por su milicia Madhi.
http://www.lukor.com/not-mun/africa/0710/29133531.htmhttp://iblnews.com/story.php?id=20117En tu “pedagogía” nos indicas que no hay nada que reprochar a los ocupantes en este capitulo, es que parece y según Albertopus, la violencia esta solo en el ADN iraqui, en los ocupantes, ni pensarlo, solo cumplen ordenes de llevar la democracia y el sufragio a ese pueblo pleitista.
Teatro de Operaciones que es el Medio Oriente. Antes debo echarle una manito a tu memoria.
Albertopus escribió:Luisfer escribió:...Es que sigues metiendo la pata, Albertopus, tu solito de una manera que busca no admitir que te equivocaste en tu posición acerca del teatro o teatros de operaciones y los intereses que están en juego en esos teatros de operaciones, ahora pareciera tratas de voltear la torta.
No Luisfer, criaturita... no. Lee con cuidado y procurando juntar las palabras hasta que tengan sentido. Nunca he dicho que Oriente Medio no sea importante.
Digo que: Oriente Medio - es - importante -, pero - que - EE.UU - y - el - Reino - Unido - tenían - suficiente - control - del - mismo - antes - de - 2003. Incluso afirmo que: a - pesar - de - la - importancia - de - Oriente - Medio -, tanto - EE.UU - como - el - Reino - Unido - tienen - otras - fuentes - donde - obtener - sus - recursos.
El resto, desengáñate, son ensoñaciones tuyas.
Colocas el ventilador y al mismo tiempo de forma disimulada ya veo estas captando por fin de que van estas cosas. Esto evidentemente es un cambio significativo de argumentación, donde paginas más atrás decías lo siguiente:
Albertopus escribió:Estimado Luisfer:
Luisfer escribió:No lo creo, Albertopus, creo que eh sido bastante claro poniendo el dedo en la llaga...
Discúlpame; atribuir la ocupación de Irak a algo tan genérico como la geopolítica o a intereses estratégicos nebulosos no creo que eso sea poner el dedo en ninguna llaga. Es un diagnóstico que no aclara nada; como si un médico le dice a un paciente que padece una enfermedad. ¿Qué enfermedad? ... Una.
El pedagogo, dice entre otras cosas, que esa “realidad” no aclara nada, además de tacharla como una tesis/teoría/ensoñaciones mías en el contexto Irak de hoy, es necesario entonces revisar algunos acontecimientos y por ello las circunstancias dadas, recalcar, eso si, que esto son hechos, y no las especulaciones y hasta yo si afirmaría, ensoñaciones según la “pedagogía” impartida.
Hechos En Medio Oriente entorno a Irak en los últimos años:
11 de Septiembre de 2001, el mundo por primera vez tomo conciencia del alcance de los grupos terroristas. Todos a una sola vos rechazamos el terrorismo. Tras lo cual se anuncia “La Guerra Global Contra el Terrorismo”.
7 de Octubre de 2001, operación “Libertad Duradera”, en Afganistán se inicia a manos de EE.UU y OTAN, tiene como fin establecer un orden democrático al país, cabe recordar que la excusa de la intervención fue la no entrega a petición de EE.UU a los Talibanes de Osama Ben Laden, acusado de ser el responsable de los atentados el 11/09.
29 de enero de 2002, la doctrina Bush es anunciada al mundo, “El Eje del Mal”.
25 de Junio de 2002, discurso de Mr. Bush, a Oriente Medio, dando a conocer así y al mundo parte de los planes que reserva EE.UU a la zona, en especial a la problemática Palestina e Israelí.
20 de Marzo de 2003, inicia la operación, “Libertad Iraki” por parte de EE.UU. Es decir la invasión y ocupación de Irak, antes de esto se busco la buena pro de la comunidad internacional, pero esta se mostró reticente al no creer las bases en las que se excusaba esta ocupación, tenencia de armas de destrucción masiva/enlaces con AL Qaida, entre otros.
5 de Noviembre de 2006, ejecución de Sadam Husein, derrocado tras la ocupación por ser jefe de un régimen acusado de ser parte del “Eje del Mal” entre otras cosas.
¿Hasta aquí hay alguna muestra de no haber interés en la zona? Yo creo que no, estos hechos no pueden ser ensoñaciones mías para explicarte de que van estas cosas cuando de potencias se mueven por el mundo tomando posiciones estratégicas, si es evidente son los factores/circunstancias al cual eh mencionado. Hay que sumarle a esto los argumentos que se han dado sobre la importancia que ya tenia Irak desde terminada la SGM y aun antes, hasta nuestros días, además agregarle tu excelente corrección a mi error de definición, sobre cuando y donde “pueden” darse nuevos teatros de operaciones, el caso de los piratas de Somalia y el caso Nigeriano un claro ejemplo.
Sin embargo aun en tu sesuda “pedagogía”, te resistes a aceptar que los intereses estratégicos y geoestratégicos tengan algo que ver en el caso iraki, en efecto ya desde antes del 2003, existía un vital interés en la zona desde esos puntos:
2 de Agosto de 1990, da inicio la Guerra del Golfo, una guerra iniciada por Irak a manos de Sadam Husein al invadir Kuwait y terminada con la victoria de la coalición aliada en Febrero de 1991. Resultados de la guerra, sanciones a Irak pero no así un aislamiento total al país, además de que Sadam Husein seguía siendo un enemigo latente para los intereses estadounidenses, en efecto:
Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens -- leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children. This is a regime that agreed to international inspections -- then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world.
22 De septiembre de 1980, Guerra entre Irán - Irak, leer la “Operación Earnest Will”
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... t_will.htmpor parte de los EE.UU, la cual consistían en proteger los buques de exportación petrolera a pedido de Kuwait.
Aun así, Albertopus, nos dice:
Albertopus escribió:Alabado sea el teatro de operaciones. Por fin algo de luz en tus párrafos. Ahora retén esa idea y repítetela mucho... NO es necesario más acciones de las necesarias para asegurar un control... No es necesario más de lo necesario para controlar algo... Luego, si se hace algo más, ¿por qué será?
Aquí vamos a analizas un poquitín esa “pedagogía” impartida y si es que tu sesudo análisis te lo permite, veras si es o no necesario revisarla pues eh de decirte que tu confusión es enoooorme, no das la talla hombre, te lo eh dicho ya reiteradas veces.
La doctrina “Eje del Mal” para bien o para mal, ya ah dado sus frutos, Irak del 2003 a adelante es una posición importantísima para EE.UU. por evidentes razones, el país no es estable si lo comparamos a antes del 2003. Esto muy aparte de las palabras para consumo interno, democracia, libertad, sufragio, elecciones, bla bla bla.
Pregunta:
¿Tu crees que EE.UU no va a aprovechar la oportunidad de concretar bases militares en el país? ¿Porque?
Como muy probablemente dirás que no, o simplemente que no lo sabes por razones x, entonces por lógica tenemos y en resumidas cuentas:
La Doctrina Eje del Mal solo tenía como único fin llevar libertad y democracia a costa del sacrificio “gratuito” de miles de soldados y de miles de cientos de millones de dólares, la causa era tan importante, noble y desinteresada que se despreocuparon de la crisis económica que se les venia en cima y que hoy se ha tumbado a importantísimas empresas.
En síntesis según la “pedagogía” impartida, como ya hay control en la zona desde los países vecinos, los sacrificados soldados junto con los sacrificados estrategas, junto con los sacrificados políticos vuelven a sus bases y se ocupan de sus asuntos internos nuevamente para que desde allí, vigilar al país para que no se vuelva a descarrilar. Es así que siguiendo la lógica de la “pedagogía” impartida, si por esas cosa de Dios, sí fuera un Irak autosuficiente donde tipos como Sadr olvidara su radicalismo junto con otros de su misma calaña y salen a pasear con sus pares Sunies y a estos se le suman los Kurdos, pero siempre vigilados por las bases en Medio Oriente, ya sabes, por si se vuelven a descarrilar en el lado oscuro.
Pregunto:
¿Eso acaso no seria control sobre el Teatro de Operaciones que es el Medio Oriente? ¿Vigilarlos?
Ah pero claro, segun la “pedagogía”, muy probablemente nos matizara que con que haya un gobierno fuerte y bla bla bla, eso ya no seria necesario, porque para entonces Irak seria autosuficiente.
Pregunto:
¿Pero y entonces que harían las bases estacionadas en los países vecinos? O es que todo El Medio Oriente seria yupilandia para entonces, ¿cuando seria eso?
Siendo “un poquitín” más realistas, según la “pedagogía” impartida, dices:
“No es necesario mas acciones de las necesarias para asegurar el control”
Pero y sin embargo, en tu “pedagogía” también queda claro que aun existirá un control dado los intereses existentes y en un teatro de operaciones que es el Medio Oriente, las bases allí puestas no son castillos en el aire, están allí.
Diga usted, Albertopus, es correcta su “pedagogía” o quizás necesite limarla un poco.
Vuelvo a preguntarle, señor “pedagogo”, eso acaso es una negación de que no exista tal control en ese teatro de operaciones.??
Nos pregunta:
Albertopus escribió:¿Porque Sera?
En mi opinión intereses varios que ya te eh comentado, en tu opinión, queda claro que es esa “pedagogía” que acabas de impartir. O no, Albertopus???
Unas buenas lecturas del asunto.
OPLAN 1002 Defense of the Arabian Peninsula
Through the end of the 1980s, the United States had no forces, bases, supplies, or infrastructure in Saudi Arabia. Forces, their equipment, and their sustainment stocks of fuel, ordnance, spare parts, and a million other things would have to be deployed into the theater, and bases established for them. Through the end of the Cold War the CENTCOM operation plan OPLAN 1002 involved Iran.
In 1987 students in the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Fort Leavenworth [Kansas] participated in an eight-day Southwest Asia war game. The pertinent part of the scenario portrayed a takeover by anti-American rebel forces of several key cities in Iran, mostly in the southern part of the country. The rebels threatened to seize the Persian Gulf ports, and thereby shut down oil cargo out of the Persian Gulf. Twenty-three Soviet divisions from three fronts entered Iran in support of the rebels.
In response to the threat to its national interests as expressed by the Carter Doctrine, the United States deployed a joint task force to assist the loyalist Iranian forces. Ground forces consisted of roughly five and one-half Army divisions under the control of a field army headquarters plus one Marine amphibious force.
SAMS students decided early in the planning that their mission, to “defeat” rebel and Soviet forces in Iran and to facilitate the flow of oil out of the Persian Gulf, needed clarification. What was the defeat criterion? Restore Iran’s national borders? Destroy all Soviet and rebel forces within the borders of Iran? Or should they emphasize the second part of the mission statement, to facilitate the West’s and Japan’s access to Persian Gulf oil? In the absence of a national command authorities (NCA)-player cell, the students judged that NCA intent was to optimize chances for the uninterrupted flow of oil, consistent with means.
With this understanding, they concentrated on securing the vital Gulf ports of Chah Bahar, Bushehr, and Bandar Abbas. The ground commander (in this exercise, the notional US Ninth Army commander) determined that he would attempt to drive out, or prevent from entering, any enemy forces in an area centered on Bandar Abbas and circumscribed by an arc running roughly through Shiraz, Kerman, and Bam, some 250 miles away.
This decision made sense in four important respects. First, in the ground commander’s opinion, the US force was too small to fight much-superior enemy forces across the vast entirety of Iran itself. Second, with almost no infrastructure from which to establish supply operations, to move farther than 250 miles inland would have been logistically unsupportable. Third, this course of action permitted friendly forces to exploit the excellent defensible terrain of the Zagros Mountains. Fourth, a secure enclave would be available from which to launch attacks to the northwest should the NCA subsequently decide upon a more ambitious and aggressive course.
The principal Army war plan in the fall of 1989, OPLAN 1002-88, assumed a Soviet attack through Iran to the Persian Gulf. The plan called for five and two-thirds US divisions in the defense, mostly light and heavy forces at something less than full strength (apportioned to it by the Joint Strategic Capability Plan [JSCAP]). The strategy of the original plan called for these five and two-thirds divisions to march from the Arabian Gulf to the Zagros Mountains and prevent the Red Army from seizing the oil fields of Iran. Less than two divisions were apportioned to the separate plan then in place for the defense of the Arabian Peninsula.
On November 23, 1988, Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, U.S. Army, became USCENTCOM’S third commander-in-chief (USCINCCENT). Spurred by the rapid diminution of Soviet aggressiveness under Mikhail Gorbachev, Gen. Schwarzkopf worked to supplant USCENTCOM’s primary war plan, which involved a war against the Soviets in Iran, with a more realistic scenario.
In his FY 1990 Annual Report to the Congress, Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci defined maintaining access to regional oil supplies and promoting the security and stability of friendly states to be US regional goals in SWA. The report cited the continuing need for US rapid force deployment and resupply, access to local facilities, and assistance from local military forces to respond adequately to regional threats.
In May 1989 CENTCOM conducted the CINCCENT War Game to review and examine newly revised Operations Plan OPLAN 1002 for SWA. During 1988-89 CENTCOM revised its OPLAN 1002, originally to plan operations to counter an intra-regional conflict, without Soviet involvement, to specifically address the US capability to counter an Iraqi attack on Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
In October 1989 President Bush stated that "access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states in the area are vital to US national security. Accordingly, the US remains committed to defend its vital interests in the region, if necessary and appropriate through the use of US military force." He further stated that the US is also committed to "support the individual and collective self-defense of friendly countries in the area to enable them to play a more active role in their own defense and thereby reduce the necessity for unilateral US military intervention."
Following the guidance provided by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in 1989, USCINCCENT began planning for the defense of the Arabian Peninsula against a strong regional threat. In October 1989 the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had directed that a major revision of this plan be prepared, with Iraq as the opponent.
In January 1990 the Secretary of Defense's guidance made the US central objective for SWA the prevention of a hostile power from gaining control over a share of oil supplies or shipment routes sufficient to provide it with leverage over the US and its allies.
Even before Schwarzkopf changed Central Command's planning priorities, ARCENT began adjusting to the idea that Iraq constituted the major regional threat. Third Army also held that any U.S. response to the potential danger would require a significantly larger and heavier force than had been anticipated. As early as March 1989, Third Army began to coordinate with the Army Concepts and Analysis Agency (CAA) in Bethesda, Maryland, to conduct a war game simulation of the existing war plan for the Arabian Peninsula to examine this hypothesis. CAA ran Wargame Persian Tiger 89 in February 1990, as planning for a revised defensive concept got under way. Persian Tiger posited a defensive force of three Army light brigades (one airborne, two airmobile), a battalion of the Ranger regiment, an air defense artillery brigade, corps aviation, and artillery. Two Marine expeditionary brigades and aviation forces allocated under the existing plan were also portrayed. The findings of the game, which began to emerge in February but which were not published until August 1990, were that U.S. forces could not arrive in theater in time to resist an Iraqi invasion if deployment were ordered only upon outbreak of hostilities. It was learned also that the allocated U.S. force structure was too light to do what was required of it, in any event.
The focus of Third Army and CENTCOM (and the rest of the US military) was shifting to a different type of contingency in Southwest Asia. CENTCOM was moving away from a supporting theater in a Central European conflict to a primary theater of war fighting in mid-1990. In April 1990 the outline for USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90 had been published; the plan would be completed in April 1991, after DESERT STORM ended.
OPLAN 1002-90
In March 1990, over 500 military and civilian staff from CENTCOM and other US agencies began work at Fort McPherson, Georgia, to develop a detailed blueprint for a U.S.-Iraqi war in the Kuwait/Saudi Arabia area. Known as Operations Plan (OPLAN) 1002-90, the document covered major aspects of a future conflict. The plan detailed which US divisions would go to Saudi Arabia, what radio frequencies they would use, where they would get their water, how they would treat their casualties, and how they would handle the news media.
As Saddam Hussein increased tensions in the region throughout the spring, US assistance to Iraq (which dated back to the Iran-Iraq War) would become a political issue. In April, CENTCOM planners were directed to drop the country's identifications in their planning documents and to substitute the less politically sensitive color codes of RED (Iraq), ORANGE (Iran), and YELLOW (People's Democratic Republic of Yemen).
CENTCOM draft OPLAN 1002-90 (Defense of the Arabian Peninsula) had the highest CENTCOM planning priority in the Spring of 1990. The second draft of OPLAN 1002-90 was published in July 1990 with a third draft scheduled to be published in October 1990 in preparation for a Phase I Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) conference in October/November 1990.
A number of features of the draft Third Army plan (1002-90), published in July 1990, show how prewar planning guided Third Army's actions during Operation Desert Shield. The plan was intended to direct the Army's contribution to Central Command's broader-objective regional plan "designed to counter an intra-regional conflict on the ARABIAN PENINSULA to protect UNITED STATES (U.S.) and allied access to ARABIAN PENINSULA oil." Central Command's strategy for a regional contingency spelled out its strategy this way: "The USCENTCOM regional contingency strategy to counter an intraregional threat initially seeks to (secure] U.S. and allied interests through deterrence. Should deterrence fail, the strategy is to rapidly deploy additional U.S, combat forces to assist friendly states in defending critical ports and oil facilities on the ARABIAN PENINSULA. Once sufficient combat power has been generated and the enemy has been sufficiently attrited, the strategy is to mass forces and conduct a counteroffensive to recapture critical port and oil facilities which may have been seized by enemy forces in earlier stages of conflict."
The plan portrayed an Iraqi attack through Kuwait and into Saudi Arabia. The attack force consisted of sixty brigades, supported by 640 fighter/ground-attack aircraft and a minimum of 3,200 tanks. The plan assumed four days would be needed to take Kuwait and another five to reach the port of Al Jubayl. It credited Iraq with an operational reach no longer than Al Hufuf-enough grasp to occupy the main Persian Gulf ports and key oil facilities. The plan also assumed three to six months' increased regional tension and up to thirty days' strategic warning.
The corresponding Third Army plan assumed a deployment decision at least nineteen days prior to hostilities, an immediate 200,000-man selected Reserve call-up, and availability of assigned National Guard roundout brigades and necessary combat service support units.19 In the pre-Desert Storm Army force structure, roundout brigades were National Guard formations that were expected to fill out incomplete Regular Army divisions and deploy with them to war. In the event, Third Army would enjoy neither the advanced warning nor have the benefit of an early selected Reserve call-up. The absence of both would influence significantly how Third Army went to war.
The Third Army plan was designed for the defense of critical port and oil facilities in the vicinity of Al Jubayl and Abqaiq, the operation of common-user seaports, and the provision of combat support and combat service support (logistics) to Central Command forces in theater. The concept of operations called for a three-phase deployment.
Phase one addressed the introduction of "deterrent forces," the Third Army and XVIII Corps' forward headquarters, an aviation brigade task force, and troops from the 82d Airborne Division. These forces, along with Marine units, were to establish a deterrent force north of Al Jubayl to secure the points of debarkation at Jubayl, Ad Dammam, and Dhahran and, upon arrival of the Marines, to establish a defense of the Abqaiq oil facilities. The deterrent effect of ground forces would be greatly enhanced, of course, by the simultaneous arrival of air and naval forces. Indeed, in the first month of any deployment, the U.S. and Saudi air threat to extended Iraqi lines of communication was the deterrent.
Phase two of the Third Army deployment was to involve the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) with their reserve component "roundout" brigades, a brigade of the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) (then undergoing deactivation), and the 197th Separate Infantry Brigade (Mechanized). Arrival of these heavier forces would permit the establishment of a defense in depth behind Saudi and Gulf Cooperation Council forces to the north along the Saudi border and forward of the ports and oil facilities. Should the enemy attack at this point, the Air Force component (principally Central Command Air Forces [CENTAF]) was assigned to contest the offensive. The Army aviation task force of attack helicopters would link the ground forces with the theater air interdiction program. The brigade of the 9th Division (Motorized) was to be held in theater reserve.
Phase three called for a coordinated counteroffensive involving Saudi, U.S. Army, and Marine forces to restore lost territory and facilities.
CENTCOM scheduled Exercise Internal Look 90 in late July 1990 to test the validity of operational and logistic support concepts in OPLAN 1002-90. Focused on an Iraqi incursion on the Arabian peninsula, the exercise revealed the need for a revised troop list, and an armor heavy and highly mobile force to fight a high-speed tank battle in the expanses of the Arabian desert.
From 20-28 July 1990 CENTCOM conducted the INTERNAL LOOK 90 command post exercise to examine new Operational Plan (OPLAN) 1002, "Defense of the Arabian Peninsula," to validate operational and logistical support concepts. The initial Third Army plans drawn up to support Internal Look and operations plan (OPLAN) 1002-90 for CENTCOM took on a different character. Planners recommended a heavier armored force whose closure would be in question due to sea-lift limitations. However, this force offered more combat power and an offensive capability that Army planners believed previous planning forces lacked.
On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. Within hours, U.S. Naval forces responded to that crisis. That same morning, the Commander-in-Chief, United States Central Command (USCINCCENT), briefed the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) on available military options. One option involved deployment of forces according to the Commander-in-Chief's (CINC's) Strategic Concept for OPLAN 1002-90, a deliberate plan in-the-making. In response to the situation, USCINCCENT modified existing deliberate planning and began immediate execution planning. The initial order deploying U.S. forces came on 6 August 1990, four days after the invasion. During that time, USCINCCENT and the rest of the Joint Planning and Execution Community had used the crisis action planning process to plan and execute Operation Desert Shield.
US Central Command's Desert Storm planning for support from DoD and national space forces was reflected in OPLAN 1002-90, "USCENTCOM Operations to Counter an Intra-Regional Threat to the Arabian Peninsula." Dated 13 July 90 and in its second draft, US Central Command was forced to use this immature and uncoordinated plan to begin its initial deployments to Saudi Arabia on 7 August 1990. OPLAN 1002-90 should have represented the commander's concept of operations and identified the forces and supplies required to execute the plan and a movement schedule of the resources into the theater. For integrated planning within the theater, US Central Command had developed supporting annexes to the OPLAN. These annexes provided detailed guidance to US Central Command's component commands, subordinate commanders and supporting commanders. In the case of space forces, detailed guidance and a statement of operational need was included in multiple annexes. However, the primary annex for space remained Annex N: Space Operations.
Annex N to OPLAN 1002-90 was supposed to describe the concept of operations and explain theater-wide space forces support required by US Central Command's employment plan. However, the level of detail reflected the relative immaturity of the space mission. Some space force functional areas, such as communications, weather, and intelligence, contained enough detail to be of use. On the other hand, navigation, early warning, and geodesy lacked even basic information. Any good planning found in Annex N can be largely attributed to the fact that there were separate, detailed annexes in some functional areas, such as communications, intelligence, and weather. Nevertheless, even in these areas pre-planning was not totally acceptable. For example, SATCOM communications links had to be altered at least 75 times, and the intelligence dissemination network worked backwards. The lack of planning for interoperability between service dissemination systems forced intelligence data collected by one service to be routed from the theater back to the Pentagon, then transmitted back to the theater. Consequently, throughout the Gulf War operations space support took on an ad hoc character because of inadequate planning for the use of space forces.
OPLAN 1002-92
Iran has become the greatest threat to peace and stability in the region. Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War in August 1988, Iran has been steadily rebuilding its forces. Initially, Tehran relied on equipment captured from the Iraqis or repaired through cannibalization. In 1990, Iran began to purchase high-tech weapons using hard currency from oil profits. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the resultant oil price increase provided Iran with unexpected revenues to accelerate an already ambitious rearmament program. Even after oil prices fell, Iran has been able to continue its arms build-up.
OPLAN 1002-94
Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran has been rebuilding its military at an increasing pace in an effort to reestablish itself as a prominent regional military power. Iran has demonstrated its capability to threaten neutral shipping and the Gulf Cooperation Council states by conducting offensive naval and amphibious exercises in the Arabian Gulf. It is attempting to modernize its air and ground forces by purchasing arms from the Commonwealth of Independent States, China, North Korea, and East European countries. Iran has also sought to purchase military and industrial items from Germany, Italy, France, and Japan to facilitate its modernization efforts. However, high domestic inflation, a mounting foreign debt, and reduced oil revenues from an aging oil production infrastructure have combined to reduce Iran’s ability to modernize as rapidly as desired. If this situation should change, Iran will find many nations willing to provide sophisticated arms in exchange for petro-dollars.
OPLAN 1002-96
Continuation del articulo:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... n-1002.htmDice:
Albertopus escribió:Luisfer, pequeñín, ¿es que no sabes distinguir la realidad de tus pensamientos?
Aunque sé que es una pérdida de tiempo, te descubriré la trama de mis argumentos. Trataba pérfidamente de asumir que EE.UU usaba la misma política de Irak con Somalia, Nigeria o Libia. En un ejercicio de política-ficción describía sucesos que no han sucedido, pero que pudieran suceder si la teoría tuya de EE.UU en Irak se hubiera repetido en esos países.
Supuse, equivocadamente, que tu mente sensible captara la diferencia entre realidad y ficción y comprendiera (qué cosa tan difícil) que ante EE.UU no respondió igual en esos países que en el caso iraquí.
Tranquilo. Prometo no volver a hacerlo. Usaré frases cortas y sin esdrújulas para facilitar la comprensión de mi línea argumental.
Sigamos con la pedagogía:
No se como puedes tener el “sesudo análisis” de decir que lo de Somalia y lo de Nigeria puede ser, pero a la ves decir que en base a ello, lo de Irak no lo es. No se si me dejo entender, ya sabe, que noto su procesamiento anda muy limitado. ¿Es o no es así, expliqueme?
Seguimos con los “secretos” que me cuentas, pues ni tan secretos te diré, hay mucho forista que anda por allí hablando las cosas como deben de ser, es decir sin prejuicios ni parcialidades, objetivamente. Esa es al diferencia que le encuentro a comparación tuya, Abertopus, usted en su “pedagogia” no tiene capacidad de análisis mas que para replicar por replicar, refutar por refutar, renegar por renegar, solo miremos las sarta de incongruencias/replicas que se suelta por cada palabrita que se ah dicho en este debate.
Irak 2003 es una “excepción”, si claro.
An Analysis Of Gulf War Psyops And Their Applicability To Future Operations
CSC 1993
SUBJECT AREA - Operations
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: AN ANALYSIS OF GULF WAR PSYOPS AND THEIR APPLI-
CABILITY TO FUTURE OPERATIONS
AUTHOR: Major Peter A. Whitenack, United States Marine Corps
THESIS: The many-faceted PSYOP contribution to victory in
the Persian Gulf War should be examined in more detail to
determine how its lessons may be better integrated into
preparations for dealing with conflicts in the lean times
ahead.
BACKGROUND: U.S. military planners were pivotal in
developing and executing a coordinated, multi-national
combined arms theater campaign that succeeded in defeating
Iraq. Time for planning and coordination was a decisive
determinant of this success, and this type of opportunity may
not be afforded us to prepare similarly for future opera-
tions. PSYOPS in the Persian Gulf War actively spanned the
conflict and supported all elements of the theater campaign.
While integration of PSYOPS into operational planning was not
conducted according to doctrine, it was nevertheless
effective in all mediums, significantly contributing to mass
capitulation of Iraqi forces and an overwhelming victory for
the Coalition. While PSYOPS efforts successfully comple-
mented operations in the field, planning was initiated from
the bottom up for approval.
RECOMMENDATION: That psychological warfare operations in
the Persian Gulf War be thoroughly studied for establishment
of future doctrinal concepts in order to realize the full
potential of this effective force multiplier.
AN ANALYSIS OF GULF WAR PSYOPS AND THEIR
APPLICABILITY TO FUTURE OPERATIONS
OUTLINE
THESIS: The many-faceted PSYOP contribution to victory
in the Persian Gulf War should be examined in more detail to
determine how its lessons may be better integrated into
preparations for dealing with conflicts in the lean times
ahead.
I. Foundation for Analysis
A. Time as a determinant for success
B. Concern with force reduction
1. PSYOPS to facilitate objectives
2. Offset degradation of force potential
C. Basis of Gulf War PSYOP analysis
II. Historical Overview of Gulf War PSYOPS
A. Genesis of command
B. Operational establishment
III. PSYOPS Planning
A. Campaign description
B. Tying operations to the mission
C. Regional sensitivities, the Coalition
IV. Propaganda Development
A. Traditional forms
B. New campaign initiatives
V. Product Application
A. Pre-air war dissemination
B. Pre-ground assault dissemination
C. Delivery systems discussion
VI. Impact and Potential
A. Results and interpretations
B. Views to the future
El articulo continua aquí:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... 93/WPA.htmSobre Libia:
Luisfer escribió:...Ahora que si quieres mi opinión, si en ese entonces no se dio algo parecido a Irak, a saber porque, supongo yo que la política “Eje del Mal” aun no estaba madura porque la atención estaba con el “Imperio del Mal”.
Vale. Obejtividad pura. Qué lástima que eso no sirva para explicar la política de EE.UU con Libia entre principios de los noventa hasta ahora. Veinte añitos de ná. [/quote]
Tu capacidad de procesamiento es casi nula, es que tienes por norma burlarte y en eso metes la pata, refutas por refutar.
A ver por aquí:
Text: Neumann's Senate Testimony on U.S. Policy Toward Libya
(Asst. Secy says U.S. policy toward Libya remains consistent) (2400)
"U.S. policy and policy goals vis-a-vis Libya have remained consistent
through three Administrations," Ronald E. Neumann, deputy assistant
secretary of state
for Near Eastern Affairs, told Congress May 4.
"Our goals have been to end Libyan support for terrorism, prevent
Tripoli's ability to obtain weapons of mass destruction and contain
Qadhafi's regional ambitions," Neumann said in testimony before the
Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee for Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs.
He added that an additional aim of the U.S. is to bring to justice the
persons responsible for the bombing more than 11 years ago of Pan Am
Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. The trial of two Libyans accused
of the terrorist act that killed 270 people opened May 3 in the
Netherlands. Neumann pointed out that Libya's surrender of the
suspects came as a result of intensive efforts by the U.S. to bring
them to trial.
Since Muammar Qadhafi's 1969 coup, the U.S. policy agenda towards
Libya has been focused on Libya's sponsorship of terrorism, support
for groups violently opposed to Israel and the Peace Process,
preventing Tripoli's efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction and
unhelpful activities in neighboring African states, Neumann said.
Neumann testified that Libya no longer poses the threat it once did on
terrorism, opposition to Middle East peace, and regional intervention
and U.S. efforts to impede Libya's WMD and missile programs have had
substantial success.
However, he said, "we must continue to watch Libya closely and will
maintain pressure until all of these concerns are fully addressed."
The U.S. will continue to oppose lifting UN sanctions against Libya
"until we are satisfied that Libya has met all the relevant UN
Security Council requirements."
Neumann also said the provisions of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act
regarding investment in Libya's petroleum sector will continue to be
considered until, as the statute prescribes, the President has
determined and certified to Congress that the UNSCR requirements have
been met. "Also until that time, we expect to maintain core unilateral
economic sanctions prohibiting U.S.-Libyan business."
Following is the text of Neumann's testimony:
(begin text)
Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern Affairs
Ronald E. Neumann
May 4, 2000
I appreciate the invitation to speak to you on current U.S. policy
towards Libya and welcome the opportunity to address a topic of
interest to many members. We have achieved significant success in
meeting long established goals, but this is a continuing story whose
ending is as yet unclear.
U.S. policy and policy goals vis-a-vis Libya have remained consistent
through three Administrations. Our goals have been to end Libyan
support for terrorism, prevent Tripoli's ability to obtain weapons of
mass destruction and contain Qadhafi's regional ambitions. Since
Lockerbie, we have added additional aims, including bringing the
persons responsible to justice. I would like to discuss current
developments in the context of U.S. policy goals and unilateral and
multilateral efforts on behalf of these goals, and consider what
remains to be done.
Prior to the Qadhafi regime, we enjoyed a generally warm relationship
with the Libyans and pursued policies centered on our interests in
operations at Wheelus air force base with its 4,600 Americans the
considerable U.S. oil interests, and other key issues.
After Qadhafi's 1969 coup, the relationship quickly soured. Concerns
about Libya's foreign policies came to dominate our policymaking.
Chief among these concerns are state sponsorship of terrorism, support
for groups violently opposed to Israel and the Peace Process,
preventing of Tripoli's efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction
and unhelpful activities in neighboring African states. Since that
time, the U.S. policy agenda towards Libya has been focused on these
concerns.
Although our commercial relationship with Libya flourished throughout
the 1970s, the political relationship deteriorated, marked by
confrontation and by intermittent reconciliation attempts on both
sides. In the 1980s, we ended the long-standing commercial
relationship and rejected any possibility of reconciliation so long as
Libya pursued its policies of concern. We imposed sanctions
piece-by-piece in response to Libyan support for terrorism, beginning
with the disapproval of all further military sales to Libya and the
designation of Libya as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1979. We
ultimately imposed comprehensive sanctions on all commercial and
financial transactions with Libya under an executive order in 1986.
The unilateral sanctions regime against Libya has remained one of the
most comprehensive.
Also, in 1986, we identified Libya as responsible for the La Belle
Disco bombing and in retaliation bombed select military and
terrorist-related targets in Tripoli and Benghazi. Our judgment on
Libyan responsibility for the bombing was recently given additional
credibility by new testimony in the Berlin trial of the La Belle
bombing suspects.
In the wake of the La Belle bombing, our European allies finally began
to coordinate efforts against Libya. The EU resolved to reduce Libyan
diplomatic presence abroad, embargo arms sales to Libya and encourage
policy and security cooperation against Libyan support for terrorism.
We obtained UN Security Council support against Libya for its
sponsorship of terrorism following evidence of Libyan involvement in
the tragic 1988 Pan Am 103 and 1989 UTA 772 bombings. In 1992 and
1993, the Security Council passed a series of resolutions calling on
Libya to surrender the suspects, accept responsibility for the actions
of its officials, pay appropriate compensation, disclose all it knew
of the crime and cooperate with the criminal investigation, cease all
forms of terrorist action and assistance to terrorist groups, and
prove its renunciation of terrorism by concrete actions. The Security
Council imposed civil aviation, financial, and diplomatic sanctions
against Libya.
Carefully targeted, UN sanctions against Libya were for many years one
of the most successful multilateral sanctions regimes. Rigorously
observed sanctions succeeded in isolating Libya and limiting its
access to dollars and other hard currencies for almost a decade.
However, two years ago, support for the international sanctions began
to fade. Deliberate violations by some states were increasing. We
found little support to upgrade or even maintain the international
sanctions. [/quote]
El articulo continua aquí:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/libra ... -usia1.htmEso en año 2000, hoy, año 2009, como cambian las cosas:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... -nns01.htmEn fin, ala espera de tu siguiente lección de “pedagogía”, o debería decir de “traducciones” a ver si puedes dar talla.
Albertopus escribió:Incluso hay por ahí unos cuantos foros y análisis que se preguntan lo mismo.
Seria interesante citaras donde se practica que en Irak, no hay intereses geoestratégicos de por medio, además de intereses por recursos/asegurar esos recursos. Estoy seguro que a tu ahijada, le va ah gustar saber la realidad, lo que es tu, ni aunque te lo pinten en un cuadro, fíjate.
Albertopus escribió:Y los "nuestros" para mí suelen ser yo y lo que me interesa, cosa que sólo ocasionalmente incluye al gobierno de EE.UU.
Por cierto. Si hablas de los "nuestros", ¿te estás refiriendo a los peruanos que están como "mercenarios" en Irak?
Bueno permite iluminarte con mi opinión personal al respecto. Para mí, siempre me ah interesado el pueblo iraki, cuado menos desde que tome conciencia del tremendo engaño para ocupar el país. Parto desde allí para argumentar y debatir.
Sin embargo hablas cual vidente que a mí el pueblo de Irak me importa un carajo, bueno lo dejo para el análisis de cada quien, por mi parte esta claro que no soy de esos “que construyen castillos en el aire defendiendo el asunto del sufragio libre y democrático en un país ocupado a punta de plomo”. Ya sabes, “estate quieto que te voy a democratizar”
Sobre los peruanos en Irak, dejame decirte que no me meto con ningún soldado/guardia de seguridad que arriesga el cul* allá, salvo mercenarios, ni con ningún otro sea la nacionalidad que fuere. En cambio mis argumentos siempre han apuntado a la responsabilidad que tienen los dirigentes políticos estadounidenses por la situación iraki.
Y cuando hablo sobre los nuestros me refiero a que soy parte de occidente, y en resumen las acciones de occidente tienen enorme repercusión incluso en estos rincones del mundo.
Sobre occidentalismo, hombre que mira, a mi nunca se me hubiera ocurrido decir que lo de Irak es una “Excepción”, caramba, un análisis muy sesudo para resumir una pila de hechos, no hay duda que tu “pedagogía”, es única, y yo, pobre mortal, no llego ni a tus pies, fíjate. O cuando soltases esa de que los irakies son rudos para sufragar, pero por otro lado reniegas sobre que en Irak no hay resistencia, claro, es que según tu, ello solo son rudos cuando sufragan. O mas aun, cunaod sueltas esto:
Albertopus escribió:Luisfer escribió:...Partiendo por el hecho de que Irak del 2003 a adelante es una “invasión y ocupación” a un país soberano para “imponer” por la fuerza un nuevo orden, eso no tiene nada de democrático, mas aun si se espera ver resultados democráticos de esta acción y en un país como Irak, eso es como pensar y sostener utopías...
No. Una cosa es la ocupación y otra la posibilidad de elegir libremente. Eso último lo han podido hacer los iraquíes por primera vez en su vida. A las elecciones se han presentado todo tipo de agrupaciones políticas, étnicas y religiosas. El país dispone de una Constitución parlamentaria en la que el Consejo de Representantes (Parlamento) dispone de una gran poder.
Que te puedo decir hombre, yo te hablo sobre que no es nada democrático invadir un país soberano y tú me citas que los irakies por fin han elegido libremente. No hombre que va, yo pensar de ti que no tienes practicas occidentales llevadas al extremo por tu parcialidad, dios me libre.
Sobre el gas, resumamos un tanto para no ser tan redundantes. Nos dices:
Albertopus escribió:Por último. Hay responsables de Gazprom que saben menos que tú y yo, los pobres, que consideran que ambos proyectos no son incompatibles.
http://english.hotnews.ro/stiri-top_news-6104574-interview-gazprom-spokesman-says-company-primarily-studying-turkey-route-for-south-stream-route-which-avoids-romania.htm"Rep.: In which way the recent signing of the agreement for Nabucco modifies the games on the energy market in the Southern Europe in the near future?
Sergei Kupriyanov: It will not change anything. Gazprom Group does not consider the Nabucco project as a competitor to our South Stream gas pipeline project. We operate under the assumption that demand for natural gas in Europe will increase in the coming years, while at the same time production by European companies in European countries will fall and their reserves will be dwindling..."Pero tú tranquilo, que Italia debe estar a punto de enfadarse por la construcción de Nabucco... o no.
Ay, Albertopus, es que ya no sabes ni que decir con tal se dar talla, allí has citado lo que quisiste que se leyera, pero en ese enlace nos dice algunas cosas más respecto a la realidad de Nabuco en comparación a South Stream y Nord Stream.
La mas clara, Nabuco aun tiene que negociar mucho con los “posibles” proveedores, eso no sucede con Nord Stream y South Stream, aquí el proveedor ya esta dispuesto a ejecutar el proyecto y así lo esta haciendo. En efecto, se deja patente en el mismo enlace que nos das o en este.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8090104.stmVes la diferencia, Albertopus de porque no son compatibles estos proyectos gasíferos, tanto es así que Croacia ya mostró su interés en South Stream.
A menos claro, de que nos salgas con una mas, de tus jocosas traducciones de lo que quisiste decir. Tú dirás.
Albertopus escribió:Como difícilmente comprenderás, ni se me pasó para la cabeza hablar de South Stream ya que no tiene nada que ver con Irak (remóntate al principio de tus desvaríos). Tú y tus pensamientos tan intrasferibles e impredecibles creiste que era de valor citar South Stream en este hilo. Felicidades y gracias por el esfuerzo, pero no.
Ay Albertopus, a mi ya me entro curiosidad saber tu edad, los achaques a veces nos dan malas pasadas, digo yo. Por aquí señor:
Sobre el gaseoducto:
Luisfer escribió:...Yo te pregunto a ti ¿que crees que dirá o mejor dicho, condicionara Irán al proyecto…eh Albertopus????
¿Quien crees que influye mas en esas regiones…eh Albertopus?
¿Irán? Encantada con vender. Serán los clientes europeos los que decidan si se dan las condiciones políticas y económicas para conectarse con Irán. Mientras tanto, otros países, como Turkmenistán, Azerbayán, Irak y quizá Rusia, según las autoridades turcas, suministrarán el gas. Egipto ha pensado también interconectarse a través del Gasoducto Árabe, que pasará por Jordania y Siria.
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/jul2009/gb20090713_747206.htmLuisfer escribió:...¿Quien crees que influye mas en esas regiones…eh Albertopus?
¿En la región?... En Irán, Ahma, en el resto de países ellos mismos con la suficiente capacidad para firmar un acuerdo de contrucción de un gaseoducto y suministro de gas.
Luisfer escribió:...No, Albertopus, Europa esta en su derecho de buscarse sus recursos como mejor prefiera y convenga, pero Nabuco no es tan sencillo. Además de que tanto Alemania como Italia no se muestran tan incómodas con las propuestas de la FR.
¿Alemania incómoda?... no sé, un socio principal es una compañía que se llama RWE y es un poco alemana. ¿Italia?... ¿Qué tiene que ver Italia con todo esto?
En conclusión: Que no has leído nada de Nabucco, ni de los contratos petroleros en general de Irak tras 2003... Lástima.
Como te crees saber mas que yo, supusiste que me equivoque al meter a Almenia e Italia, y es en relación a ello que mencione después a South Stream, recuerdas?
Te lías mucho, Albertopus.
Albertopus escribió:Hummm, objetividad pura... ¿haces predicciones para el futuro? ¿presintiendo un conflicto en el Ártico? (ten cuidado, que cualquier desalmado te puede acusar de subjetivo... incluso de sufrir occidentalismo).
No hombre, que va, incluso la discusión tiene su tema propio en este y otros foros. Lee un poco.
http://www.barentsobserver.com/oil-drau ... 16320.htmlY como los rusos son los reyes en la zona.
http://www.barentsobserver.com/no-fear- ... 16320.htmlhttp://www.barentsobserver.com/stronger ... 16320.htmlPero nada, Albertopus nos dice que es solo subjetividad. Deja de dártelas de listillo, ya te lo eh dicho.
Albertopus escribió:Por cierto, y como mera curiosidad vaga... en el lenguaje Luisfer ¿qué significa utópico? Es por si utópico en lengua Luisfer significa otra cosa que en español.
Sencillo:
Irak es una “excepción”, podría ser, ahora que si no te gusta, seria eso de que en Irak han ejército elecciones libres. Me pongo a pensar, suponiendo que sea cierto,
¿Por cuanto tiempo?
Sobre cohesión iraki, el problema con tigo, Abertopus y tu escaso análisis, es que siempre te gusta mencionar lo que asen los terroristas y de allí justificas la ocupación, obvias de forma “natural” referirte a como estaba antes Irak, es decir, mucho mas estable con Chies y Sunies viviendo sin mayores problemas que el mismo régimen o alguno que otro radical que era mantenido a raya. Eso juega en contra de lo que te gusta predicar.
Albertopus escribió:Tampoco me llama la atención los más o menos millares, quizá millones de desplazados por presión de otros grupos. Por ejemplo, los kurdos desplazados en tiempos de Saddam o los sunníes desplazados del Kurdistán iraquí tras la ocupación.
Eso, “detalles”, que solamente tu y uno que otro iluminado gusta obviar. Naturalmente es opinión personal, ni pinta ni cose nada, salvo subjetivismo puro y duro.
Albertopus escribió:Si te retratas muy bien, Luisfer. Por cierto, ¿a que portas bigotito?: pequeño y ridículo como los del Hitler y Franco o largo y mostachudo como los de Stalin. Otros que también tenían la misma consideración acerca del resto de los humanos que tú.
Hombre, no entiendes, me vale una mierda los DD.HH en temas como este, quienes se jactan de defenderlos, me son solo una bola de hipócritas.
No te esfuerces mucho en meter al tal Hitler o Stalin, se nota que ya no sabes que argumentar al respecto en un contexto como este.
Albertopus escribió:Si tu memoria de pez te lo permite leete el "contexto" y averigua mi opinión sobre la violación de los derechos humanos por parte de los ocupantes y sobre la de los "resistentes" tan particulares tuyos.
No gracias, con leerte decir que Irak es una “excepción”, ya lo aclaraste todo.
En definitiva, una ves mas, intentas pero no puedes, quieres pero no das, quedo ante tu replica
Saludo
PD: Cansino, no lo creo, me parece mas bien que ya no sabes como defender tus subjetivismos, para variar.
