Análisis de la guerra del 2008. Es un pdf en ruso de 144 páginas, basado en informes de prensa, datos de Internet, de los gobiernos, etc.
http://www.cast.ru/comments/?id=351
http://www.megaupload.com/?d=5XF0KTED
Link alternativo para bajar el .pdf (sin contraseña, para poder copiar y pegar en traductores
)
Resumen en inglés:
http://www.cast.ru/eng/?id=358
¿Comentarios de los “rusoparlantes”? respecto al contenido y la credibilidad?
Me gustaría discutir sobre los casos de friendly fire, respecto de la aviación rusa (desde la página 109), ó resumido:
Given the extent of the initial attention paid to Russian air losses in the war, Lavrov’s chapter on that topic should attract great attention. Lavrov cites those losses as one of the most unexpected outcomes of the conflict for observers. The Russian defense ministry reported the loss of four aircraft (three SU-25 ground attack aircraft s and one Tu-22M3 strategic bomber). Saakashvili announce that Georgian forces had shot down 22 Russian aircraft. Two additional Su-24 fighter-bombers were never announced as combat losses by official Russian sources, but were verified by reports of downed aircraft. The confusion about Russian air losses follows from the usual fog and friction associated with combat. In this case, one of the contributing factors in this conflict was instances of loss by “friendly fire.” The first Russian Su-25 was shot down over South Ossetia late on August 8 by ground fire from South Ossetian forces. This missile attack was broadcast by Russian national television and reported as the shooting down of a Georgian Su-25. The first Russian aircraft lost to Georgian fire came on the morning of August 9 when the Tu-23M3 returning from a bombing strike came down from 12,000 meter altitude to 4,000 meters and was attacked by Georgian air defense missiles about 50 km north-west of Gori. The aircraft lost some of its major systems. Only the pilot and co-pilot ejected from the aircraft, but only the co-pilot survived the ejection and was captured by the Georgians. The bodies of the other two crewmen were recovered from the crash site later. The second success of Georgian air defense forces came later that morning when a Su-24 was shot down by an anti-aircraft missile south of Tskhinvali. Several cell phone cameras caught the attack and destruction of the aircraft. Both the pilot and co-pilot ejected from the aircraft, but the co-pilot’s parachute was damaged by fire from the aircraft and he died on impact. The pilot, who was wounded, was captured. About 1030 the same morning another Su-25 was hit by a SAM south of Tskhinvali during a strafing run and lost an engine. The pilot decided to return to base but when crossing the city of Tskhinvali he was hit by another SAM and lost his second engine. He was able to glide into Russian controlled territory, before ejecting and was recovered by a Russian search and rescue helicopter. It is still unclear who fired the second SAM at the aircraft. At that time, South Ossetian air defenders claimed to have shot down a Georgian Su-25 in the same region. Moreover, Georgian sources confirm that there were no Georgian Su-25 combat missions on that day, raising at least the possibility that the second Su-25 was also a victim of friendly fire. Later that day another Su-25 was shot down in the area of Gufta Bridge. At the time Russian air defense forces claimed to have shot down a Georgian Su-25 in the same area. The pilot of the lost Russian aircraft did not report any damage nor did he attempt to eject for the aircraft. Lavrov, on the basis of evidence of later inspection of the crashed aircraft by Russian officials concluded that the aircraft was probably shot down by a Russian ZSU-23 in a case of failure of the fighter’s indicator “friend or foe” system. The final aircraft lost in combat was a Su-24, which was shot down by friendly forces while it was escorting a Russian column on the Tskhinvali-Gori highway, when it was hit by a Russian SAM. The crew ejected and was recovered by a search and rescue helicopter. Lavrov's analysis makes a compelling case on two points: Russian air losses were concentrated in the period 8-9 August, with August 9 witnessing the heaviest losses of four aircraft, and that of the six aircraft lost, over half were the result of friendly fire. While this analysis reduces the effectiveness of the Georgian air defense system, it raises serious questions about the ability of Russian air control systems to manage the airspace of the battlefield. Lavrov goes as far as to suggest that the Russian air and ground forces actually fought two different wars without much knowledge of what was going on in the other sphere. This reveals the gap that exists between Russian forces’ capabilities and the proclaimed desire to conduct network-centric warfare as part of “new look” reforms.
En ruso está más detallado, con nombre de pilotos, etc.
Saludos!