Yorktown escribió:Y los exitos de la ONU son cuales?
Bla,bla,bla...
De momento hemos visto que la crisis de Berlín en 1.948 se solventó partiendo de los contactos secretos que llevaron a cabo los diplomáticos que representaban a URSS y EEUU en la ONU, y en la sede de la ONU. Ahora supongo que vamos a profundizar un poco más en su labor en la crisis de los misiles. La verdad es que haber jugado un papel en la resolución de las dos mayores crisis de la guerra fría y que ese papel se encuentre en la cadena causal de los acontecimientos que llevaron al mantenimiento de la paz no es poca cosa.
Supongo que una revisión más completa de los hechos puede llevar a conclusiones más documentadas. Éste es un buen punto de partida para quien quiera echar un vistazo
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/hi ... index.htmlYa volveremos a él
Bueno, normalmente son aún más ridículos quienes se burlan de los nombres extranjeros.
Oooooh, que sensible el picapleitos...
Hombre no, sensible es quien no puede evitar burlarse de un nombre extranjero. Es un tipo de sensibilidad que tiene un nombre concreto.
Más, blab, bla, bla escondiendo un recule y más mentiras sobre las negociaciones secretas
Página 9....Puesto en boca de Kruschev:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_m ... R-Cuba.pdfHe indicated that a personal meeting with the president was preferable to a UN appearance for the purpouse of negotiating Cuban settlements... Más adelante dice que esta muy contento con las conversacion Gromyko-Rusk en Berlin, en la que los soviéticos se comprometieron a no realizar ninguna represalia sobre Berlin a cuenta de Cuba...
Y la ONU, bien gacias.
Ah, en ese documento también habla de la palabra dada por Nikita al inmarcesible U sobre que los barcos no forzarían la "cuarentena"...y fijate que cosas, los yankees no terminan de creerse nada. Será que no se fian de los canales diplomáticos que tanto te gusta, y como vimos en el primer documento, se ocupan de sus cosas con Mamá directamente?
Y que en cualquier caso, habría que ver como se confirma el desmantalmiento de los misiles ya que Castro no admitría una comisión de la ONU...que recurrente
A ver si dice Castro algo de la ONU....
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_m ... shchev.pdfVaya...tampoco.
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_m ... 20Amb..pdfComo los representates de Cuba vemos que tampoco pintaron mucho, ni dentro ni fuera de la ONU.
Bueno, vamos a ver lo poco que pintó en la crisis de los misiles
64. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Washington, October 24, 1962, 11:15 p.m.
(…)
Pres.--I don't know if there is any way for a binding concentration. The time is so short. When we talk about a barrier, we talk about 500 miles, we can always take it at 300 miles if you have to. We can take it late in the afternoon, the question would be
if there is any message we would send to U Thant to give them a way out.
Ball--What we might do, we might get up a draft of something tonight. Let me just read you what we sent him last night, what you sent him last night. Ball reads the letter. He had this in front of him when he, this looks as if he wrote it himself, saying in effect, talking about it in the Security Council . . . . This is a letter coming back and saying that he can't do it.
Pres.--The only thing it seems to me would be to U Thant. I don't think there is anything we can say to him that will cause him to change. We are saying not to send them and he is going to send them. Whether U Thant gives him a way out or not, I don't know.
Ball--I just have been talking to Stevenson and the trouble with the U Thant proposal is that there is no inspection or verification in it at all. Stevenson said that he thinks that if we were to accept the principle of some preliminary conversation, in the course of the conversation we could insist upon some kind of verification about when you have to point into the UN; I would not have too much confidence in him or boarding parties in the UN getting on ships and that would give us protection while we were trying to work something out. That is going to take 2 or 3 days to do.
Pres.--He is going to hold up his ships during that 2 or 3 days.
Ball--What we could say is that if you will hold up your ships during the 2 or 3 days, we would have some preliminary talks in the UN to see to if there is some solution.
Pres.--I think rather than direct a message to him, we should get ourselves back to U Thant and say that he can request the Soviet Union to hold up their shipping for the next, for the immediate area, that we would be glad to get into conversations about how the situation could be adjusted.
Ball--If we were to say to the Sov. Union, it appears that a confrontation is about to take place,
Pres.--And to hold their ships, while we meet with him tomorrow afternoon. Probably that is about all we can do. Otherwise we just have to go with this thing. In that case, we could pick up this tanker tomorrow afternoon, instead of tomorrow
morning.
Ball--Yep. I will talk to Bob, Dean and Adlai and get back to you.
Es decir, el día 24 de Octubre, a las 23:15 horas el Presidente Kennedy llama por teléfono al subsecretario Ball para indicarle que la única vía de solución que ve al problema es que U Thant presente un mensaje a los rusos proponiendo que los barcos no penetren la línea de cuarentena mientras llevan a cabo negociaciones. Una petición similar realizada por el mismo Presidente había sido rechazada por la URSS y la única forma que se le ocurre de proporcionar a Kruschev una vía de acción que evite en enfrentamiento a raíz de la cuarentena es que esa proposición sea presentada por el Sercretario General de las Naciones Unidas.
65. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)
Washington, October 24, 1962, 11:25 p.m.
//Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons--Cuba. No classification marking.
Ball--The President called me again and we've been talking about what we might do about getting some kind of a message to K [Khrushchev]. The Pres. had the idea that maybe we ought to do with U Thant tonight instead of trying to get a message back to K because there isn't much we can say that we didn't say in that message he sent last night. Try to get U Thant to make a direct appeal to Mr. K to hold off his ships on the ground that there is going to be a confrontation in the morning which could escalate until there is a chance for a discussion on the modalities of negotiation. The Pres. is very reluctant to face this thing particularly with a tanker involved tomorrow until we make one last try to see if the UN can get itself in between.
Secretary--I must say that I don't think a tanker is the best case.
Ball--It isn't the best case. I talked to McNamara and what he said they had in mind with regard to the tanker was simply to hail it and ask it what it is carrying, where it was going, and if it answered satisfactory to let it go, not to board it. In fact the Commander has no instructions to do more than that. If it goes on through, then we have lost the principle of the quarantine, having done that. On the other hand, we could let this one go but then there will probably be a whole day without stopping a ship, and I am afraid this would be misinterpreted in Moscow, particularly in the light of this letter. The President's idea, this was a kind of an idea we were developing together was possibly if we could get Thant tonight to make the appeal on the ground that there was going to be a likelihood of a confrontation and ask K to instruct his fellows to talk with ours and see if a negotiation could be gotten under way. In the meantime, to hold his ships away from Cuba that something might be done.
Sec.--I don't think there is a chance in the world that K would get instructions to this tanker by 2 am.
Ball--In the meantime, we could hold off til, actually we could even change the thing for half a day as far as that goes. We could outrun the tanker.
Sec.--I should think that we ought to wait til daylight anyhow.
Ball--Well, we are going to wait til daylight as I understood it.
Sec.--I think you might talk to Adlai about this and see if U Thant on his own responsibility will ask Mr. K not to send his ships pending modalities.
Ball--Let me see what we can do.
Sec.--All right, fine. What about the answer?
Ball--If we did that, I suppose we wouldn't answer.
Sec.--Hold off until in the morning?
Ball--Yes. There really isn't anything much that we can say that hasn't been said. If we can now get Thant to do something rather than doing it ourselves.
Sec.--Right.
Ball--Let me see what I can work out when I talk to Stevenson.
Ball habla a continuación con el secretario de Estado para poner en práctica de forma inmediata la idea del Presidente. La cuestión es que EEUU no puede volver a dirigirse a Kruschev porque no puede decirla nada nuevo ni distinto de lo que ya le ha dicho y a lo que Kruschev ya ha contestado. La vía de U Thant es la única que parece posible para evitar una confrontación inmediata.
66. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson)
October 24, 1962, 11:45 p.m.
//Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons--Cuba. No classification marking. Ball was in Washington; Stevenson was in New York.
Ball--We've got another idea that I would like to try out on you. Do you think there is any chance that U Thant would be willing to send Mr. K a [letter?]. Let me bring you up to date. We've had a message from K/1/ in which he says in effect that he can't give instructions to his ships to abide by the blockade and that if we violate these rules, that will be our fault and they will be forced to take measures that they deem necessary and adequate to protect their rights, and they have what's necessary to do that. Implications being knowing that there may be a submarine or two in the waters, that could be an attempt to torpedo one of our ships. Would U Thant under all the circumstances knowing the possibility of a confrontation tomorrow be prepared to send a message to K along the lines that he is very concerned about possibility of a confrontation in connection with this quarantine, and that he asked K to hold his ships away from Cuban waters on the condition that we will not molest them while there is a discussion of the modalities of a possible negotiation.
/1/Document 61.
Stevenson--Yes, I think he might do something like this.
Ball--If we could get something out like that tonight, I think we would hold off, because all we've got is a tanker coming through. We've just given instructions not to touch the thing tonight. We can buy a day or two here and see how it goes.
Stevenson--I think it would be a lot more helpful for me in trying to get U Thant to do this if I could have a copy of the message that we have from K.
Por si a alguien no le quedaba clara la situación, Ball se la resume a Stevenson: Kruschev ha dicho que no puede parar los barcos y que si alguno es detenido tendrá que tomar las medidas adecuadas y necesarias para proteger sus derechos. Sabiendo que puede haber un submarino soviético o dos en las aguas eso puede significar el torpedeo de un barco americano. Supongo que no hace falta que nadie explique a qué hubiera conducido un acto así, y para evitar que tal cosa pueda suceder la diplomacia americana pide la intervención directa y personal del Secretario General de la ONU. Para evitar que la situación consecuencia del bloqueo degenere en un enfrentamiento abierto entre las dos potencias se pide la intervención personal de U Thant. Porque, como ya han comentado antes, no hay nada nuevo y que rebaje la tensión que puedan decirse EEUU a URSS y viceversa.
73. Summary Record of the Fifth Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council
(...)
Secretary Rusk reported on diplomatic developments. He said the question was whether we can get Soviet strategic missiles out of Cuba or at least under UN control. He added that if there was any prospect of success in following a political track, we would have to keep heavy pressure on the Russians. He reported that Soviet representative Zorin in New York was furious about U Thant's proposals for U.S./USSR talks under UN sponsorship in New York, but that Khrushchev had agreed to such talks./1/ Our position would be that during these next two days of preliminary discussions we must somehow stop the missile buildup in Cuba. We must know what is going on at the IRBM sites in Cuba and we need to know whether warheads have actually been delivered to Cuba. Shortly we must decide if the Soviet signals which they are sending us means they are getting ready to talk or whether they are getting ready to attack us.
/1/See Document 59.
(...)
At this point the President entered the Cabinet Room.
Secretary McNamara reviewed the situation with respect to the Voelker Freundschaft. He said the East German ship had left Rostov on October 11 and Leningrad on October 14. [2 lines of source text not declassified] The destroyer Pierce is following the ship which is still outside the barrier. Secretary McNamara recommended that we not stop this ship.
The President referred to the message from U Thant asking us to avoid incidents pending the talks at New York./3/
/3/See Document 59.
Mr. Bundy said the East German ship was not covered by U Thant's message.
General Taylor and Director McCone asked Mr. McNamara [5 lines of source text not declassified]
The President said the only argument against stopping the ship is U Thant's request for no incidents for the time being. He said that we would have to drop the other shoe soon.
Secretary McNamara repeated his earlier statement with respect to the difficulty of stopping a passenger ship. He preferred to stop the Graznyy tomorrow if Khrushchev did not accept U Thant's proposed mediation effort.
The Attorney General said he wished to describe again the other side of the argument. He said we could let the tanker through the barrier. As of now no other ships were approaching the barrier. Surveillance measures could be taken to keep the pressure on the Russians and provide time for the political measures suggested by Secretary Rusk without appearing to be backing off from a confrontation. He repeated his view that we may decide that it is better to avoid confronting the Russians by stopping one of their ships and to react by attacking the missiles already in Cuba.
Secretary Dillon said he preferred that the confrontation take place in Cuba rather than on the high seas.
Secretary Rusk noted that the quarantine had become fully effective.
Secretary McNamara reported that there had been no response yesterday or today to our low-level reconnaissance flights. He recommended that we continue to fly daylight reconnaissance missions and add night reconnaissance not only to gain information, but also to convince the public that we are increasing the pressure on the Russians.
The President decided that we should not stop the East German ship. Tomorrow we will know the Soviet response to U Thant's proposal. We will let the tanker through the barrier and later add jet fuel to the list of products embargoed.
Como dice Kennedy
The President said the only argument against stopping the ship is U Thant's request for no incidents for the time being.
El único argumento para no detener el barco es la petición de U Thant. Y el barco no se para.
74. Record of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan
October 25, 1962, 6:30 p.m.
//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Macmillan Telephone Conversations. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. For Macmillan's account of this conversation, see At the End of the Day, pp. 205-208.
President: Prime Minister, how did you do with your debate?
PM: We did very well, actually very good, very good. I sent you the text of what I said, and I think it was very well accepted. I made all the points I could, especially the one you gave me about your statement of September 11, and the reception was good--and that was very well received.
President: We've got a second message from U Thant/1/ which you may be familiar with which says that . . . asks Khrushchev to keep the ships out of there and asks us to avoid a confrontation. Now we are inclined to--we are sending back a message that if he keeps his ships out of there of course we will avoid a confrontation. As you know, today we figure now 14 ships turned around. They were probably the ones with the aggressive cargo. One tanker we stopped; we asked where it was going; it said it was coming from the Black Sea to Cuba and the cargo was oil. It was obviously a tanker and we passed that. We have tomorrow 2 or 3 vessels that--including particularly an East German vessel which has probably 600 or 700 passengers. It stopped in Leningrad on its way and it may have 6,000 tons of cargo on it, so we are going to have to stop that, we think. That's what we are now discussing. Now we've got two tracks running. One is that one of these ships--these selected ships--which Khrushchev continues to have come toward Cuba--on the other hand, we have U Thant--we don't want to sink a ship, and then right in the middle of one, U Thant is supposedly arranging for the Russians to stay out, so we are going to have to let some hours go by, but sooner or later, probably by tomorrow evening, we are going to have to accost one of these and board it. Now we got a message last night from Mr. Khrushchev/2/ which I'll make sure you get, if you haven't gotten it already, which says that this is piratical and their ships are going to go through and not submit to this, and if we do stop them they have the means of action against us. That's last night. So that's about where we are.
PM: Thank you very much. I have just seen your message to U Thant./1/ It seems to me extremely ingenious and very calm, because you are saying that the--as you say, the real point is that they ought to get rid of these weapons.
/1/See Document 59.
/2/Document 61.
And then Ambassador Stevenson will be discussing with U Thant the arrangements. What time do you think the Ambassador will be speaking with U Thant?
President: . . . about a half hour ago which goes somewhat further than the first one went. The second one said that he is asking Khrushchev to keep his ships out of there. His first message didn't do that. We are therefore going to accept that because it comes further in our direction than his first one, and tell him that if he can keep the ships out of there that's fine, then we won't have the incident. On the other hand, we do point out in our response to him that some ships still are coming. Now that is that. Now if these conversations begin we are going to point out--once we get this matter of the ships straightened out, because we still haven't had our first search yet, and that's going to be a very important event because we will then know what the Russians are going to do, but that will come tomorrow. Now then, if we begin the conversation we are going to begin to point out that work is going on and that work must stop or otherwise we have got to extend this blockade, and consider other action to stop it. But I think that's at least 24 hours away. I think the next thing for us to do is to figure out how we will handle this first search in view of the fact that the UN is involved in this now. In other words, I don't want to have an incident--fight--with a Russian ship tomorrow morning and to search it at a time when it appears that U Thant has gotten the Russians to agree not to continue. I hope that by tomorrow afternoon it will be clear either that the Russians are discontinuing their shipping during these preliminary conversations or, if they are not, then the responsibility is on them.
. . . . garble . . .
President: Prime Minister, can you repeat that?
PM: I was saying that the question of dealing with the weapons in Cuba--you will be discussing that with U Thant?
President: Yes. As I say, the first problem we have is the circumstances under which we will search the first Russian ship, on the basis of two things: first, Mr. Khrushchev's reply to me last night that he will not permit it; and secondly, U Thant's appeal for a suspension of Russian shipping while these talks go on so that if we get Russian shipping suspended that will produce one situation; if Russian shipping does not suspend, then we will have to face the search and the possible sinking of the ship sometime tomorrow afternoon, so that's our first problem. Then . . . but if we satisfactorily get through that problem, then when these conversations begin we are going to then begin to emphasize that work on these sites is continuing and that unless it is discontinued we must tighten the blockade and possibly take other actions. That would probably begin to be emphasized the minute the talks begin, but even if the talks don't begin, we are going to begin to say it on Saturday/3/ anyway.
Es resumen a un aliado remarca una cuestión que preocupa al Presidente: si U Thant no consigue la suspensión de los intentos soviéticos de traspasar la línea, entonces en algún momento tendrán que enfrentarse a la decisión de hundir un barco, como todas sus consecuencias.
Quien tenga interés en toda la historia puede seguirla en el enlace que he proporcionado al inicio, pero supongo que todos sabemos que los barcos se mantuvieron más allá de la línea y algunos ahora saben que fue como consecuencia, entre otras cosas, de esta gestión concreta.
Bueno, a alguien informado se le supone saber que las negociaciones secretas entre USA y URSS que condujeron al acuerdo que puso fin al bloqueo las realizaron en la sede de la ONU los respectivos representantes, Jessup y Malik ¿Que qué hubiera cambiado de no existir la ONU? Que esa vía diplomática no hubiera existido y sabe dios como se hubieran desarrollado los acontecimientos.
Falso.
Bueno, a alguien informado se le supone saber que las negociaciones secretas entre USA y URSS que condujeron al acuerdo que puso fin al bloqueo las realizaron en la sede de la ONU los respectivos representantes, Jessup y Malik ¿Que qué hubiera cambiado de no existir la ONU? Que esa vía diplomática no hubiera existido y sabe dios como se hubieran desarrollado los acontecimientos.
Doblemente falso lo primero, estupidamente incierto lo segundo. Claro que tú eres bastante de ambas dos cosas, falso y estúpido.
Por favor, no puedo comprarme a un maestro. Al fin y al cabo y por lo que estoy viendo, son las únicas dos cuestiones en las que realmente destacas.
Por lo demás, esta parte de la discusión tenía su origen en la crisis de Berlín de 1.948, y es rigurosamente cierto y exacto que el bloqueo de Berlín se levantó como consecuencia de los contactos secretos realizados en la ONU entre los representantes en ella de EEUU y la URSS, Jessup y Malik.
Es una cuestión de hecho que las conversaciones diplomáticas por los cauces habituales estaban estancadas, que aumentaba la preocupación por las consecuencias de un incidente durante el puente aéreo y que para intentar superar la situación el embajador americano inició una aproximación a su colega soviético. Esa aproximación llevó a unas negociaciones secretas y de ellas surgió el acuerdo que puso fin a la crisis. Quien tenga interés en comprobarlo puede echar un vistazo, por ejemplo, a The United States and the Berlin Blockade, 1948-1949: a study in crisis decision making de Avvi Shlaim, que podrá encontrar en la red con solo introducir el título el Google.
Y por mucho que duela, el hecho es que así se solucionó la crisis y las dos partes sabían que el mantenimiento del puente aéreo podía llevar un incidente o una acumulación de ellos de consecuencias imprevisibles. No sabemos que hubiera sucedido de haberse prolongado seis meses más y no sabemos de qué otra forma hubieran podido solventar sus problemas EEUU y URSS, ya que ellos mismos en aquel momento no encontraron otra.
Algo similar puede decirse de la crisis de los misiles, cuando se encontraban en una vía muerta y abocados a un incidente en el mar que hubiera podido desencadenar una guerra, los EEUU acudieron a una vía a través de la ONU que permitió que las dos partes obtuvieran tiempo y tuvieran excusas para desbloquear sus relaciones. Es algo que puede no gustar a quien tenga un prejuicio tan arraigado que le impida ver la realidad, pero ese no es un problema de los hechos, sino suyo.
Mas bla,bla,bla...pero nada concreto viene a continuación...
Por otra parte, lo que dices mantener es que a nadie le importa lo que diga la ONU, y al margen de que finalmente hagan una cosa u otra, la dedicación de grandes recursos para que respalde cursos de acción concretos es una prueba evidente que de sí les importa.
Si, si...Israel está preocupadisimo con todas las condenitas de la ONU...pero no suele preguntarles nada, ni hacerles mucho caso, a no ser que quien llame sea del Despacho Oval. Y que se tire dinero ajeno y se ocupe a momias desocupadas en ese chiringuito no significa que les importe, significa que como con tantas otras cosas, se dedican a gestionar mal el dinero ajeno. Según tu absurda teoría como se gasta dinero en el ministerio de igualdad, este debe servir para algo.
Claro, todos son imbéciles y gestionan mal el dinero. La próxima vez que se produzca una crisis la resolverán en la casa de Yorktown o pidiendo al eminente que haga un propuesta que permita reemprender negociaciones diplomáticas.
Me temo que, una vez más, el único que falta de forma grave a la verdad eres tú. Si lees con la normalmente requerida atención mi párrafo verás que te inventas las cosas a las que respondes, supongo que porque no puedes responder a las que realmente digo. Por lo demás, tu estima de Kennedy y Kuschev debe ser muy baja si, imbéciles de ellos, perdieron el tiempo contestando a U Thant, pidiéndole su intervención o esperando el resultado de algunas de sus gestiones cuando hasta el portero de tu casa sabía que no pintaba nada. Todos son imbéciles menos el potero de tu casa; aunque también es posible que sea al revés y que se limitaran a hacer uso de los recursos que tenían para evitar una guerra, y la ONU era uno de esos recursos.
Lee, lee los documentos desclasificados...
.
Como también suelen hablar con el Dalai Lama...crees que le tienen muy en cuenta a la hora de decidir que hacer, supongo.
. Mientes, como un pobre diablo, pero por aproximación aciertas. Ni JFK ni Kruschev eran dos lumbreras, pero ya te dije antes que lo que se hace en la ONU es pura cosmética, y eso es lo que era el señor U, un pintalabios resultón. Y eso le gusta mucho a los políticos, sean de donde sean, y por tanto, lo usan para mostrar su "buena voluntad".
:lol::lol:
El atrevimiento y la desvergüenza llevados a su máxima expresión. Yo sí he leído los documentos desclasificados y he transcrito aquí párrafos completos. Y la palabras de Kennedy, Rusk o Ball son muy claras: es necesario acudir a la mediación de la ONU para evitar una escalada en la crisis.
¿
¿A los efectos se esta conversación? Es el representante americano que recibió la confirmación a través de U Thant de que los rusos estaban desmontando las instalaciones y las enviarían de vuelta a Rusia. No es gran cosa, pero es más de lo que te gustaría ¿Verdad?
Y que no se creyeron hasta que lo confirmaron...otras fuentes.
Busca, busca lebrel, busca. Y aún así...eso es todo lo que puedes presentar. Algo así como el caso que le hicieron unos y otros a los inspectores de la ONU en Irak?
¿
Por supuesto que lo confirmaron. Pero ni tan siquiera en algo tan sencillo eres capaz de darte cuanta de la realidad. EEUU y URSS, que deseban evitar una guerra, querían y solicitaban la comprobación a través de Inspectores de la ONU. EEUU estaba dispuesto a traspasar a la ONU los medios en el caso de acordarse inspecciones aéreas de la ONU. Cuba, que no deseaba ese acuerdo porque suponía la pérdida de su material de guerra –que, cabe suponer, consideraban fundamental para evitar un invasión- hacía todo lo posible para dificultar el acuerdo. Por eso Cuba no acepta las inspecciones de la ONU que sí aceptan EEUU y URSS. La postura de las tres partes demuestra que consideraban la importancia de la mediación de la ONU y sus inspectores: los dos primeros los proponían como vía para el acuerdo y el último los evitaba como forma de torpedear ese acuerdo.
Su reconocimiento y establecimiento de mecanismo de respeto es necesario para entrar en la UE.
Y a ti quien te ha dicho que yo quiero estar en esa otra cueva de ladrones??
No, no necesito nada de la ONU.
¿Y a ti quien te dice que a nadie le importa lo que tú quieras? El hecho es que hay estados que sí quieren –han querido unos y lo han logrado cumpliendo, entre otros, ese requisito, y siguen queriendo otros- y a todos ellos les importa un rábano lo que tu opines al respecto. Para ellos el cumplimiento es requisito para algo que desean y marca sus líneas de actuación.
El Tribunal Supremo de Israel te metería en la cárcel si hicieras con su uniforme lo que propugnas por aquí, aunque lo cierto es que probablemente la propia IDF te expulsaría antes.
Ah, ¿No pero sabes que Israel acepta y aplica en las acciones de su ejército las normas de derecho internacional humanitario de guerra que tanta gracia te hacen? ¿No lo sabías?
Antes o despues de mandarme a Dubai, saltandome unas cuantas leyes de esas tuyas, a matar a un cabroncito amiguito tuyo y de la ONU? El muchachín es tan naif... Se cumple lo que hay que cumplir, y lo que no...pues no.
Pero te aseguro que nadie llama a la ONU para pedir permiso para hacer lo que hay que hacer.
¿A Dubai? No chico, no, Israel no manda a ninguna misión en el extranjero a enajenados a quienes no les importa causar bajas civiles.
Por lo demás, Israel no ha matado a ningún amigo mío y la extraterritorialidad y soberanía no tienen nada que ver con el derecho humanitario que tanta gracia ye hace.
Ah, ah...se me olvidaba. Exactamente como es que la ONU, que es la artifice según el señorito de que no haya habido guerras entre potencias...fue un bando en la única que ha habido desde el 45?. Paradojico no?
Pues no, para cualquiera que sepa que la URSS metió la patita en la votación de Corea. Obviamente, no eres uno de los que lo saben, pero eso a estas alturas ya no puede sorprender a nadie.
Claro...porque al señorito India y Paquistán no le parecen potencias.
A efectos de la ONU y de el sistema se seguridad establecido con su creación. No. Entonces eran parte del Imperio Británico ¿Tan mal andamos de historia? Uffff
Those heroes that shed their blood and lost their lives... You are now lying in the soil of a friendly country. Therefore rest in peace. There is no difference between the Johnnies and the Mehmets to us where they lie side by side now here in this country of ours...