And... escribió:leí por ahi que los destructores británicos podrían portar misiles crucero tomahawk, que era una posibilidad o también esperar el desarrollo frances de un misil parecido, es cierto??
La primera prueba de este misil fue hace menos de un año, tal vez más adelante estos equipen a las T-45, leí por ahí que el problema con el tomahawk era de compatibilidad, no se que tan cierto sea.
Saludos.
"Los tiranos no pueden acercarse a los muros invencibles de Colombia sin expiar con su impura sangre la audacia de sus delirios."...Simón Bolívar
La primera prueba de este misil fue hace menos de un año, tal vez más adelante estos equipen a las T-45, leí por ahí que el problema con el tomahawk era de compatibilidad, no se que tan cierto sea.
Es cierto porque ya al margen de que antes de emplear un arma hay que integrarla en el sistema, y tendrían que pagar la integracion del TLAM en el sistema de combate del Daring -Que ya es un dinero-, los brits además tendrían que diseñar silos Ad-hoc a partir del Sylver, gastandose un dinero en I+D al margen del coste de integracion, o comprarles Mk.41 a los americanos para meterle TACTOMs en exclusividad. Todo lo cual supone unos gastos considerables. Y es que los Sylver nunca se prepararon para los tommies como es lógico.
Por eso es por lo que si piensan en embarcarle misiles de crucero a sus destructores el SCALP es mejor candidato y sale ganando aun no siendo un misil que ya esté en el inventario de la Royal Navy. Y es que los franceses se encargaron de desarrollar el Sylver A70 y la compatibilidad del misil con sistemas de combate de la familia PAAMS.
"Guarda con ello, como un tesoro, los nombres de los miles de héroes que cayeron por Marruecos y no contra Marruecos". General Alfredo Paniagua.
And... escribió:leí por ahi que los destructores británicos podrían portar misiles crucero tomahawk, que era una posibilidad o también esperar el desarrollo frances de un misil parecido, es cierto??
La primera prueba de este misil fue hace menos de un año, tal vez más adelante estos equipen a las T-45, leí por ahí que el problema con el tomahawk era de compatibilidad, no se que tan cierto sea.
a615618 escribió:No sabia que la construcción de éste portaaviones estubiera tan avanzada, parece que esta bien aprovechado, hay muchas divisiones interiores....quiza excesivas no????
Depende de que secciones estemos viendo, si trata del area de habitabilidad o talleres esta bien, quiza cuando veamos los hangares interiores o las salas de maquinas las separaciones sean menos
saludos
\\\\\\\"Mientras más sudor derrames en la paz, menos sangre derramaras en la guerra\\\\\\\\"
ATLANTA escribió:Esa costa por donde navega el SS me parece conocida según lo que muestra la consola de abordo
saludos
ATLANTA
??
No había caido en ese detalle. Ahora que lo dices se parece la costa oeste de EEUU aunque no me cuadra con la escala del mapa que la pantalla debería estar utilizando... ¿que litoral es el que ves tú en esa pantalla?
With Britain's Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers not due to enter service for nearly a decade and talk of strong new threats to carriers emerging, Dr Lee Willett, Head of RUSI's Maritime Studies programme, examines their viability
The United Kingdom's two Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers survived the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) – but only just. Despite the demonstrable strategic value of two highly flexible flat-topped ships in meeting a range of UK tasks from the high end to the low end of the spectrum, the carriers' fate hung in the balance right until the very end of the review. Even today, their fate may still not be secure. Despite carriers' demonstrated utility in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Asian tsunami, Hurricane Katrina, the Lebanon, Haiti and the ash cloud, questions continue to be asked about their strategic value.
These questions generally can be grouped under two broad assumptions. The first is that they are expensive, inflexible Cold War relics. Yet £5bn to build two ships which can show the strategic flexibility to adapt to a range of circumstances and conflicts over up to 50 years of life demonstrates extremely good value for money. For example, the US Navy carrier USS Enterprise (CVN-65) is 49 years old, has more deployments due, and has seen active service during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam and Afghanistan – each a different crisis requiring a different response.
The second assumption is that carriers are militarily vulnerable. This article will address this second question.
It may be quite hard to sink a 100,000 – or 65,000 – ton ship. It is for this reason that the Soviet Navy carried nuclear-capable anti-ship cruise missiles during the Cold War, to help break free from the grip of the carrier-based vice that the US Maritime Strategy would place around the Soviet Navy's access to open water. However, in reality the requirement should not so much be to sink a carrier but just to stop its aircraft from flying. With this in mind, even a kinetic energy projectile penetrating the flight deck might prove to be enough.
The discussion of carrier vulnerabilities has raised the profile of several major anti-ship cruise and ballistic missile programmes. These include the joint Indian-Russian Brahmos super- and hyper-sonic cruise missile, the Russian SS-N-27 Klub cruise missile, the Chinese C-802 cruise missile and – perhaps most notably – the Chinese Dong Feng-21D anti-ship ballistic missile. This is not a hypothetical threat either: Hezbollah used a C-802 to sink an Israeli warship in the Lebanon crisis in 2006. Reflecting Cold War era Soviet thinking, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (Navy) strategic logic seems to be to develop such weapons as an anti-carrier capability, to give them an option for releasing the operational pressure likely to be created by the presence of several US carriers in the event of any high intensity conflict. In both strategic terms, such developments are not new. What is new, though, is the technology – both in terms of the missiles themselves and the systems intended to defend against them.
However, there are still two basic – and fundamentally erroneous – assumptions in the argument that short-range missiles provide a direct, indefensible threat to aircraft carriers. The first is that an aircraft carrier is a static, lone platform which anchors just offshore. In reality, an aircraft carrier has the ability to sit well over the horizon in the vastness of the ocean. Simply, finding a ship in large areas of water is tricky. Indeed, while a lot of the counter-carrier arguments in the SDSR appeared to emanate from proponents of funding more capability on the ground in Afghanistan, retired Army officer Patrick Hennessey noted in his acclaimed book The Junior Officers' Reading Club, while visiting a deployed Royal Navy carrier, that he "marvelled at how tiny and insignificant the little grey box ... was against the expanse of the ocean". Using tanking support, which it can carry itself if needed (as shown by the way in which the US Navy uses modified versions of its own F/A-18 Hornets to provide an indigenous tanking capability) a carrier can project power at ranges sufficient to allow it to stand well offshore. It also can move over 500 miles per day. So a carrier would not be a stationary, close-in target. There is also the question of whether a potential opponent has sufficient intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) capability to be able to find, fix and strike a carrier with the requisite degree of surety and with enough redundancy to deal with jamming capabilities. In terms of conventional anti-ship missiles, the reduced firepower compared to a nuclear weapon means that the missiles would also require a much greater degree of accuracy to ensure they find their target.
Second is the fact that this argument ignores the offensive and defensive capability of the carrier's battle group – its own dedicated self-defence unit. The carrier sits offshore behind this potent screen of offensive and defensive firepower. In the case of the UK's carriers, in combat circumstances the ship would likely be accompanied some of the most advanced warships in the world: an Astute-class submarine, able to deal with both surface and underwater targets; and one or maybe two Type 45 Daring-class air defence destroyers, with an anti-air warfare defensive suite with the potential to be developed to deliver an anti-ballistic missile capability. The short range of most of the anti-ship weapons means that their launch platforms would need to be much closer to the carrier itself, thus increasing significantly their own exposure to the defensive capabilities of the battle group.
The reality is that a potential adversary will have to first find the carrier and then negotiate heavy layers of defence which will need to be peeled away. Thus, making a carrier vulnerable may not be as simple as sometimes is assumed.
Yet, despite these challenges, major powers are continuing to develop an anti-carrier capability. The Chinese DF-21D is the most prominent example. While its capability and in-service date remain open to question, its 900-mile range from its land bases mean that there is no need to deploy a ship within range, or inside the range, of the task group.
However, elements of the task group – such as land attack cruise missiles (such as the Tomahawk missile carried by the Astute boats), Joint Strike Fighters launched from the carriers themselves or the revived US conventional long-range bomber programme - can still hold land-based launch sites at risk. In terms of ship-based systems, the issue of having to deal with the defensive firepower of the task group itself is perhaps demonstrated by developments in the Russian SS-N-27 Klub-M anti-ship cruise missile programme. The missile can be fired from shipping containers. While generating this extra versatility – in terms of being able to fit warships with the weapon more quickly and cheaply – is probably the principal reason for this development, an added bonus would be the ability to position the weapon more discreetly, perhaps on land at a choke point or perhaps more notably on a commercial ship which might have a greater chance of getting further inside a carrier's defensive shield.
Whether the capabilities of these new weapons will be proved in due course to be credible, there has been some debate as to whether their emergence would be a game changer in terms of rendering carriers obsolete. It seems more likely that such developments will impact more on the modus operandi of a strategic asset such as a carrier, but this is where such weapons may have greater benefit as a tactical deterrent, giving a potential sea denial capability – for example reducing the desire of the US Navy to commit carriers into the Taiwan Strait in the event of a clash over Taiwan.
Perhaps the most significant questions in terms of carrier vulnerability is not anti-ship missiles, but submarines. Notwithstanding, in China's case, its building of large numbers of nuclear-powered and conventional-powered attack submarines (SSNs and SSKs) and notwithstanding the Chinese Song-class SSK found shadowing the USS Kitty Hawk carrier and its battlegroup in 2006, the challenge here for Western navies relates more to its own reducing focus on Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) as a discipline. Seen superficially as once again a Cold War requirement, following the collapse of the Soviet Navy at the end of the Cold War and to ward off arguments that Western SSNs were Cold War relics, major Western navies began adding to the tasking list of SSNs, including roles such as land attack. A consequence of this was a decline in submarine-based ASW skills sets. With other nations and navies around the world seeing submarines – especially those purchased off the shelf and particularly from the West – as a way of jumping the queue in terms of naval power, the threat to aircraft carriers may come more from below the surface than above it. Submarines are of course a principal platform for anti-ship cruise missiles, raising the issue of the threat from missiles such as the Brahmos and the Klub from a platform far better equipped to sneak into range.
Whatever the conclusions of this debate, the fact that key nations are placing a high priority on a range of anti-carrier capabilities certainly does one thing: it highlights the enduring strategic utility and importance of the carriers themselves.
Saludos
"That men do not learn very much from the lessons of history is the most important lesson history has to tell."
Aldous Huxley 1894-1963
Ten retired army and navy chiefs wrote to Prime Minister David Cameron over the move to scrap the Harrier jump jet and leave Britain without carrier strike capability for nearly a decade. The Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) last year ordered the scrapping of HMS Ark Royal and all Harriers. The UK will not have carrier strike capability again until the Queen Elizabeth class carriers enter service in 2019 or 2020. "This not only removes a very important component of the offensive and defensive capabilities of the Fleet but also undermines support of the Army and of the Royal Marines in their amphibious role," the letter reads. "This valuable operation can no longer be attempted even against a lightly armed aggressor without considerable risk." The letter also criticised the lack of continuity in fixed wing aircraft in the Royal Navy, saying it was "not a capability that can be easily and quickly reinstated or carried out by inexperienced air or ground crews". "Continuity of operations is highly desirable if the new carriers are to be brought into operational service quickly, with the right experience and supporting elements such as flight deck crews, command and staff officers at all levels." The former chiefs, who include former chief of the defence staff Field Marshall Lord Bramall, Admiral Sir John Woodward and Major General Julian Thompson, propose keeping "some Tornadoes and some Harriers, the latter under Royal Naval command, and both in reduced numbers. "A further option is for a mix of Harriers and F18s under naval command while retaining a reduced RAF Tornado force. Either option would help retain a highly desirable operational capability and, in doing so, give a marvellous fillip to morale of the Royal Naval air and ground crews that would be welcomed and, importantly, would ensure their retention in service." A group of retired admirals wrote a similar letter in November last year following the SDSR. In it they argued that the loss of carrier strike capability left the Falkland Islands vulnerable. Shadow Defence Secretary Jim Murphy has said the situation in the Middle East has left the decisions in the SDSR "already looking out of date". However, Defence Secretary Liam Fox defended the decisions, saying: "Sustaining both Tornado and Harrier would be prohibitively expensive in this current economic climate and Tornado continues to provide vital support to the front line in Afghanistan. "None of our allies have seen fit to position an aircraft carrier off the coast of Libya as this is not the tool required for this task; there is no requirement for ground attack aircraft, but even if there were we would use our extensive regional basing and overflight rights."
Saludos
"That men do not learn very much from the lessons of history is the most important lesson history has to tell."
Aldous Huxley 1894-1963
Prego de Bezoucos escribió:El Juan Carlos I y su Ski Jump han hecho pupita en Inglaterra.
pues como no te expliques....
Hombre, los foros británicos estaban "risueños" con la Ski Jump del JCI y los problemas del J-35B, hasta que les llegaron las noticias de la retirada de los harrier, el desguace del Invencible, el próximo final del Ark Royal (se habla, en modo [DESESPERATIOn=ON] de usarlo ¡como helipuerto para los JJOO de 2012! como forma de mantenerlo a flote). El shock final fue la botadura del Canberra. Han descubierto horrorizados que España tendrá dos plataformas operando con harriers en 2015 y ellos tendrán un portahelicópteros.
Un par de conceptos curiosos,que cobra especial interes ante la perdida de los Portas
Novel Air Concepts Vision
UXV Combatant
Sobre este ultimo,tengo una duda.
¿Hay espacio suficiente en un buque de 8.000Tn y 152m de eslora,para encajar catapultas electromagneticas en sendas pistas con Ski-jump de 50m que puedan lanzar un UCAV de 8Tn como el Taranis?.¿Podria hacerse,el lanzamiento,sin catapultas electromagneticas?.
