Goshawk escribió:Al menos 25.000 soldados de EEUU pueden permanecer en Afganistán para vigilar la frontera con Pakistán
...
Las autoridades de Estados Unidos planean firmar un acuerdo con Afganistán para la permanencia por tiempo indeterminado de al menos de 25.000 soldados de EEUU en el país asiático para la vigilancia de la frontera con Pakistán, reveló hoy la prensa rusa.
No sé si ese acuerdo se prepara o no...
Goshawk escribió:Según el periódico “Kommersant”, que cita fuentes en el Departamento de Estado de EEUU,
... sobretodo si la noticia la da un medio ruso y no procede de alguna de las múltiples filtraciones gubernamentales a la prensa norteamericana.
En cualquier caso, parece claro que, independientemente de lo que pasa en Afganistán, la frontera paquistaní es un problema y un nido de terroristas extremistas. Y no es culpa de los norteamericanos o de la ISAF. En un Congress Report de marzo se pone de manifiesto que, mientras en Afganistán se avanza contra alcaedianos e imbéciles talibán, en Pakistán hay un problema con el gobierno, la oposición y la incapacidad militar paquistaní para controlar sus propios imbéciles a pesar de la cantidad de muertos entre las FF.AA y civiles paquistaníes que están provocando la lucha. Los militares paquistaníes se resisten a emplearse a fondo en la frontera Oeste, porque su enemigo de verdad -de los de toda la vida- es India. Prefieren mantener el grueso de tropas en su frontera Este.
http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/afpak-0311.pdf
"Pakistan's military immediately recognized the disaster relief imperative and shifted about 70,000 Pakistani security forces to flood relief functions. Many of these forces were already in flood-impacted areas and were re-missioned in place.The military also allocated virtually all of the air assets in the border region to flood relief, depriving them of assets that facilitate close air support and the insertion and extraction of ground forces for offensive actions. "
"the offensive military operations Pakistan had envisioned for KP and the FATA in the second half of 2010 were overtaken by events. Militants were impacted by the floods as well, so we did not observe significant offensive actions on their side, but as Pakistani forces ceased offensive operations, extremists extended their control to areas without sufficient Pakistani central government-provided security and governance."
"large elements of Pakistan's military remain committed to maintaining a ratio of Pakistani to Indian forces along the eastern border. This deprives the Pakistani COIN fight of sufficient forces to achieve its "clear" objectives and support the "hold" efforts, while encouraging pre-engagement aerial bombardment that increases the number of displaced persons, and causing available"
"Army forces to be bogged down with "hold" activities because there are insufficient trained civilian law enforcement personnel to assume that responsibility."
"Pakistani security forces remained largely static during this reporting period, generally focusing on maintaining the security of previously cleared areas in the FATA and KP 'and continuing to support flood relief operations. There were small but notable security operations in November and December in Orakzai Agency and Dir District, but no major operations."
"In January, Pakistan military and paramilitary units began Operation BREKHNA, an effort to clear militants from Mohmand Agency using 6,000 Pakistani security forces along with Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets and ISAF ground troops and fire support on the Afghanistan side of the border. This effort expanded to include some operations in neighboring Bajaur Agency. It is important to note that this is
the third time in the past 2 years that the Army has had to conduct major clearing operations in the same agency; a clear indicator of the inability of the Pakistan military and government to render cleared areas resistant to insurgent return. Similarly, Pakistan's military helicopter fleet, a key
COIN enabler, remains beset by low operational readiness rates exacerbated by Pakistani reluctance to accept U.S.-provided helicopter maintenance teams. While Phase I of BREKHNA has cleared some areas, the operation has yet to proceed to the critical "hold" and "build" phases of COIN.
Operation BREKHNA highlights a few of the recurring challenges associated with conducting COIN in Pakistan. The military originally intended the operation to be completed in a few weeks, but has since extended the timeframe into at least April. Adversoe weather, underestimated militant resistance, resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the discovery of several large caches of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have all hampered ongoing operations, but what
remains vexing is the lack of any indication of "hold" and "build" planning or staging efforts to complement ongoing clearing operations. As such, there remains no clear path toward defeating the insurgency in Pakistan, despite the unprecedented and sustained deployment of over 147,000 forces (up from around 80,000 in 2001-2003). Pakistan's security forces made tremendous human sacrifices (2,575 killed in action and over 8,500 wounded since 2001)."
"despite the success of the four Border Coordination Centers (BCC) in Afghanistan, we still have not seen a functioning BCC established on Pakistani territory (as pledged in the May 2009 joint statement of the last trilateral meeting between the United States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan) ."
... Y todo eso en un informe escrito antes de la muerte de Bin Laden. Ahora la posición paquestaní será menos colabroadora que antes.
Saludos.
PD. De cualquier manera, no hay problema, Karzai ya ha dicho que el Ejército afgano estará preparado para defender su territorio tras la marcha de los norteamericanos. In Afghan We Trust..., según Karzai.
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=13901697
Si dejamos a Karzai que controle algo, démoslo por perdido.
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