110. On 27 March at 20:07 the Italian Naval Fleet Command (CINCNAV) made a call to the Rome MRCC
where the boat in distress was discussed. Importantly, the CINCNAV officer confirms that a military vessel
under NATO command was located around 11 miles away from the boat in distress: the Spanish naval
vessel Méndez Núñez.
111. Given the Méndez Núñez’s distance from the boat, it seems that it could have reached the boat in
distress in less than two hours. It remains unclear why NATO, or the Méndez Núñez itself, failed to provide
this information to the Rome MRCC following the launch of the distress alert. What is clear is that no attempt
was made by the Spanish vessel to approach the boat. Furthermore, the Méndez Núñez is a naval vessel
with the capacity to carry a helicopter. If it had a helicopter on board it would have been an even simpler
operation to check on the boat in distress.
112. During the above-mentioned telephone conversation between the CINCNAV and the Rome MRCC,
shortly after referring to the Méndez Núñez, mention is made of the Italian vessel ITS Etna as being within
the specified region as well as the ITS Borsini. In information provided by NATO, it is confirmed that the ITS
Borsini was 37 nautical miles away, but that the ITS Etna was much further away (155 miles). The presence
of an Italian naval vessel within the specified region could provide a link to the origin of the water and biscuits
dropped by the helicopter to the boat in distress. The ITS Borsini has a helicopter capacity. More information
is needed from the authorities to establish whether or not this vessel was aware or involved in the incident.
113. It also transpires from the aforementioned conversation between the Rome MRCC and the
CINCNAV officer that the CINCNAV officer left it to NATO to deal with its own assets which were “the
nearest of all in absolute terms”.
114. It is not clear whether the NATO vessel located at 24 miles from the boat was the Méndez Núñez, or
another military vessel. It can be noted that 24 miles is a relatively close sailing distance. Indeed, I was told
by the Malta MRCC that when organising a Search and Rescue operation they look for assets in a 100-mile
radius. As one NATO official said: “it would have been a piece of cake” to sail to the boat.
115. NATO officials have confirmed in a meeting, in follow-up written communications, as well as in
several press briefings, that NATO’s operations are fully aware of their international maritime law
responsibilities. Their active involvement in a number of SAR operations during this period resulted in the
saving of hundreds of lives. This is clear evidence of their general readiness to assist when and as
required.27 Yet despite this understanding of international maritime law rules and a willingness to save lives
at sea, no asset known to be close to the boat headed to its rescue.
116. According to NATO, the contents of the message they received from the Rome MRCC in the
evening of 27 March were unclear. NATO told us that the message was not sent in the required format,
standardised for ease of comprehension, and that it was therefore not a clear distress call requesting specific
action. NATO specified that the message’s text “did not convey a sense of seriousness or urgency”.
117. Whilst the indication that the vessel was in difficulty appears to be clear, the message does not
request any prompt specific action and the word “DISTRESS” is not used. The Malta MRCC also commented
on the nature of the alert, saying that there was no specific query as to availability of assets.
118. This possible lack of clarity on the alert level is not seen in the Inmarsat-C Enhanced Group Call
(EGC) launched by Rome (27 March 2011 at 19:54), which clearly indicated the alert’s priority as
“DISTRESS”. The Hydrolant Warning Message launched on 28 March at 06:06 specifically stated that the
persons were in need of assistance, requesting all vessels in the vicinity to keep a sharp lookout and to
“ASSIST IF POSSIBLE.”
119. It is my understanding that the messages were sufficiently clear to indicate that action was
necessary and that they should not be ignored. If authorities were considering not intervening because of the
lack of clarity, asking for clarification from the Italian border guards would have been the most appropriate
step to take.
120. In order to understand the situation better, I wrote to the Ministry of Defence of Spain with respect to
the Méndez Núñez and to NATO with respect to the ITS Etna (which I was informed was under NATO
command) seeking the following information:
– The specific location of the Méndez Núñez and thand the ITS Etna at the time of the Rome MRCC’s fax
alert to NATO, as well as the logs of their respective aircrafts/helicopters;
– The name and nationality of the military vessel located at around 24 miles from the boat;
– The details of any communications between NATO Naples Headquarters and the Méndez Núñez
and the ITS Etna, and also the vessel 24 miles away. Most importantly, I am attempting to ascertain
the specific considerations and decision-making processes that led to these vessels taking no action.
121. On 8 March 2012, I received a reply from the Spanish Minister of Defence assuring me that the
Méndez Núñez “never had any contact at all with [the] vessel adrift” and that it “never was at the distance of
11 nautical miles” referred to in my letter. Furthermore, the Ministry added that “this frigate did not receive any fax from MRCC Rome or any other communication” regarding the matter mentioned in my letter. Finally,
the Ministry underlined that the helicopter from the frigate “did not overfly, and consequently had no chance
to provide any assistance to the boat”.
122. While I was aware that the Rome MRCC did not contact the military vessels directly, I have to
conclude that NATO Naples Headquarters did receive the distress fax. Whether they passed it on to vessels
operating under its command is unclear and contradictory. NATO confirms to me that they did while the
Spanish authorities contradict this saying that they did not receive the message. I also have difficulties in
understanding how the Méndez Núñez, and other vessels could not have received the general Inmarsat and
Hydrolant distress messages which were sent to all vessels in the area.
123. The letter from the Spanish Minister of Defence, while stating that the Méndez Núñez was never at a
distance of 11 nautical miles from the boat, does not provide me with its exact position. It is highly likely that
it was nevertheless extremely close to the boat.
124. Without full information on this matter it is difficult to conclude on the responsibility of NATO or boats
under national command. It is, however, clear to me that there was a failure by NATO to react to the distress
signals. Bearing in mind that the Italian MRCC had no independent way of identifying military vessels in the
area or having direct contact with them, it was up to NATO to take action. Furthermore, the helicopter that
went to the aid of the boat and then disappeared had to be attached to some naval vessel. No explanation
has come forward from any quarter recognising the role of the helicopter or explaining the lack of follow-up to
its mission, including the lack of communication with the MRCC about this flight.
129. NATO’s extensive presence in the region seems to have been planned and implemented with
insufficient consideration of search and rescue structures. I understand that the Rome MRCC did not
consider that its SAR responsibilities extended to military vessels operating under NATO command. When
informed of the Méndez Núñez’s location, the Rome MRCC concluded that it must have received the
Inmarsat-C alert, but stopped short of taking further specific action.
138. The helicopter must almost certainly have come from a ship. From the information I gathered, I can
state that at least two military ships under NATO or national command were in close proximity to the boat at
the time the distress call was made. These boats were the Spanish ship Méndez Núñez and the Italian ship
ITS Borsini; both have aircraft facilities, which means that they are capable of launching helicopters.
139. As noted above, NATO’s written reply to my letter of 8 December states that “based on a review of
existing records in NATO operational headquarters, there is no record of any aircraft or ship under NATO
command having seen or made contact with the small boat in question”.
140. In the light of the information I have received concerning the whereabouts of the Méndez Núñez, the
ITS Etna, I have sent a further letter to NATO and Spain asking for information on the precise location of
these boats and the detailed logs of their respective helicopters. As stated above, the Spanish Minister of
Defence replied to me that the helicopter from the Méndez Núñez “did not overfly, and consequently had no
chance to provide any assistance to the boat”. NATO replied, as already mentioned, that the ITS Etna was
not in the region but that the ITS Borsini was 37 miles away. No mention is made in this reply of the
helicopter activities or rescue activities of the ITS Borsini.
147. The United Kingdom and the United States have not yet replied to my letters.
110. On 27 March at 20:07 the Italian Naval Fleet Command (CINCNAV) made a call to the Rome MRCC where the boat in distress was discussed. Importantly, the CINCNAV officer confirms that a military vessel
under NATO command was located around 11 miles away from the boat in distress: the Spanish naval vessel Méndez Núñez.
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